Information security research: External hacking, insider breach, and profound technologies by Li, Yuanxiang
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2017
Information security research: External hacking,
insider breach, and profound technologies
Yuanxiang Li
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Behavioral Neurobiology Commons, Databases and Information Systems Commons,
and the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Li, Yuanxiang, "Information security research: External hacking, insider breach, and profound technologies" (2017). Graduate Theses
and Dissertations. 15566.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/15566
 Information security research:  External hacking, insider breach, and profound 
technologies 
 
 
by 
 
Yuanxiang John Li 
(Yuanxiang Li) 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
Major: Business and Technology (Information Systems) 
 
Program of Study Committee: 
Elizabeth Hoffman, Co-major Professor 
Dan Zhu, Co-major Professor 
James A. Davis 
Zhengrui Jiang 
Huaiqing Wu 
Sunanda Roy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Iowa State University 
 
Ames, Iowa 
 
2017 
 
 
Copyright © Yuanxiang John Li, 2017. All rights reserved.  
ii 
DEDICATION 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my families, especially my wife, Yang Cui, for their 
continuous support.  They are my ultimate motivation to pursue my doctoral degree and finish 
this dissertation. 
 
  
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ ii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................................. v 
 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... vi 
 
CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 
 
CHAPTER 2.  UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC VS. INTERNATIONAL INTRUSION 
BEHAVIORS: A GAME-THEORETICAL MODEL .................................................................... 5 
2.1.  Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 5 
2.2.  Review of the Literature ..................................................................................................... 7 
2.3.  The Basic Bayesian Game Model ..................................................................................... 11 
2.4.  The Continuous-Type Hacker Bayesian Game Model ..................................................... 18 
2.5.  Bayesian Game with Learning of External Signal ............................................................ 24 
2.6.  Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 28 
 
CHAPTER 3.  INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY COMPLIANCE:  DESIGN AN 
INCENTIVE STRUCTURE TO PREVENT INSIDER DATA BREACHES ............................. 31 
3.1.  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 31 
3.2.  Review of the Literature ................................................................................................... 35 
3.2.1.  Human factors in information security and a firm’s economics ................................ 35 
3.2.2.  The principal-agent dilemma in the information security context ............................. 37 
3.2.3.  Employees cooperation for firm’s information security ............................................ 39 
3.3.  Theoretical Argument and Core Hypotheses .................................................................... 41 
3.3.1.  Rational choice theory ............................................................................................... 42 
3.3.2.  Collective sanction ..................................................................................................... 44 
3.3.3.  Complete and incomplete information about monitoring .......................................... 47 
3.4.  Research Methodology and Experimental Design ............................................................ 48 
3.4.1.  Scenario-based security compliance measurement .................................................... 48 
3.4.2.  Real dollar treatment vs. perceived treatment............................................................ 50 
3.4.3.  Experimental design................................................................................................... 51 
3.5.  Data Collection and Analysis............................................................................................ 54 
3.5.1.  Participants ................................................................................................................. 54 
3.5.2.  Data collection ........................................................................................................... 55 
3.5.3.  Experimental procedure ............................................................................................. 57 
3.5.4.  Data-analysis procedure ............................................................................................. 59 
3.6.  Experimental Results and Discussions ............................................................................. 61 
3.6.1.  Experiment 1 and discussions .................................................................................... 62 
3.6.2.  Experiment 2 and discussions .................................................................................... 66 
 
iv 
3.6.3.  Experiment 3 and discussions .................................................................................... 69 
3.6.4.  Experiment 4 and discussions .................................................................................... 73 
3.7.  Robustness, Demographic and Personal Characteristic Variables ................................... 79 
3.8.  Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations...................................................................... 84 
 
CHAPTER 4.  THE APPLICATION OF BLOCKCHAIN IN ADVANCING  
INFORMATION SECURITY ...................................................................................................... 88 
4.1.  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 88 
4.2.  The Theory of Bounded Rationality and Information Security Defense .......................... 89 
4.3.  Motivations and Incentives for Data Breaches ................................................................. 90 
4.4.  The Value of Currency and the Value of Digital Assets .................................................. 93 
4.5.  Blockchain and a New Way to do Bookkeeping .............................................................. 94 
4.6.  Blockchain and its First Application, Bitcoin ................................................................... 95 
4.7.  Blockchain and Its Properties ........................................................................................... 99 
4.8.  Blockchain Helps Prevent External Hackers .................................................................. 101 
4.9.  Blockchain Helps Reduce Insider Breach ....................................................................... 106 
4.10.  Concerns of Blockchain ................................................................................................ 108 
4.11.  Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 109 
 
CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................ 112 
 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 112 
 
APPENDIX A.  30 SCENARIOS FOR INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY  
VIOLATIONS ............................................................................................................................ 126 
 
APPENDIX B.  EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS ................................................................... 130 
 
APPENDIX C.  DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN ....................................................... 136 
 
APPENDIX D.  BRIEF QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DEMOGRAPHIC AND PERSONAL 
CHARACTERISTIC VARIABLES ........................................................................................... 141 
 
APPENDIX E.  TIME SERIES AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL (AR=1)  
DATA-ANALYSIS RESULT .................................................................................................... 144 
 
APPENDIX F.  SUMMARY OF KEY NOTATIONS ............................................................... 147 
 
APPENDIX G.  IRB APPROVAL LETTERS AND CONSENT FORM.................................. 148 
 
  
v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my committee chairs, Dr. Elizabeth Hoffman and Dr. Dan Zhu, as 
well as my committee members, Dr. James A. Davis, Dr. Zhengrui Jiang, Dr. Huaiqing Wu, and 
Dr. Sunanda Roy, for their guidance and support throughout the course of this research. 
 
In addition, I would also like to thank my friends, colleagues, the department faculty and 
staff for making my time at Iowa State University a wonderful experience.  Particularly, I would 
like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Kenneth J. Koehler, Dr. William Q. Meeker, Dr. Helle 
Bunzel, Dr. Haiyang Feng, Dr. Linlin Chai, Dr. Inmyung Choi, and Yang He, for their generous 
help of improving this dissertation.  I also want to offer my appreciation to those who were 
willing to participate in my studies, without whom, this dissertation would not have been 
possible. 
  
vi 
ABSTRACT 
 
Information assets are one of the most valuable intangible productive capital for a 
company to compete with its rivals, to learn consumers’ shopping habits, to guide its 
development directions, and to standout to retain its profitability.  However, with the Internet’s 
characteristic of pervasiveness, information breaches from both external hacking and internal 
corruption are continuously encroaching a company’s economic profit.  This dissertation consists 
of three studies where each study investigates the different aspects of information security, and it 
is aimed to address the growing concern of securing a company’s information assets.  The first 
study examines the external hackers’ behaviors and models a Bayesian game between a firm and 
two discrete types of hackers (domestic and international) based on the framework of Inspection 
Game.  This study explains why external hackings, especially the international ones, are hard to 
prevent effectively.  The second study is an empirical work and explores the other side of 
information security data breach, which is mainly due to insiders’ (e.g., employee) malicious 
deeds or noncompliance with information security policy.  This study shows that individual 
reward and punishment together with 100% detection is the best incentive structure to reduce 
insider data breaches.  In addition, the second study finds that individual reward is more effective 
than individual punishment, which can better explain why employees are more willing to spend 
time to comply with security policy when a reward is present.  Lastly, the third study is a 
conceptual work and relies on the Theory of Bounded Rationality to discuss how the Blockchain 
technology can undermine the motivations of both external and internal intruders in order to 
prevent information breaches.  Overall, this dissertation discusses the current issues of hacking, 
constructs a payment/incentive structure to regulate noncompliance, empirically tests the validity 
vii 
of the proposed structure, points out a solution to advance information security defense, and 
provides some managerial recommendations to practitioners. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
With the rapid development of Information Technology, comes numerous opportunities 
for corporations to grow, but also exposes those corporations to an increasing number of 
potential risks caused by data breaches.  According to The New York Times report on October 7th 
2016, the U.S. government formally accused the Russian government of stealing and disclosing 
emails from the Democratic National Committee and a range of other institutions and prominent 
individuals in order to interfere with the U.S. presidential election process (Sanger and Savage 
2016).  If hackers could manipulate the country’s presidential election, what else can they do?  It 
constitutes a huge threat to the national security system.  Meanwhile, a large number of 
organizations’ databases are constantly comprised by external and internal intruders.  Hence, this 
three-essay dissertation examines the information security issues from both outside hacking and 
inside employee non-compliance including intentional and unintentional.  Moreover, the third 
essay of this dissertation focuses on the application of a disruptive technology, Blockchain, in 
advancing information security defense.  As a whole, this dissertation discusses the current 
issues of hacking, constructs a payment/incentive structure to regulate noncompliance, 
empirically tests the validity of the proposed structure, points out a solution to advance 
information security defense, and provides some managerial recommendations to practitioners.   
 
The first study examines the external hackers’ behaviors and models a Bayesian game 
between a firm and two discrete types of hackers (domestic and international) based on the 
framework of Inspection Game.  Pure Strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibriums (PSBNEs) are 
derived.  Then, the continuous-type of hackers is extended to the basic model, and its PSBNEs 
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are also presented.  Additionally, the paper incorporates information derived from external 
signals (e.g., newspapers or other media channels) to update the firm’s prior beliefs of hacker 
types over time.  The paper finds that a firm could prevent some domestic hackings but not 
effectively prevent international hackings.  This is due to the cost of investigating data breaches 
by hackers in distant countries, as well as the perception by international hackers that they have a 
low risk of prosecution.  Interestingly, there are some circumstances in which a firm will even 
choose to give up an investigation to avoid costs under the hackers’ choice of hackings, no 
matter how severe a punishment it can impose.  Moreover, when a firm observes a strong signal 
of domestic hackings in recent months, the firm will be able to effectively thwart some domestic 
hackers by imposing more severe penalties on them.   
 
The second study is an empirical work and based on Hu et al. (2015) JMIS paper.  It 
explores the other side of information security data breach, which is mainly due to the 
employees’ noncompliance and ignorance of information security policy.  This study aims to 
design and identify an incentive structure to better regulate the insider data breaches.  Firstly, it 
examines how extrinsic incentives, Reward and Punishment, could help to enhance employees’ 
compliant behavior.  In addition, it also explores the impact of Collective Sanctions (Reward All 
and Punishment All) on employees’ compliance.  Due to the imperfect Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) of a company, this study further investigates how a perceived low chance of 
detection influences employees’ noncompliance.  Lastly, it studies how Collective Sanctions and 
Detection working together to mitigate employees’ noncompliant behavior.   
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Laboratory experiments with student subjects from Iowa State University were 
conducted.  Four sequential experiments to study the aforementioned factors’ impacts on 
information security policy compliance were developed.  The main result, which is very 
significant, shows that individual reward and punishment with 100% detection is the best 
incentive structure among all other combinations.  This result is in line with Andreoni et al. 
(2003, p. 901) saying “the absence of a reward is not equivalent to a punishment”, as rewards 
and punishments are complementary to each other.  Interestingly, another result shows individual 
reward is more effective than punishment, which seems to be contradictory to existing literature.  
However, paying additional rewards to motivate employees to put extra effort and time to follow 
the security policies seems to be more attractive for them compared with punishment.  This could 
be illustrated by some giant IT companies’ (like Google’s) reward-oriented welfare package.  
Additionally, another result shows that collective sanctions have a spiral-downwards impact on 
cooperative compliance when interaction between subjects was not permitted.  This result is 
consistent with the findings by Rand et al. (2009).  Lastly, as expected, the perceived low chance 
of detection reduces the positive effects of reward as well as punishment.  Hence, it is critical for 
a company to improve its IDS accuracy to achieve better compliance with a properly adapted 
reward and punishment incentive mechanism.   
 
The third study is a conceptual work and introduces the breakthrough idea, Blockchain, 
the first native digital medium for securely transferring value over the Internet (Tapscott and 
Tapscott 2016).  Furthermore, it relies on the Theory of Bounded Rationality to discuss how 
Blockchain technology can undermine the motivations of intruders in order to prevent 
information breaches.  Particularly, it focuses on preventing intruders’ monetary-gain motivation 
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from cashing out the stolen information assets, as such assets cannot be sold without 
appropriately transferring their ownership on the Blockchain ecosystems.  This study further 
illustrates how the properties of distributed mechanism and immutability of Blockchain can 
greatly improve current information security defense against external hackers’ attacks.  In 
addition, since each unit of the content digitally stored on the Blockchain network can be 
programmed and auto-executed by the smart contract, and such execution is autonomous without 
middle parties, the properties of computational logic and peer-to-peer transmission thus can 
greatly prevent insider data breaches including both unintentional and intentional ones.  Overall, 
the third study demonstrates how Blockchain can help to assist and advance information security 
defense. 
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CHAPTER 2.  UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC VS. INTERNATIONAL INTRUSION 
BEHAVIORS: A GAME-THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
The Internet has greatly benefited humanity by providing limitless and immediate 
information, communication, entertainment, and e-commerce to individuals, corporations, 
educational institutions, nonprofit organizations, and governments worldwide.  Advances in 
technology have spawned gigabit networks, dramatically reducing the “virtual distance” between 
people and organizations.  However, as the Internet has no borders and few regulations, its dark 
sides have been gradually revealed over time, especially with accelerated speed, making distance 
irrelevant (e.g., via mobile devices, LTE, etc.).  The increasing globalizing influence of the 
Internet facilitates cross-business interconnectivity as well as data accessibility. However, it also 
brings a consequent increase in network vulnerability.   
 
More and more aggressive hackings have occurred in recent decades.  In fact, according 
to The New York Times, the F.B.I. ranks cybercrime as one of its top law enforcement activities, 
and the U.S. government has sharply increased its security budget to $14 billion (Granville 
2015).  In 2014, unknown hackers unlawfully obtained private photos of dozens of celebrities 
through the iCloud online storage service of Apple, Inc., violating the celebrities’ privacy and 
shaking consumer confidence in Apple, Inc.’s network security, and online privacy in general.  
Also in 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment was hacked by an unknown group, "Guardians of 
Peace," believed to be North Korean (Sanger et al. 2014).  More recently, it was reported that 
some of President Obama’s email correspondence was accessed by Russian hackers (Schmidt 
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and Sanger 2015).  Hence, we cannot help wondering why firms, as well as government entities, 
are constantly facing cyberattacks. Is there an effective way to prevent hacking, and how can 
firms strategically respond to hackers?   
 
The fact that countless hacking intrusions and destructive cyberattacks occurred in recent 
years without effective defenses from either business sectors or governments indicates that 
information security not only remains a crucial topic in information systems research, but is also 
essentially relevant to practices.  A great deal of literature has been devoted to examining social 
norms and behavioral theories to explain how to prevent intrusion, especially that caused by 
internal staff.  However, due to the limited availability of security data (e.g., number and extent 
of incidents), few new insights have been gained in recent years – certainly not sufficient to 
explain the increasing aggressiveness of hackers for the purposes of stealing trade secrets as well 
as political information.  In fact, intrusion behavior is rarely studied through behavioral theories, 
because firms are afraid to release their security breach information and damage their brand 
equity.  Without access to specific data on information security breaches, game theory becomes 
the logical approach to study the interplays between firms and hackers.  It provides powerful 
tools that allow us to model a sophisticated hacker who knows how to gain access as well as 
what defense strategies are used by a firm, and can adjust his attack strategies accordingly.  
Though game theory has been frequently criticized by psychologists for its assumptions (e.g., 
rationality), it is still one of the most useful approaches to studying the interaction phenomena to 
predict the steady stage of game between players, without full details.  Moreover, abstract 
modeling permits game theory to explain a set of phenomena, rather than merely isolated 
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incidents.  This more complete picture can enhance our ability to understand why cyber-
intrusions are so pervasive.   
 
In this study, we proposed a Bayesian game for modeling intrusion behavior to capture 
the interplay between a hacker’s intrusion and a firm’s subsequent investigation.  Particularly, 
we differentiated international hackers from domestic ones to explain the increasing number of 
international hackings.  We further incorporated the external “signals” (e.g., newspaper reports) 
which organizations may use to adjust their best response strategies to different types of hackers.  
The results of our model caution the firm that it is unlikely to prevent international hackings and 
should conserve its resources to avoid futile spending.  Fortunately, under certain conditions, a 
firm could effectively deter domestic hackings to minimize losses.   
 
2.2.  Review of the Literature 
Our work is closely related to Cavusoglu et al. (2005).  They constructed a Nash game 
with complete information based on the framework of Inspection Game in econometric literature 
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).  In their paper, the firm is modeled as “the principal” to choose 
“Investigate” or “Not Investigate,” and hackers are “the agent” to choose “Hack” or “Not Hack.”  
The hacker gains a benefit if intrusion occurs without the firm’s inspections; otherwise, the 
hacker receives a penalty when the firm investigates the transaction activities.  Additionally, the 
firm must pay the cost of labor for the investigation, but could save a fraction of damage 
prevented or recovered when an intrusion is detected.  Cavusoglu et al. (2005) found a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium which is the probability profile for the firm to investigate and the 
hacker to hack.  However, as debated in game theory literature, mixed- strategy equilibrium is 
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difficult to interpret, since it implies that both the firm and the hacker commit themselves to 
using a random device to play the game (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994).  
 
In reality, hackers often strategically choose those targets which are easy to break into or 
which yield a better payoff, although a firm may have no idea when and how the intrusion will 
occur for a single play of an incident (Cremonini and Nizovtsev 2009).  Hence, in our model we 
focus on pure-strategy Nash equilibriums, rather than mixed-strategy equilibriums.  Additionally, 
to our knowledge, the existing literature (Alpcan and Basar 2006; Bloem et al. 2006; 
Çakanyıldırım et al. 2009; Cavusoglu et al. 2005; Lin et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2006; Nguyen et al. 
2009; Patcha and Park 2004) arbitrarily treat all hackers equally, which is not accurate in our 
virtual world.   
 
As aforementioned, advancing Internet technology brings people much closer than 
before, and hacking overseas becomes a commonplace activity.  In fact, The New York Times 
reported that since 2013, an international cybercriminal group has stolen up to $1 billion from 
more than 100 banking and financial institutions in 30 different countries around the world.  
More concerning, these cyberattacks continued for two years without detection by banks, 
regulators, or law enforcement (Sanger and Perlroth 2015).  As hackers come from different 
geographical regions, the level of control over such attacks varies accordingly.  Furthermore, 
equipped with sophisticated technology (e.g., IP masking, anonymous surfing, etc.), hackers can 
hide their IP addresses from detection, which increases the difficulty of being caught by firms.  
In other words, there is no effective deterrent due to the increased difficulty in identifying and 
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stopping hackers.  Therefore, we proposed a novel model differentiating international hackers 
from domestic ones, to illustrate the distinct intrusion behaviors of each group.   
 
The broader area of this paper falls under non-cooperative games in the concept of 
econometric literature (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).  In the context of cyber-security, much 
research has been done in computer science as well as computer engineering communities.  Liu 
et al. (2006) also built their model based on inspection games and examined the interaction 
between pairs of attacking and defending nodes, using a Bayesian formulation.  Each node of a 
flat ad hoc network was treated either as malicious and regular users or defenders of network 
administrators.  Furthermore, they developed dynamic Bayesian game intrusion-detection 
algorithms and designed a hybrid detection mechanism.  Their paper aims to increase the 
precision of intrusion detection as well as the energy efficiency of defenders.  Our paper differs 
from their research in considering the business components (i.e., costs of monitoring intrusions, 
costs of investigation, costs of lawsuits, investment of time, etc.) and different impacts of distinct 
types of hackers.   
 
In addition, Patcha and Park (2004) modeled intrusion detection in mobile ad-hoc 
networks by adapting the signaling game in the multi-stage dynamic non-cooperation 
frameworks.  Alpcan and Basar (2006) modeled the interactions between malicious attackers and 
their targets’ intrusion detection systems using a stochastic (Markov) game.  They captured the 
operation of the intrusion- detection sensor system using a finite-state Markov chain and naïve 
Q-learning (Bertsekas et al. 1995) to find the best strategies. Nguyen et al. (2009) adopted the 
“fictitious play” game framework to model the interplay between hackers and defenders as a 
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sequence of a non-zero game.  Lin et al. (2009) viewed the interactive behavior between the 
hacker and the defender as information warfare and developed a tree diagram based on game 
theory.  In spite of the complex games used in previous literature, those researchers only focused 
on the classifications of malicious and regular users, as well as evaluating the defensive 
mechanisms of systems.  They did not consider the large number of hackers nor the diversity in 
their intrusion behaviors.   
 
From the cost perspective, Bloem et al. (2006) developed an algorithm for optimal 
allocation of a system administrator’s time available for responding to attacks, based on a non-
cooperative non-zero sum game.  Çakanyıldırım et al. (2009) examined the investigation costs, 
damage, and occurrence probabilities of intrusion in the presence of multiple alarm types.  
Nevertheless, they did not differentiate the impact of different types of hackers nor consider the 
differences in the costs of preventing intrusions.   
 
The following section presents our basic Bayesian game model, and the Pure Strategy 
Bayesian Nash Equilibriums (PSBNEs), as well as our insights, are provided.  In section 4, a 
more general Bayesian game is characterized. In section 5, a Bayesian game with learning of 
external signals is constructed.  We interpret the PSBNEs, particularly when switching strategies 
under certain conditions of the signal effects in comparison with the basic model.  Finally, we 
present our conclusions in section 6.   
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2.3.  The Basic Bayesian Game Model 
Abstracted from real-life scenarios, especially from newspaper reports, we assume that 
hackers comprise two types – 𝜃𝐻 = {𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐, 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙} – which reflects the modern 
trend of both geographical types of hackings.  Both types of hackers can choose to Hack (H) or 
Not Hack (NH).  Therefore, the hacker’s strategy space is: 𝑆𝐻 = {(𝐻,𝐻),
(𝐻,𝑁𝐻), (𝑁𝐻,𝐻), (𝑁𝐻,𝑁𝐻)}, where the first element of the pair is the strategic action chosen 
by Domestic hackers, and the second element is the strategic action chosen by International 
hackers.  Meanwhile, the firm can choose to Investigate (I) or Not Investigate (NI).  
Accordingly, the firm’s strategy space is 𝑆𝐹 = {𝐼, 𝑁𝐼}.  The payoff matrices for both players with 
two types of hackers are given in Table 1: 
 
Table 1.(a) Payoff of 𝜽𝑯 = 𝑫𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄 
 H NH 
I (−𝑐𝐷 − (1 − 𝜙)𝑑, 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷) (−𝑐, 0) 
NI (−𝑑, 𝜇) (0, 0) 
 
Table 1.(b) Payoff of 𝛉𝐇 = 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 
 H NH 
I (−𝑐𝐼 − (1 − 𝜙)𝑑, 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼) (−𝑐, 0) 
NI (−𝑑, 𝜇) (0, 0) 
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As shown in Table 1, the firm pays 𝑐, where 𝑐 > 0, for the cost of monitoring one 
incident, and 𝑐 may be sufficiently small, depending on the policies employed by the firm (e.g., 
fully automated monitoring, manual monitoring, or semi-automated monitoring).  It costs the 
firm 𝑐𝐷 and 𝑐𝐼 to investigate an intrusion caused by a domestic and international hacker, 
respectively.  The aggregate investigation cost 𝑐𝐷 and 𝑐𝐼 includes the monitoring cost (i.e., 𝑐), 
payment to investigators, efforts spent to catch hackers after hackers were detected, etc.  The 
investigation of an international hacking is complex and time-consuming, so it is understandable 
that it is also much more costly than that of a domestic hacking (i.e., 𝑐𝐼 ≫ 𝑐𝐷 ≫ 𝑐).  In addition, 
successfully investigating an international cyberattack almost always requires assistance from the 
government, e.g., the F.B.I.   
 
For example, Anthem, one of the nation’s largest health insurers, was penetrated in 
January 2015 by hackers who gained the personal information, including Social Security 
numbers, of 80 million Anthem customers and employees (Mathews and Yadron 2015).  Anthem 
hired F.B.I. cyber-experts and the cyber-security firm, Mandiant, to help investigate the 
intrusion, and it took several months to identify the hackers’ origins (China).  The cost of the 
investigation was massive.  Furthermore, we denote that damage to the firm by an undetected 
intrusion is 𝑑 > 0.  It varies among different firms and can be estimated in the risk assessment 
from a firm’s IT department.  Additionally, through the investigation process, a firm may be able 
to recover a portion of the value of the damage caused by intrusions.  For example, a firm can 
hire technology experts to recover at least partial data from the hard drives which were 
compromised by hackers.  Therefore, we denote the fraction of damage recovered by an 
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investigation process as 𝜙, where 𝜙 ∈ [0,1].  𝜙 could be obtained from a consulting firm’s IT 
department or external technology experts, based on historical cases.   
 
Suppose in one incident, a hacker gains the benefit 𝜇 from breaching the firm’s database 
without being caught, where 𝜇 > 0.  It is reasonable to assume 𝜇 is the same with either domestic 
or international hackers. In addition, the cost of a hacker intrusion is the same with different 
attacked firms, since we consider only one type of firm (e.g., the equal level of defender 
systems).  If the intrusion is detected, domestic and international hackers incur the expected 
penalty of 𝛽𝐷 and 𝛽𝐼, respectively.  The expected penalty 𝛽𝐷 and 𝛽𝐼 mainly refers to legal 
prosecution, but also could be social humiliation.   
 
Because of the difficulty in catching and prosecuting international cybercriminals, the 
expected penalty on a domestic hacker is much heavier than that on an international one 
(i.e., 𝛽𝐷 ≫ 𝛽𝐼 > 0), although the publicly stated penalty could be the same for both types of 
hackers (e.g., imprisonment).  For instance, the F.B.I announced rewards of up to $100,000 for 
information leading to the arrest of five international hackers (Bisson 2013).  Accordingly, the 
net benefits of hackers to attack and be detected is 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 and 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 for domestic and 
international hackers, respectively.  In contrast to Cavusoglu et al. (2005), we put no further 
restrictions on 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 or 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼, since 𝜇 could be quite large.  As mentioned earlier, $1 billion 
from 100 banking and financial institutions was stolen by hackers, but few of them have been 
arrested.  Hackers, especially international ones, know that they are unlikely to be caught; 
therefore, arbitrarily assuming 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 ≤ 0 and 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 ≤ 0 is not realistic.   
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Let 𝑞 be the prior of the firm to believe that the hackers are domestic and, thus, 1 − 𝑞 is 
the firm’s belief that the hackers are international.  This prior 𝑞 can be easily obtained from the 
firm’s historical intrusion data by reviewing the percentage of domestic hackings over all 
detected intrusions.  We model both the firm and the hackers as strategically choosing their 
actions simultaneously, at a given point in time.  Figure 1 illustrates the extensive form of our 
basic Bayesian game.  In the figure, the hacker’s type is the hacker’s private information, and 
“Nature” determines the type of hackers.  The firm does not know which specific type of hackers 
it is facing, since the firm is in a single information set.  Both payoffs of the firm and the hackers 
are common knowledge.  The objective of both the firm and the hackers is to maximize their 
expected payoffs.  To solve the game, its normal form is also given in Table 2.   
 
 
Figure 1. Extensive Form of Basic Bayesian Game 
 
𝑁 
Hackers: Domestic Hackers: International 
𝑞 1 − 𝑞 
H NH NH H 
Firms 
I NI I I I NI NI NI 
(−𝑐𝐷 − (1 − 𝜙)𝑑, 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷) 
(−𝑑, 𝜇) (−𝑐, 0) (0,  0) 
(−𝑐𝐼 − (1 − 𝜙)𝑑, 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼) 
(−𝑑,  𝜇) (−𝑐,  0) (0,  0) 
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Table 2. Normal Form of Two Types of Hackers Bayesian Game 
 (H, H) (H, NH) (NH, H) (NH, NH) 
I (
𝑈𝐹(𝐼|𝑠𝐻 = (𝐻,𝐻)),
(𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 , 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼)
) (
𝑈𝐹(𝐼|𝑠𝐻 = (𝐻,𝑁𝐻)),
(𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 , 0)
) (
𝑈𝐹(𝐼|𝑠𝐻 = (𝑁𝐻,𝑁𝐻)),
(0, 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼)
) (−𝑐, (0, 0)) 
NI (−𝑑, (𝜇, 𝜇)) (𝑞(−𝑑), (𝜇, 0)) ((1 − 𝑞)(−𝑑), (0, 𝜇)) (0, (0, 0)) 
Where, {
𝑈𝐹(𝐼|𝑠𝐻 = (𝐻,𝐻)) = 𝑞[𝑐
𝐼 − 𝑐𝐷] − [𝑐𝐼 + (1 − 𝜙)𝑑]                           
𝑈𝐹(𝐼|𝑠𝐻 = (𝐻,𝑁𝐻)) = 𝑞[𝑐 − 𝑐
𝐷 − (1 − 𝜙)𝑑] − 𝑐                                 
𝑈𝐹(𝐼|𝑠𝐻 = (𝑁𝐻,𝑁𝐻)) = 𝑞[𝑐
𝐼 − 𝑐 + (1 − 𝜙)𝑑] − [𝑐𝐼 + (1 − 𝜙)𝑑]
 
 
Solving the normal form in Table 2 yields the following Proposition 1:   
Proposition 1.  The Pure Strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibriums for the firm and two 
discrete types of hackers are as follows, where {∙, (∙,∙)} denotes the equilibrium strategy profiles, 
and the first element in the braces is the strategy action chosen by the firm, and the second one is 
for the hackers.   
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 {𝐼, (𝐻,𝐻)}, 𝑖𝑓 {
𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 > 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 > 0
𝑞 >
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝑐𝐼−𝑐𝐷
      (1) 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 {𝑁𝐼, (𝐻, 𝐻)}, 𝑖𝑓 {
𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 , 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 ∈ ℝ
𝑞 <
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝑐𝐼−𝑐𝐷
      (2) 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 {𝐼, (𝑁𝐻, 𝐻)}, 𝑖𝑓 {
𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 > 0, 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 < 0
𝑞 >
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑−𝑐
      (3) 
 
Proposition 1 provides us three distinct strategy profiles which the firm and the hackers 
adopted in the steady stage.  PSBNE (1) indicates that if the penalties in relation to the hackers’ 
benefits are not heavy enough (𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 > 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 > 0), and the firm believes that there are large 
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enough proportions (𝑞 >
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝑐𝐼−𝑐𝐷
) of domestic hackers, the firm will choose to investigate and the 
hackers will certainly choose to hack for better payoff.  PSBNE (2) shows that if the firm 
perceives that the proportion of domestic hackers is small enough (𝑞 <
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝑐𝐼−𝑐𝐷
), the firm will 
choose to not investigate, no matter which type of hackers and which penalty/benefit parameters.   
 
This counterintuitive finding can be explained as follows: When the deterrents are severe 
(𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 < 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 < 0), hackers firstly choose to not hack to avoid negative net benefits; then 
the firm secondly stops investigating intrusion behaviors due to its cost 𝑐.  Next, the hackers will 
again choose to attack.  Eventually, the steady strategy for both players is {𝑁𝐼, (𝐻, 𝐻)}.  Finally, 
PSBNE (3) matches our intuitions.  When only international hackers can enjoy positive net 
benefit, they will choose to hack, but domestic hackers will stop hacking to avoid their negative 
net benefit; meanwhile, the firm will choose to investigate when it believes there are large 
enough numbers (𝑞 >
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑−𝑐
) of domestic hackers.  There may be several temporary stages in 
the game when hackers will choose to not hack and the firm’s investigations are in vain, but 
those stages are not stable as the game is being played by both rational players.  According to 
Rational Expectations Theory (Muth 1961), both the firm and the hackers will be stuck in the 
aforementioned pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibriums and will have no incentives to deviate.   
 
Cavusoglu et al. (2005) assumed that the firm’s cost to investigate is not higher than the 
retrieved benefits under the detected intrusion.  However, in our model, we relax this assumption 
and allow 𝑐𝐼 − 𝜙𝑑 and 𝑐𝐷 − 𝜙𝑑 to be any real number.  Hence, the cost of investigating both 
domestic and international hackers could be greater or less than the firm’s retrieved benefits 
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from the detected damage.  In some situations, the firm’s retrieved benefits from detection can be 
greater than its investigation cost, especially when the damage is easy to recover and the hackers 
are easy to catch.  On the other hand, the firm has to chase hackers due to the pressure from 
customers and legal requirements, even though their investigation costs could be enormous.  
Like the aforementioned Anthem case, retrieved value from the damage is much smaller than the 
resources Anthem spent on the investigations.  
 
The corollary below follows from Proposition 1: 
 
Corollary 1. The equilibriums of our intrusion-behavior game model indicate that the 
firm is unlikely to effectively prevent international hackers as long as the monitor cost 𝑐 > 0, no 
matter how severe the expected punishment.   
 
Corollary 1 provides compelling theoretical support for media reports that both firms and 
governments are constantly facing international hackings.  The firm may be able to stop a 
domestic cyberattack if the number of domestic hackers is large enough (𝑞 >
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑−𝑐
) and the 
expected penalty is severe enough on the domestic hackers (e.g., punishments from domestic law 
enforcement).  This result delineates the boundary of the General Deterrence Theory proposed by 
Straub Jr (1990), which argues that unwanted behavior could be deterred when perceptions of 
the certainty and severity of punishment for IS misuse is increased.  For those rational domestic 
hackers who perceive the certainty and severity of punishment (i.e., expected penalty) is severe 
enough, they will choose to not hack.  However, rational international hackers will continually 
choose to hack, no matter how severe the expected penalty is.  This finding supports President 
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Obama’s recently announced cybersecurity legislative proposal that government must do more to 
support the private sector in establishing strong regulation and a better legal environment 
(Secretary 2015).   
 
Furthermore, when the cost of catching international hackers is less than the damage 
recovered from the investigation process (𝑐𝐼 − 𝜙𝑑 < 0), in spite of the firm’s beliefs of the 
hackers’ type, hackers will always choose to attack, even with the firm’s investigations, as long 
as they can gain a positive net benefit (PSBNE (1)).  By comparing the PSBNE (1) and (2), we 
can see that hackers will always choose to hack, and the firm’s decision-making depends merely 
on their prior beliefs of hackers’ types, as long as 𝑐𝐼 − 𝜙𝑑 > 0.  Another interesting finding is 
that punishment for hackers is not “the more severe, the better.”  As we can see from the process 
of obtaining PSBNE (2), severe punishment can only deter hacks temporarily, and hackers will 
continually choose to hack when firms change their strategy to not investigate.  Therefore, for 
the U.S. government to enact legislation to enhance cybersecurity, it is necessary to consider the 
firm’s cost parameters, rather than to arbitrarily set an unrealistically high standard for 
punishment.   
 
2.4.  The Continuous-Type Hacker Bayesian Game Model 
Classifying hackers as domestic and international is intuitive, but Russian and European 
hackers have distinct impacts on American firms, as well as American firms’ retaliations.  One 
critical reason for this may be diminished legal power over a great distance.  American legal 
proceedings may more easily reach Europe than Russia.  Therefore, a more general model is to 
allow hackers to have continuous type 𝜃𝐻, which can be interpreted as the “distance” between 
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the firm and the hacker.  Here, we define the “distance” as the level of difficulty involved for the 
firm to catch the hacker.  The abstract meaning of “distance” is a multi-dimensional concept, 
which is composed of the geographical distance between the firm and the hacker, the distance in 
legislative power between law enforcement and the hacker, technology barriers between an 
ordinary firm and a sophisticated hacker, and so on.   
 
Without loss of generality, we further normalize hacker’s type 𝜃𝐻 ∈ [0, 1].  We further 
assume that the cost to the firm to investigate the intrusion behaviors is a function of 𝜃𝐻, and so 
is the penalty of hackers to intrude.  Based on our definition of “distance,” it makes sense that 
with the increasing difficulty of catching hackers, the cost of investigating them will be 
increased, but the expected penalty on them will be decreased.  Therefore, let a monotone 
increasing function 𝑤(𝜃𝐻) be the total cost, including the monitor cost 𝑐, for the firm to 
investigate hackers, and another monotone decreasing function 𝑔(𝜃𝐻) be the expected penalty on 
hackers for intrusion.  In addition, we define ?̅?𝐻 as the marginal hackers, whose utilities are 
indifferent between NOT hacking and hacking.  Because 𝑔(𝜃𝐻) is monotone decreased, the 
hacker’s payoff under firm’s investigation 𝑈𝐻(𝜃𝐻|𝑠𝐹 = 𝐼) = (𝜇 − 𝑔(𝜃𝐻)|𝑠𝐹 = 𝐼) is thus a 
monotone increasing function.  As Figure 2 indicates, it will be better for hackers to not hack 
when their types are less than ?̅?𝐻, but to hack if otherwise.  Therefore, for a given type of hacker, 
there is the following payoff matrix (Table 3) and expected utilities for both the firm and the 
hackers, where 𝑓(𝜃𝐻) denotes the probability density function over the hacker’s type 𝜃𝐻 ∈ [0, 1].   
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Figure 2. Marginal Hackers 
 
Table 3. Continuous-Type Payoff Matrix 
 𝐻(𝜃𝐻) 𝑁𝐻(𝜃𝐻) 
I (−𝑤(𝜃𝐻) − (1 − 𝜙)𝑑, 𝜇 − 𝑔(𝜃𝐻)) (−𝑐, 0) 
NI (−𝑑, 𝜇) (0, 0) 
 
𝑈𝐹(𝜃𝐻|𝑠𝐹 = 𝐼) = ∫ −𝑐𝑓(𝜃𝐻) 𝑑𝜃𝐻
?̅?𝐻
0
+∫ (−𝑤(𝜃𝐻) − (1 − 𝜙)𝑑)𝑓(𝜃𝐻) 𝑑𝜃𝐻
1
?̅?𝐻
  
𝑈𝐹(𝜃𝐻|𝑠𝐹 = 𝑁𝐼) = ∫ 0𝑓(𝜃𝐻) 𝑑𝜃𝐻
?̅?𝐻
0
+∫ (−𝑑)𝑓(𝜃𝐻) 𝑑𝜃𝐻
1
?̅?𝐻
= ∫ (−𝑑)𝑓(𝜃𝐻) 𝑑𝜃𝐻
1
?̅?𝐻
 
𝑈𝐻(𝜃𝐻|𝑠𝐹 = 𝐼) = {
0,                  𝜃𝐻 ≤ ?̅?𝐻
𝜇 − 𝑔(𝜃𝐻), 𝜃𝐻 > ?̅?𝐻
 
𝑈𝐻(𝜃𝐻|𝑠𝐹 = 𝑁𝐼) = {
0, 𝜃𝐻 ≤ ?̅?𝐻
𝜇, 𝜃𝐻 > ?̅?𝐻
 
 
𝑈𝐻 (𝜃𝐻) 
0 
1 𝜃𝐻 
?̅?𝐻 
NOT Hack 
Hack 
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In order to obtain the Pure Strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibriums, we need to further 
specify the function forms for both 𝑤(𝜃𝐻) and 𝑔(𝜃𝐻).  Due to the skewed nature of the firm’s 
cost function, as well as the penalty function on the hackers, let 𝑤(𝜃𝐻) = 𝑐 + 𝛾𝑐𝜃𝐻
2  and 𝑔(𝜃𝐻) =
 𝛽 − 𝛾𝛽𝜃𝐻
2 , where 𝛾𝑐 > 0 and 𝛾𝛽 > 0.  It is worthwhile to note that 𝑐 is the monitor cost (as well 
as the minimum cost) for the firm to catch the hackers, and 𝛽 is the maximum expected penalty 
on the hackers for intrusion.  Furthermore, we assume that the hacker’s types are uniformly 
distributed between zero and one (i.e. 𝑓(𝜃𝐻) = 1).   
 
Although the hacker’s type is continuous, the game has infinite discrete strategy space.  
For notational convenience, we index ?̅?𝐻 as 0 = ?̅?𝐻
0% < ⋯ < ?̅?𝐻
𝑘 < ⋯ < ?̅?𝐻
100% = 1.  To 
illustrate, (?̅?𝐻
𝑘 ∶ 1 − ?̅?𝐻
𝑘) represents the hacker’s strategy space as (𝑁𝐻,… ,𝑁𝐻,𝐻,… ,𝐻) over the 
continuous type 𝜃𝐻 ∈ [0, 1]; in this discrete infinite set of the hacker’s strategy space, 𝑘 hackers 
will choose “NH,” and (1 − 𝑘) hackers will choose “H,” where 𝑘 is a percentage between 0% 
and 100%.  Using this newly introduced notation, we can get the normal form of the Bayesian 
game with continuous types of hackers as follows in Table 4.   
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Table 4. Normal Form of Continuous Types of Hackers Bayesian Game 
 (?̅?𝐻
0% ∶ 1 − ?̅?𝐻
0%) … (?̅?𝐻
𝑘 ∶ 1 − ?̅?𝐻
𝑘) … 
(?̅?𝐻
100% ∶ 1 −
?̅?𝐻
100%) 
I (
− [𝑐 + (1 − 𝜙)𝑑 +
1
3
𝛾𝑐] ,
(𝜇 − 𝛽 + 𝛾𝛽𝜃𝐻
2 , … , 𝜇 − 𝛽 + 𝛾𝛽𝜃𝐻
2)
) … (
𝑈𝐹(𝜃𝐻|𝑠𝐹 = 𝐼),
(0, … , 𝜇 − 𝛽 + 𝛾𝛽𝜃𝐻
2)
) … (−𝑐, (0, … ,0)) 
NI (−𝑑, (𝜇, … , 𝜇)) … 
(𝑈𝐹(𝜃𝐻|𝑠𝐹
= 𝑁𝐼), (0, … , 𝜇)) 
… (0, (0, … , 0)) 
Where, 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑈𝐹(𝜃𝐻|𝑠𝐹 = 𝐼) =
1
3
𝛾𝑐?̅?𝐻
3 + (1 − 𝜙)?̅?𝐻𝑑 − [𝑐 + (1 − 𝜙)𝑑 +
1
3
𝛾𝑐]
𝑈𝐹(𝜃𝐻|𝑠𝐹 = 𝑁𝐼) = (?̅?𝐻 − 1)𝑑
𝑈𝐻(𝜃𝐻|𝑠𝐹 = 𝐼) = {
0,                         𝜃𝐻 ≤ ?̅?𝐻
𝜇 − 𝛽 + 𝛾𝛽𝜃𝐻
2 , 𝜃𝐻 > ?̅?𝐻
𝑈𝐻(𝜃𝐻|𝑠𝐹 = 𝑁𝐼) = {
0, 𝜃𝐻 ≤ ?̅?𝐻
𝜇, 𝜃𝐻 > ?̅?𝐻
 
 
Solving the continuous type of hackers’ Bayesian game yields the following Proposition 
2: 
Proposition 2.  The Pure Strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibriums for the firm and 
continuous-type of hackers are as follows, where {∙, (∙ ∶ ∙)} denotes the equilibrium strategy 
profiles, and the first element in the braces is the strategy action chosen by the firm, and the 
second one is for hackers.  Additionally, for notational convenience, the pairs in parentheses are 
the proportions for hackers to choose NOT hack and hack, respectively.   
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 {𝐼, (0 ∶ 1)}, 𝑖𝑓 {
𝜇 > 𝛽
𝜙 >
3𝑐+𝛾𝑐
3𝑑
       (4) 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 {𝑁𝐼, (0 ∶ 1)}, 𝑖𝑓 {
𝜇 − 𝛽 ∈ ℝ
𝜙 <
3𝑐+𝛾𝑐
3𝑑
       (5) 
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𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 {𝐼, (?̅?𝐻
∗ ∶ 1 − ?̅?𝐻
∗ )}, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ?̅?𝐻
∗ = √
𝛽−𝜇
𝛾𝛽
, 𝑖𝑓
{
 
 
 
 
0 <  𝛽 − 𝜇 < 𝛾𝛽
𝜙 >
[1−(
𝛽−𝜇
𝛾𝛽
)
3
2
]𝛾𝑐+3𝑐
3[1−(
𝛽−𝜇
𝛾𝛽
)
1
2
]𝑑
  (6) 
As expected, Proposition 2 is consistent with Proposition 1, but also provides some new 
insights for the firm’s decision-making.  PSBNE (4) shows that if the firm can recover a large 
enough proportion (𝜙 >
3𝑐+𝛾𝑐
3𝑑
) of their damage, and if hackers’ benefits are greater than the 
maximum expected penalty, the firm will choose to investigate and all types of hackers will 
choose to attack.  PSBNE (5) indicates that if the firm believes their retrieved proportion of value 
over the damage is low enough (𝜙 <
3𝑐+𝛾𝑐
3𝑑
), hackers will choose to hack and the firm will give 
up investigation, no matter the hackers’ net benefits.  Although it is counterintuitive and 
implausible behavior for the firm to stop investigating, it is also irrational to spend more money 
to investigate than the value received in return.   
 
PSBNE (6) is the most interesting and useful finding.  It states that when the net expected 
penalty on hackers is in a certain range (0 <  𝛽 − 𝜇 < 𝛾𝛽), and the fraction of damage recovered 
is large enough (𝜙 > {[1 − (
𝛽−𝜇
𝛾𝛽
)
3
2
] 𝛾𝑐 + 3𝑐} 3 [1 − (
𝛽−𝜇
𝛾𝛽
)
1
2
] 𝑑⁄ ), the firm will choose to 
investigate and a proportion (?̅?𝐻
∗ = √
𝛽−𝜇
𝛾𝛽
) of hackers will choose to stop attacking.  This 
equilibrium not only instructs the firm on how to prevent intrusion behaviors with respect to 
some parameters, but also demonstrates the specific percentage of hackers the firm could deter.  
Recall the convex function form we defined for the expected penalty on hackers as 𝑔(𝜃𝐻) =
 𝛽 − 𝛾𝛽𝜃𝐻
2 , where 𝛾𝛽 can be interpreted as a deterrence decay coefficient.  The smaller the value 
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of 𝛾𝛽, the more severe the punishment on the hackers.  As we can see from the PSBNE (6), 𝛾𝛽 
cannot take the value of zero.  In other words, it is not always effective to prevent intrusion 
behavior by arbitrarily setting a super-heavy penalty, regardless of the firm’s cost parameters, 
which also confirms the previous finding in the two-type hacker’s game.   
 
Careful readers may wonder if we can allow 𝛽 − 𝜇 ≥ 𝛾𝛽, which will lead to ?̅?𝐻
∗ ≥ 1.  In 
this case, it seems that all types of hackers will choose to not hack.  But similar to the analysis of 
the two-type game, the firm will choose to stop investigating due to its cost 𝑐 > 0.  Therefore, it 
will not form a Nash equilibrium.  However, if the monitor cost (e.g., fully automated) can be 
negligible (𝑐 = 0), it is possible for the firm to prevent all hackers’ intrusions under severe 
punishment (𝛽 − 𝜇 ≥ 𝛾𝛽).  Hence, matching our intuition, the most practical advice to the firm is 
to reduce monitoring cost and increase the precision of automated detection in order to reduce 
manual detection cost.   
 
2.5.  Bayesian Game with Learning of External Signal 
Learning from past experience is beneficial for humans as well as firms; lessons from 
peers or others are even more useful for a firm’s decision-makers to predict/prevent future events 
(i.e., intrusion behaviors in our context).  For the sake of parsimony and intuition, we only 
discuss the two types of hackers in this section.  As an illustration, suppose Walmart and Target 
are repeatedly facing domestic hacking (say, 30%) and international hacking (say, 70%).  
Unfortunately, The New York Times reports that Target’s network was attacked by some 
international hackers (Abrams 2014).  If the CIO of Walmart reads the newspaper article, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that she will decide that Walmart needs to update its beliefs about the 
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percentage of international hackers (say from 70% to 80%) that will attack Walmart in the near 
future.  This scenario can be reflected by Figure 3.   
 
 
Figure 3. Updating the Firm’s Belief with Respect to External Signal 
 
At a given time 𝜏𝑖, the firm can obtain its belief 𝑞𝑖 from reviewing its own historical data.  
After observing the external signal 𝜀𝑖 (e.g., newspapers or other media), which indicates the 
strength/frequency of domestic hacking over all intrusions that occurred during time period 
(𝜏𝑖, 𝜏𝑖+1), the firm can update its belief to get 𝑞𝑖+1.  It is worthy to note that 𝜀𝑖 is a random 
variable, depending on time, and can be distributed as uniform, normal, Poisson, etc.  In this 
study, we do not specify the particular function form for 𝜀𝑖; instead, we treat it as a stochastic 
variable.  Furthermore, we normalize 𝜀𝑖 ∈ [0, 1].  Due to the restrictions of 𝑞𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖+1 ∈ [0, 1], we 
assume 𝑞𝑖+1 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑞𝑖 + 𝛼𝜀𝑖, where 𝛼 is the perceived signal impact factor representing the 
internalizing effects of external information into the firm’s prior beliefs about the hacker’s type.  
Although the game between the firm and hackers is played repeatedly, we can still focus on the 
game stage 𝑖 and 𝑖 + 1 to study the intrusion behaviors, because no discount factors with respect 
to the payoffs of the players are introduced in our model.  Therefore, for a one-shot simultaneous 
𝜏𝑖−1 𝜏𝑖 𝜏𝑖+1 𝑡 
Firm’s belief 𝑞𝑖 
𝜏0 … 
Firm updates its 
belief to get 𝑞𝑖+1 
𝜀𝑖 
𝜏𝑖+2 𝜏𝑁 … 
𝜀𝑖−1 𝜀𝑖+1 … … 
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game at stage 𝑖 + 1, we can replace 𝑞𝑖 with 𝑞𝑖+1 to get new pure-strategy Bayesian Nash 
equilibriums as follows: 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 {𝐼, (𝐻,𝐻)}, 𝑖𝑓 {
𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 > 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 > 0
𝑞𝑖 > (
1
1−𝛼
)
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝑐𝐼−𝑐𝐷
− (
𝛼
1−𝛼
) 𝜀𝑖
      (7) 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 {𝑁𝐼, (𝐻, 𝐻)}, 𝑖𝑓 {
𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 , 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 ∈ ℝ
𝑞𝑖 < (
1
1−𝛼
)
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝑐𝐼−𝑐𝐷
− (
𝛼
1−𝛼
) 𝜀𝑖
     (8) 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦 {𝐼, (𝑁𝐻, 𝐻)}, 𝑖𝑓 {
𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 > 0, 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 < 0
𝑞𝑖 > (
1
1−𝛼
)
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝑐𝐼−𝑐−𝜙𝑑
− (
𝛼
1−𝛼
) 𝜀𝑖
     (9) 
 
PSBNE (7)-(9) is also consistent with Proposition 1.  However, by comparing the 
conditions of PSBNE (1)-(3) and current equilibriums, we can characterize the impacts of 
external signals on the steady strategy profiles which will be played out by the firm and the 
hackers over time.  Accordingly, Proposition 3 is as follows: 
 
Proposition 3.  When the External Signal 𝜀𝑖 falls to a certain interval, the Pure Strategy 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium will switch from one to another over time,  
(i) In stage 𝑖, if the PSBNE {𝐼, (𝐻,𝐻)} occurs and 𝜀𝑖 ∈ [0,
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝛼(𝑐𝐼−𝑐𝐷)
−
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑞𝑖), the PSBNE 
will switch to {𝑁𝐼, (𝐻,𝐻)} in stage 𝑖 + 1.      (10) 
(ii) In stage 𝑖, if the PSBNE {𝑁𝐼, (𝐻, 𝐻)} occurs and 𝜀𝑖 ∈ (
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝛼(𝑐𝐼−𝑐𝐷)
−
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑞𝑖 , 1], the PSBNE 
will switch to {𝐼, (𝐻,𝐻)} in stage 𝑖 + 1 as long as 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 > 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 > 0.  (11) 
(iii) In stage i, if the PSBNE {𝐼, (𝑁𝐻,𝐻)}  occurs and 𝜀𝑖 ∈ [0,
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝛼(𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑−𝑐)
−
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑞𝑖) , the 
previous PSBNE {𝐼, (𝑁𝐻,𝐻)} will disappear in stage 𝑖 + 1    (12) 
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(iv) In stage i, if 𝜀𝑖 ∈ (
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝛼(𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑−𝑐)
−
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑞𝑖, 1], a new PSBNE will emerge as {𝐼, (𝑁𝐻,𝐻)} in 
stage 𝑖 + 1 as long as 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 > 0, 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 < 0.     (13) 
 
Proposition 3 implies that under a certain external signal strength, the equilibrium 
strategy profiles of the firm and the hackers will not be stable when the game is played 
repeatedly over time.  Condition (10) indicates that when the signal strength is small enough 
(𝜀𝑖 ∈ [0,
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝛼(𝑐𝐼−𝑐𝐷)
−
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑞𝑖)), the firm will choose to forgo investigations in the following stage, 
but the hackers will keep hacking.  In other words, when the firm perceives a strong signal of 
international hackings, the firm will choose to not investigate to save costs.  Condition (11) 
states that when hackers can receive positive net benefits, and the external signal is large enough 
(𝜀𝑖 ∈ (
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝛼(𝑐𝐼−𝑐𝐷)
−
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑞𝑖, 1]), the firm will choose to investigate in the following stage and the 
hackers will keep hacking.   
 
This finding is counterintuitive; however, when a strong signal indicates more domestic 
hackers, the firm is better off investigating to catch hackers, as well as recover some damages to 
reduce losses, even if the hackers will gain positive net benefits.  Interestingly, condition (12) 
shows that when the external signal is small enough (𝜀𝑖 ∈ [0,
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝛼(𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑−𝑐)
−
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑞𝑖)), the previous 
PSBNE {𝐼, (𝑁𝐻,𝐻)} will disappear.  In the previous stage, the firm chose to investigate and 
domestic hackers chose to not hack due to the severe deterrence (𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 > 0, 𝜇 − 𝛽𝐷 < 0).  
However, when the firm observes there will be a large proportion of international hackings, the 
firm will choose to stop investigation to save costs and domestic hackers will switch back to 
attack; accordingly, equilibrium cannot converge.  The most useful finding for the firm is 
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condition (13).  It illustrates that when the firm perceives a strong signal of domestic hackings 
(𝜀𝑖 ∈ (
𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑
𝛼(𝑐𝐼−𝜙𝑑−𝑐)
−
1−𝛼
𝛼
𝑞𝑖, 1]), the firm will be able to effectively prevent domestic cyberattacks 
in the following stage, as long as domestic hackers receive heavy punishment𝜇 − 𝛽𝐼 > 0, 𝜇 −
 𝛽𝐷 < 0.   
 
By analyzing the equilibrium switching from time to time, the external signal 𝜀𝑖 is 
unlikely to help the firm to effectively prevent international hackers, no matter how strong or 
weak the signal.  This finding is consistent with Corollary 1, since the external signal εi 
essentially updates the firm’s prior belief of the hackers’ type.  However, with the help of 
external signals, the firm could learn how to respond strategically to the hackers.  Condition (13) 
indicates that the firm could learn from peers’ experience to prevent domestic hackers in certain 
stages.  Condition (10) advises the firm to stop investigation to avoid unnecessary spending.  On 
the other hand, condition (11) recommends that the firm investigate to reduce losses or recover 
partial damage.  Although it is not easy for the firm to deter all intrusion behaviors, the firm 
could learn from external information besides its own historical data in the current stage to adjust 
its best response to hackers in the following stage.   
 
2.6.  Conclusions 
The ever-increasing global network continues to facilitate the collaborations within and 
among enterprises and also promote multinational corporations’ expansion of market shares.  In 
the meantime, it also increases the vulnerability of a firm facing the intrusion attacks around the 
world.  In fact, the US-CERT, a part of the Department of Homeland Security, has reported more 
than 20,000 vulnerable, with the increasing rate of 50 to 60 per month, implying a world-wide 
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cost of more than $1 trillion dollars (US-CERT 2009).  Various efforts have been undertaken by 
the research community in the last two decades to study detection of intrusions and increasing 
the precision of the detection mechanisms.  Game theory, as one of the most commonly used 
approaches, offers many promising perspectives, insights, and models to address the ever 
changing security threats in cyberspace.  However, almost all existing game theoretic 
methodologies concentrate on uniform hackers and defenders.  They do not pay attention to the 
diversity in a hacker’s intrusion behaviors, nor do they consider the firm’s costs to investigate the 
abnormal activities.  Our research is aimed at filling this gap and providing insights to explain 
the phenomenon of the increasing number of hackings, especially international cyberattacks.   
 
Our game theoretical model captured the natural interplay between a firm’s investigations 
and a hacker’s intrusions as a “cat and mouse” game; most importantly, in our basic model, we 
demonstrated that international hacking cannot be fully prevented, no matter what strategy a 
firm adopts.  In the extreme circumstance, no matter how severe the expected penalty, the firm 
will choose not to investigate if it believes there are too many international hackers.  
Fortunately, under a certain proportion of international hackers, the firm could prevent some 
domestic hackings, as long as the deterrents are large enough.  This information provides some 
managerial insights for a firm to strategically allocate its resources to prevent inevitable 
intrusions and could improve the firm’s profits, by treating security investments like costly 
insurance.  Furthermore, our model of the continuous type of hacker provides the specific 
percentage of hackers who will be deterred by a certain level of heavy punishment.   
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Additionally, the fraction of damage recovered by the investigation process is another 
relevant factor.  Moreover, by incorporating external signals (e.g., a newspaper report or other 
media channels) with the firm’s historical data, we illustrate that equilibrium strategy profiles 
between a firm and hackers will switch from one to another, over time.  Particularly, when a 
strong signal of domestic hackings is observed in a recent time period, the firm will be able to 
effectively stop some domestic hackers in the following stage with severe penalties.  Our work 
also contributes to current IS literature by differentiating hacker types and considering the 
diversity in firm’s investigation costs, as well as hackers’ expected penalty.  Moreover, we focus 
on the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibriums, rather than mixed-strategy profiles, for the 
sake of more straightforward interpretations, which could better reconcile mathematical 
modelling with real life.   
 
One of the future directions of this study is to allow the firm to have more than one type.  
And the firm’s strategy action could be “investigate with pre-investments on security”, 
“investigate without pre-investments”, and “not investigate at all.”  Accordingly, we could 
characterize the level of investment firm should have for securing its information assets.  
Another research question could be the optimal update frequency of the firm’s belief about 
hacker types based on its historical data as well as external signal effects.  In our current study, 
we did not consider the discount factors with respect to the payoffs of the players.  It will be 
interesting to incorporate decay factors (e.g., time cost for both players, hacker’s benefit, etc.) 
into the model as the game is played by both players repeatedly over time.   
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CHAPTER 3.  INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY COMPLIANCE:  DESIGN AN 
INCENTIVE STRUCTURE TO PREVENT INSIDER DATA BREACHES 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
In the age of information technology modern firms face vast challenges which could 
undermine their economic performance.  For decades, information has been recognized as a 
valuable corporate asset, enabling an organization to add value to its products and services, 
reduce costs, and meet customer needs (van den Hoven 1999; Zhao 2004).  Given the integral 
role of IT in today’s enterprises, information security has to be a key component in modern 
enterprise planning and management (Chang and Ho 2006).  Information security refers to the 
extent to which corporate information is free from disclosure, modification, or destruction due to 
intentional or unauthorized access (Finne 2000).  In order to ensure information security, 
organizations often rely on technology-based solutions (Ernst and Young 2008; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008).   
 
However, information security cannot be assured only by using technology solutions.  
Solid security products or technology alone cannot protect an organization without a good 
management policy and implementation.  It is stated that information security is not primarily a 
technical problem but a management or business issue (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000; Dutta and 
McCrohan 2002; So and Sculli 2002; Vermeulen and Von Solms 2002; Von Solms and Von 
Solms 2004).  Success in information security can be achieved when organizations invest in both 
technical solutions and employees’ compliance with information security policies (Bulgurcu et 
al. 2010). 
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It has long been a well-recognized fact that companies’ information security efforts are 
threatened by employee negligence and insider breaches (Loch et al. 1992), because employees 
are often the weakest link in information security (Mitnick and Simon 2001; Warkentin and 
Willison 2009).  A survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute reported that the 
average monetary loss per respondent was $288,618, and that 44% of the respondents reported 
insider security-related abuse, making it the second-most frequently occurring computer security 
incident (Richardson and Director 2008).   
 
To prevent the information security issues caused by internal personnel, there is a large 
body of MIS literature, based on General Deterrence Theory (Straub Jr 1990) discussing how to 
“punish” employees if they do not comply with the information security policy in a firm.  On the 
other hand, some works take the more “gentle” approach, like rewards or incentives, to regulate 
their employees’ noncompliance (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Padayachee 2012; Pahnila et al. 2007; 
Vance and Siponen 2012). But, few papers incorporate both means to secure its information 
assurance (Chen et al. 2012; Liang et al. 2013).  To the best of our knowledge, no extant MIS 
literature has done behavioral economics experiments to examine employees’ compliance 
behaviors by truly engaging participants with paid benefits. A Sommestad et al. (2014) review 
paper has examined 29 studies with more than 60 variables related to information security policy 
compliance and noncompliance; however, no dominant variables were clearly identified due to 
their very small effect size.  Most of those variables are measured through a self-report survey or 
a hypothetical single scenario-based experiment without permitting real incentives of 
participations; hence, we believe our study with multi-scenario-based measurements and real 
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economic incentives will further the understanding of how reward and punishment influence 
employees’ behavior with regard to complying with a firm’s information security policy.   
 
In addition, from a company’s perspective, the distinct and extrinsic motivations of 
reward and punishment are two very practical ways for the company to discipline its workforce 
to minimize security breaches.  A meta-analysis done by Balliet et al. (2011) revealed that both 
rewards and punishments exhibited a median to large effect on cooperation in general.  In 
essence, security violation is different from regular policy misbehavior since a single data breach 
caused by a few employees may lead to the whole company suffering.  Ideally, a company would 
like all its employees to cooperatively comply with the information security policy in order to 
prevent data breaches.   
 
Although it seems to be rare to see a modern company employ a policy of collective 
rewards or collective punishment, it was commonly used in U.S. military boot camps in the 
1980s (Gilham 1994).  Heckathorn (1988) showed that when a group is subjected to collective 
sanctions (including collective rewards and collective punishment), it may encourage group 
members to monitor and regulate one another’s behavior, although it may also infuriate group 
members to react against the agent that issues the threat, especially when collective punishment 
is imposed.  If companies can balance well between reward and punishment, they could leverage 
the effect of collective sanctions to reduce employees’ noncompliance.  To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to explore such collective rewards and collective 
punishments in the context of information security research.   
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Due to the small effect sizes of perceived sanction and perceived benefits by survey-type 
research, inconclusive effects of deterrence on information systems misuse, as well as concern 
for real companies’ practice, our paper aims to assist companies to design a realistic and 
effective managerial policy and payment structure to prevent information security data breaches.  
Specifically, we would like to address the following research questions: 
RQ1: How does monetary reward affect employees’ compliance with an information 
security policy? 
RQ2: How does monetary punishment affect employees’ compliance with an information 
security policy? 
RQ3: What is the combined effect of monetary rewards and punishments on employees’ 
compliance with an information security policy?  
RQ4: How do collective sanctions affect employees’ compliance with an information 
security policy? 
RQ5: How do monitoring systems affect employees’ compliance with an information 
security policy?  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The second section reviews the previous 
works in the information security literature in an organizational context.  The third section 
develops our theoretical argument and core hypotheses.  The fourth section discusses the 
research methodology and experimental design.  The fifth section presents the data collection 
and analysis.  The sixth section provides our experimental results with thorough discussions.  
The seventh section concludes our paper and elaborates its implication as well as limitations.   
 
35 
3.2.  Review of the Literature 
 
3.2.1.  Human factors in information security and a firm’s economics 
The insider threat is always present and manifests itself in many ways in human society 
(Colwill 2009).  There is a famous mythological story among Greeks, named the Trojan War.  A 
huge wooden horse hidden with a select force of men inside was constructed and given to the 
city of Troy as a victory trophy.  Under the ignorance and silence of insiders (i.e. the people of 
Troy), Greek forces crept out of the horse during the night and eventually defeated the Trojans.  
In modern organizations, despite the increasing enhanced information security systems of 
corporations, “Trojan-Horse” insiders (i.e. malicious employees) are emerging endlessly.  In fact, 
the computer virus, Trojan horse, was developed through this concept.  It infiltrated the 
backdoors of the “infected” computers and sent any wanted information back to the hackers.  
Spam email with the .exe attachment is one particular example of such a kind of attack.  As soon 
as those noncompliant employees open (could be unintentionally, but still be noncompliant 
behavior) the .exe file, the company’s information assets are compromised.   
 
The security breach of Target in 2013 can very well illustrate the severe consequence of 
employees’ noncompliant behavior.  According to the report from the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation (Rockefeller 2014), Target’s payment network system was intruded 
via its third-party vendor, Fazio Mechanical Services, a provider of refrigeration and HVAC 
systems.  Some employees’ virtual private network credential information were stolen through a 
phishing attack of malware delivered in an email at Fazio.  Consequently, hackers used the stolen 
credential information from Fazio to remotely log into Target’s inner network payment system, 
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stealing the payment and personal information of as many as 110 million customers, and then 
removed this sensitive information from Target’s network to a server in Eastern Europe.  This 
particular hack affected more than a third of the U.S. population, exposing 34% of American’s 
financial information (Wallace 2014).  This massive data breach directly led to a more than one 
percent loss of Target’s stock price by the time of the report and a more than $148 million dollar 
loss to its shareholders (Abrams 2014).  Furthermore, in order to maintain loyal customers, 
Target has been providing a free credit monitoring service for its customers, which further 
undermines its economic profitability.  Additionally, the concern of information leaking prevents 
new customers from continuing to use Target’s service, which indirectly hurts its corporate 
reputation.  Moreover, Target has to constantly face an enormous number of lawsuits from its 
customers, which could further damage its goodwill.   
 
Even in governmental organizations, insiders are prone to accidental information security 
failures (Colwill 2009).  The UK Government’s Revenue and Customers Department lost the 
personal information of 25 million people in a single incident (Thomson 2007).  Research shows 
that 70% of fraud is perpetrated by insiders rather than by external hackers; however, 90% of 
security controls and monitoring of a company are focused on external threats (McCue 2008).   
 
The cost of security breaches can be as much as $5.4 million in some organizations and 
each security attack can cause organizations an average cost of $591.780 (Alaskar et al. 2015).  
The Datalossdb Open Security Foundation website shows that about 24% of the total data-loss 
incidents in 2012 were due to insider employees, both by accident or maliciously.  In addition, 
the ongoing PwC survey in the UK shows that 75% of information security breaches in large 
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organizations were caused by human factors in 2015.  This figure is an increase from 58% one 
year ago (PwC 2015).  Similarly, the Chronology of Data Breaches shows that approximately 
9,232,015 records have been reported as insider data breaches in 2012 in the United States.  The 
Ponemon Institute shows that 35% of data breaches globally were due to human errors (Alaskar 
et al. 2015).   
 
Although external hackers are sophisticated, with advanced technology skills, numerous 
facts aforementioned and research papers (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009b; Hu et al. 
2012; Hu et al. 2011; Myyry et al. 2009; Warkentin and Willison 2009) have shown that the 
human agent is still the weakest link in the defense against internal and external threats to 
organizational information assets.  Nevertheless, no information security practice or technique is 
effective if not properly adopted by its users (i.e. employees) (Ernst and Young 2002; 
Puhakainen and Ahonen 2006).  Therefore, making sure its employees comply with the 
information security policy and regulation is a great challenge for both profit and nonprofit 
organizations.   
 
3.2.2.  The principal-agent dilemma in the information security context 
It is always hard to make people do things which are not convenient and easy, since it 
requires extra time and effort.  In economic literature, such a phenomenon is theorized as the 
principal-agent dilemma or agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989).  The principal-agent dilemma 
occurs when one entity (called the “agent”) is able to make decisions on behalf of another entity 
(called the “principal”) and the agent is motivated to act in his own interests, which are contrary 
to those of the principal.  Specifically, the agents incur personal costs as they devote their time, 
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knowledge and effort to the principal; however the principal is not able to constantly monitor or 
assess the agents’ efforts and thus the agents can retract the level of effort, skill, and knowledge 
they provide (Herath and Rao 2009a).   
 
In order to motivate agents, the principal can either enhance the monitoring mechanism to 
identify “lazy” agents or develop an incentive structure to motivate the agents to work hard.  In 
current industry practice, the incentive motivation or commission rewarding system is more 
commonly used, especially in the sale department of a company.  A salesman’s salary is usually 
composed as two parts, the base and the commission.  The more items sold by him, the more 
commission he will earn.  In this way, the incentive structure is designed to align the agent’s 
interests with the principal’s, creating win-win situations for both entities.   
 
In an information security setting, it is rare to see a company reward those employees 
who are compliant with the information security policy.  Instead, the more common practice 
identified by the literature is through the sanction.  In organizational information security, the 
responsibility of whether to obey organizational security policies is delegated to employees 
(Herath and Rao 2009a).  Employees may leak the company’s information assets for their own 
benefits or simply ignore the security regulation for the sake of time.  In fact, time saving has 
been identified as a major incentive to violate information security policies because employees 
perceive that security policies slow their work down with added procedures (Puhakainen and 
Ahonen 2006).  As a result, employees’ interest (the agents) is in conflict with the company’s 
(the principal) as employees want more work done but the company wants more work done 
securely.  
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 As said before, in order to solve this principal-agent dilemma, the company needs to 
“induce” employees to behave as it intends to by aligning both entities’ interests.  Similar to the 
salesman’s example, the company could pay a bonus on top of the base salary to those 
employees who are compliant with the firm’s information security policy.  Essentially, the paid 
bonus could reconcile the conflict between employees’ time saving with the company’s security 
requirement as employees get extra pay for their “additional” time spent complying with the 
policy.   However, both academic literature and industry practice seem not yet to realize this 
incentive structure in information security compliance as they currently rely on the perceived 
force of regulation policy (e.g. sanctions) and believe it is the employees’ duties to obey the 
regulation and rules.  As pointed out by current principal-agent dilemma literature review, 
information security policy compliance need not merely depend on the “stick”, but the gentler 
way, the “carrot”, is also effective and useful.   
 
3.2.3.  Employees cooperation for firm’s information security 
An information security policy violation is very different from a regular rule-breaking 
behavior, as the consequence of one instance can be amplified significantly.  More often, one 
employee’s noncompliance can result in a chain effect through the Internet systems and bring a 
huge disaster for the company, as illustrated by the previous Target 2013 example.  A general 
would like all his soldiers to be equally strong, without having any vulnerability, to defeat the 
battle; similarly, the ideal situation for a company is that all its employees cooperatively fight for 
the “information battle” without any internal “capitulators”.  However, a “disobeying solider” is 
always hard to address.  Nevertheless, how to increase cooperation in information security 
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compliance is rarely studied.  In fact, to the best of our knowledge, the present research is the 
first attempt to address this issue.   
 
“Good and evil, reward and punishment, are the only motives to a rational creature: these 
are the spur and reins whereby all mankind are set on work, and guided,” said by John Locke in 
the late        1600’s (Locke et al. 1989).  He believed that incentives, both rewards and 
punishments, are effective tools to regulate individuals in their pursuit of self-interest.  In fact, 
the biological and social sciences research has shown that incentives provide a powerful solution 
to increase cooperation (Edney and Harper 1978; Fehr and Gächter 1999; Hashim and Bockstedt 
2015; Henrich 2006; Lynn and Oldenquist 1986; Ostrom et al. 1992; Rand et al. 2009; Sigmund 
2007; Yamagishi 1986).  As the company wants its employees to cooperatively comply with its 
information security policy, providing incentives for cooperation will encourage each individual 
employee to sacrifice her/his self-interest for the collective benefit of the company.   
 
In an organizational information security setting, the positive incentives (reward) for 
those employees who comply with the policy will establish positive reinforcement links among 
all employees in that group to achieve the rewards together; similarly, the negative incentives 
(punishment) for those noncompliant employees will cause negative reinforcement links among 
them in the same group to avoid the punishment cooperatively.  In the extreme, the punishment 
of those compliant employees due to the noncompliant ones will further the “cooperation” 
between employees since each individual will face the condemnation and judgement from others; 
it essentially increases the mutual surveillance among employees.  On the other hand, the given 
reward can only be earned when all employees behave (i.e., obey rules) cooperatively.  Everyone 
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wants to get the reward and thus becomes spontaneously self-disciplined.  This collective reward 
and punishment is formally described as a collective sanction (Heckathorn 1988) and will be 
discussed in greater detail later.   
 
The information security capability of a firm is not merely dependent on its hardware-
software sophistication, nor on some employees’ good compliance, but on the cooperation in 
compliance among all its employees to secure the information assets.  As the commonly-known 
barrel effect manifests, the capability of a firm to secure its data asset against its insider breach is 
heavily dependent on those few noncompliant employees rather than the majority who are 
compliant.  Therefore, information security compliance is not simply an individual matter, but 
requires employees’ cooperation to attain.   
 
3.3.  Theoretical Argument and Core Hypotheses 
According to Alaskar et al. (2015)’s review paper, the General Deterrence Theory is still 
the dominant theory used by IS scholars to study information security (Chen et al. 2012; Cheng 
et al. 2013; D'Arcy et al. 2009; D’Arcy and Hovav 2009; Guo and Yuan 2012; Harrington 1996; 
Herath and Rao 2009a; Herath and Rao 2009b; Lee et al. 2004; Siponen and Vance 2010; Son 
2011; Straub Jr 1990).  Straub Jr and Nance (1990) adopted the classical deterrence theory from 
criminology literature into their information security studies.  The deterrence theory asserts that 
individuals weigh costs and benefits when deciding whether or not to engage in criminal 
behavior (Siponen and Vance 2010).   
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In the information security setting, Straub Jr (1990) argues that violation behavior can be 
reduced by imposing sanctions that are certain and severe to potential rule-breakers.  However, 
another review paper (Sommestad et al. 2014) found out that general deterrence theory has 
questionable efficacy since its effect size, β-value, is on average lower than 0.10.  In spite of the 
survey methods used, which have self-reported bias, measuring intention as the dependent 
variable in those papers, the small effect size of the perceived severity of sanction and the 
perceived certainty of sanction have limited explanation power over employees’ noncompliance 
behavior.  Hence, deterrence alone will not eliminate information breaches. 
 
3.3.1.  Rational choice theory 
Rational choice theory can be seen as a modern extension of classical deterrence theory, 
which originated during the late 18th century with the work of Cesare Beccaria, and is a 
prominent theory in Criminology (Cao 2004).  Becker (1974)’s Economic Theory of Crimes 
indicates that criminal behavior is rational and goal-oriented based on the offender’s assessment 
of perceived costs and benefits.  Rational choice theory explains individuals’ decisions to 
commit crimes as utilitarian calculations based on their rational choices weighing means and 
ends (Cornish and Clarke 1987).  Although the theory is commonly used to explain criminal 
behavior, it is also capable of being generalized to cover all violations (Becker 1968), and is thus 
applicable to the study of violations of organizational IS security policies.   
 
In our information security research setting, we follow the typical economic assumption 
that people are rational, which means employees are selfish, seeking benefit and avoiding 
punishment.  In addition, we also assume that the company has full knowledge (i.e., complete 
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information) about each employee’s behavior.  In other words, we assume the company has 
perfect monitoring/surveilling systems to detect each employee’s action when they are facing 
information security temptations (this assumption will be relaxed later).  Accordingly, based on 
the rational choice theory, we expect the following hypotheses, 
 
H1:  Reward for compliance will have a positive impact on employees’ behavior in 
complying with a company’s information security policy.  
 
H2: Punishment for noncompliance will have a positive impact on employees’ behavior 
in complying with a company’s information security policy.  
 
Furthermore, rational choice theory also indicates that the effects of reward and 
punishment are not contrary to one another, but complementary to each other.  At least, reward 
and punishment together should have an additive effect not a cancelation effect.  As an 
individual is a rational thinker and weighs the costs and benefits, she/he may simultaneously 
assess the reward gained by compliance and punishment received by noncompliance.  
Accordingly, the optimal choice for her/him is to choose to comply since she/he can get rewards 
and avoid punishment.  In fact, almost all extant MIS literature treats reward and punishment 
separately, ignoring the complementary relationship between two treatments. The current 
literature heavily focuses on surveying participants for their compliance intentions and isolating 
perceived reward and perceived sanction.   
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In contrast, we expect a company should have a better outcome by providing both 
positive and negative incentives for compliant and noncompliant behaviors of its employees.  
Accordingly, we expect the complementary effect between reward and punishment will 
outperform either single treatment, 
 
H3: Reward for compliance and punishment for noncompliance together will have 
stronger impact on employees’ behavior in complying with a company’s information security 
policy when compared with either a reward only or a punishment only mechanism.   
 
3.3.2.  Collective sanction 
Collective sanction is the system where rewards or punishments extend not only to the 
actor but to the actors’ group (Heckathorn 1990).  In such systems, when an individual violates 
or complies with a rule, not merely the individual but other members of that person’s group as 
well, are collectively punished or rewarded by an external agent (Heckathorn 1988).  When 
properly used, collective sanction could enhance mutual surveillance to reduce noncompliant 
behavior and hence create norms and culture to enforce wanted behavior.  The literature on 
principal-agent and cooperation in compliance shows that reward and punishment are two 
distinct and effective means to enhance compliance with an information security policy.  
However, as said before, the level of a company’s information security defense is determined by 
the few noncompliant employees rather than the compliant majority.  Hence, the ultimate goal 
for a firm is to enhance employees’ cooperation in compliance.   
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In a modern firm, it seems that collective sanction is rarely used in practice.  But, it is 
commonly used in U.S. military boot camps to enhance the effectiveness of control for 
cooperation (Gilham 1994).  A more extreme application of collective sanction occurred in 
Stalinist prisons (Dallin and Nicolaevsky 1947), where prisoners earned points through work and 
compliance with prison rules and the distributions of food, medicine, and other essentials of life 
depended on the points earned by the group.  Although the use of collective sanction may sound 
cruel, the company may well leverage its benefit when adopting it properly.  Combined with the 
solution of the principal-agent dilemma, the company could reward all or punish all by giving 
additional incentives or taking away the extra incentives without changing base salaries.  This 
principle of payment structure may be more effective than the traditional deterrence mechanism.    
 
In the cooperation literature, incentives have been seen as the structural solutions to 
resolving social dilemmas by reducing conflicts of interest (Kollock 1998; Van Lange and 
Joireman 2008; Yamagishi 1986; Yamagishi 1988).  The meta-analysis paper by Balliet et al. 
(2011) provides unequivocal evidence that rewards and punishment are effective factors for 
cooperation in social dilemmas, explaining about 3% to 12% of the variance in cooperation.  
Furthermore, it also shows that people are more willing to cooperate when the collective 
incentive is given and the self-interest incentive is reduced.  Therefore, employees may be more 
regulated when the firm imposes collective punishment to punish all due to the noncompliance of 
some employees.  Meanwhile, employees may be more motivated when the firm grants 
collective rewards to reward all as long as no noncompliant behavior occurs.   
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However, collective sanction can also have exactly the opposite effect, as Heckathorn 
(1988) points out that a group threatened by collective punishment could react by attacking the 
agent and hence motivate group rebellions.  Furthermore, when attacking the external agent is 
not available and group members are not able to identify each other, collective sanction could 
lead to heterogeneous non-cooperation and convergence to a decreasing equilibrium in 
cooperation over time.  Fehr and Gächter (2000) conducted an experiment based on the repeated 
Public Goods game and they found that the level of cooperation is declining when group 
members are  not allowed to punish  non-cooperative members.  Andreoni et al. (2003) used a 
one-shot anonymous Proposer-Responder game to illustrate that people are willing to sacrifice 
personal interests to punish those non-cooperative ones and reward those cooperative ones to 
achieve high cooperation.  Gürerk et al. (2006) did another study, also based on the repeated 
Public Goods game, to show that the sanctioning institution (allowing anonymous group 
members to punish others for noncooperation) maintains a higher level of cooperation compared 
to a sanction-free institution.  The more recent paper by Rand et al. (2009) indicated that it is not 
the punishment per se that sustains the high cooperation in the repeated Public Goods game, but 
rather the possibility of targeted interactions between group members.   
 
In the setting of the Public Goods game, the low level of cooperation is reflected by the 
individual group member’s small amount of contributions to the “common goods”.  Accordingly, 
it would lead to the benefit of entire group suffering, especially for those group members who 
contribute a lot but receive so little.  Hence, such indirect collective sanction may actually 
undermine the cooperation even in information security compliance.  In fact, Heckathorn (1988, 
p. 556) said, “collective sanctions create ambivalent incentives” for compliance in a group.  
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Therefore, it seems ambiguous how collective sanction may affect employees’ behavior in 
complying with a company’s information security policy compared with individual incentives, 
especially when employees are unable to identify others’ compliant or noncompliant behaviors.  
Instead of proposing hypotheses for collective sanction, we will explore its impact on 
cooperation in security compliance and discuss its theoretical boundary conditions.   
 
3.3.3.  Complete and incomplete information about monitoring 
Previously, we assumed the company had complete information about employees’ 
behavior in information security policy compliance.  More realistically, a company usually relies 
on some sort of detecting systems (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems) for monitoring the 
input/output information traffic for alerting abnormal activities.  Khan et al. (2007) shows that 
the detection accuracy rate could range from 11% to 95% in their static benchmark data set.  
However, such detecting systems are never perfect in the real-world setting.  In fact, numerous 
research done by computer science and computer engineer scientists (Anderson et al. 1995; 
Garcia-Teodoro et al. 2009; Ilgun et al. 1995; Kumar and Spafford 1995; Lee and Stolfo 2000; 
Lippmann et al. 2000; Porras and Neumann 1997; Sequeira and Zaki 2002; Stolfo et al. 2001; Yu 
et al. 2003) still cannot show a definitive accurate rate of the IDS detection.  This is because the 
IDS constantly generates an unknown number of false positive and false negative alarms, which 
is directly caused by the dynamic nature of an unknown number of genuine attacks, especially 
when the vulnerabilities are newly discovered.  Nevertheless, the agency theory acknowledges 
the incomplete information gained by the principal and hence it gives the agent opportunity to 
retract the level of his effort.  Therefore, in the context of information security policy 
compliance, we would expect that the low chance of being caught would undermine the effect of 
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reward and punishment on employees’ compliance with information security policy.  Boss et al. 
(2009)’s paper further proves that if one knows he/she is been watched, he/she will follow the 
information security policy; otherwise, the requirement will be often ignored due to the 
additional costs of time and effort required to comply with the security policies and procedures.  
Accordingly, we compose the following hypotheses,  
 
H4: A low chance of being caught will have a negative impact on employees’ behavior of 
complying with a company’s information security policy. 
 
H5: A low chance of being caught will reduce the positive effect of Reward for promoting 
employees’ behavior in complying with a company’s information security policy. 
 
H6: A low chance of being caught will reduce the positive effect of Punishment for 
preventing employees’ behavior in noncomplying with a company’s information security policy.   
 
3.4.  Research Methodology and Experimental Design 
 
3.4.1.  Scenario-based security compliance measurement 
Both review papers by Sommestad et al. (2014) and Alaskar et al. (2015) clearly point 
out that the survey is the predominant research method used in information security literature.  It 
is well known that using self-reported data is biased, especially in studying anti-social and 
ethical/unethical behavior (Krumpal 2013).  Instead, scenario-based methods are more suitable to 
overcome such challenges by providing hypothetical situations (Pogarsky 2004).  In the field of 
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IS, the scenario methods have been widely used to study various topics in information security 
research.  Myyry et al. (2009) use a single scenario to study the influence of moral reasoning on 
employees’ compliance with information security policies.  Cheng et al. (2013) also use a single 
scenario test and develop an integrated model based on social control and deterrence theory to 
study information security policy violations.  D'Arcy et al. (2009), Barlow et al. (2013), and Hu 
et al. (2015) use multiple scenarios to measure the employees’ information 
compliance/noncompliance, whereas, other papers randomly assign one scenario per participant 
(Chen et al. 2012; D’Arcy and Hovav 2009; Guo and Yuan 2012; Guo et al. 2011; Harrington 
1996; Hu et al. 2011; Vance and Siponen 2012).   
 
The scenario method offers distinct advantages for research on unethical or socially 
undesirable behavior, especially when participants are not asked to respond directly in the first- 
or second-person manner.  Due to the secrecy involved in the undesirable behavior, individuals 
are more likely to conceal their real response to the questions and provide the socially desirable 
answers to the researcher (Trevino 1992).  However, the hypothetical scenario could make 
participants feel less afraid to report their actual intentions when acting similarly to the person 
described in the scenario (Harrington 1996).  Additionally, hypothetical scenarios drawn from 
experts could specify the situational details to enhance the realism of decision-making by 
providing contextual details (Alexander and Becker 1978); whereas, plain survey questions 
usually ask participants in general terms.     
 
In our research setting, we adopt the multiple scenarios of those minor and major 
violations developed by Hu et al. (2015).  In total, we use 30 scenarios for measuring each 
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participant’s behavior in complying with an information security policy.  It not only 
methodologically reduces our measurement error, but also increases the generalizability of 
conclusions, as the large number of scenarios is more likely to capture more realistic situations in 
real practice.  In general, all participants across Experiment 1-4 will be instructed to imagine 
herself/himself as a hypothetical employee called “Josh” of a “company”.   She/he will answer 
the given 30 scenarios on behalf of Josh.  We only adopted those 15 minor and 15 major 
hypothetical security policies and ignored their control scenarios.  Specifically, we will present 
participants in a pseudorandom order (the order of the stimuli scenario is randomized but 
consistent across all participants) omitting Hu et al. (2015)’s control group ones.  By doing so, it 
will help to prevent those unknown effects which may be caused by the different order of 
scenarios across different participants.   
 
3.4.2.  Real dollar treatment vs. perceived treatment 
Although our literature review indicates that hypothetical scenario-based methods are 
widely used in the IS field for studying information security research, the technique used in the 
scenario-based experiments which involve paying for study performance is rarely seen in the IS 
literature.  Instead, this paper adopts the behavioral economics approach to pay participants for 
their completion of study tasks.  By doing so, we can truly engage participants with the study 
design as their earnings are dependent on their task performance.  This is a significant 
methodological contribution to the IS literature, as a great deal of experimental economics 
literature has shown that real dollars make a difference.    
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In the group level for cooperation, Balliet et al. (2011)’s meta-analysis shows that both 
rewards and punishments are more effective when participants are actually paid for their 
decisions rather than when making hypothetical decisions without monetary consequence.  
Furthermore, incentives seem to matter more when the monetary stakes are greater.  For the 
employee-information-security compliance dilemma, the very practical action for a company is 
to design a suitable and effective incentive structure to motivate employees to align their self-
interest with the company’s benefit.  Balliet et al. (2011)’s paper further points out that 
incentives are more effective in monetary forms or when incentives are framed according to the 
pecuniary benefits of cooperation.  Thus, the behavioral economics approach with heterogeneous 
cash payment involved in the study will further our understanding about how reward and 
punishment influences employees’ behavior of cooperatively complying with an information 
security policy.    
 
3.4.3.  Experimental design 
There are four experiments in our study.  Experiment 1 is a basic 2x2 factorial 
experimental design containing four groups of subjects.  It evaluates the effect of individual 
reward and individual punishment.  In addition, we test if individual reward and individual 
punishment together are not simply adding to one another, but rather have a super-additive 
effect.  Experiment 2, with three groups of participants, introduces collective sanctions 
(including collective reward and collective punishment) to compare its result with Experiment 
1’s.  We explore how exactly collective sanctions influence employees’ compliance and hope to 
resolve its ambivalent effect of cooperatively compliance.  Experiment 3, building upon 
Experiment 1, uses the 2 x 2 factorial design incorporating the concept of the company’s degree 
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of monitoring.  It is more realistic for a company to install an automated detection system (e.g., 
IDS) to inspect its employees’ noncompliance rather than monitoring everyone, if possible.  We 
consider how the monitoring affects individual incentives (individual reward, individual 
punishment, and individual reward and punishment) on employees’ compliance.  Lastly, 
Experiment 4, with three groups of subjects, is the most comprehensive design, including both 
collective sanctions as well as monitoring.  This experiment permits us to give a company the 
most practical and realistic recommendations for regulating its employees’ information security 
policy violations.  It is worth noting that Experiment 1 uses individual-based interventions, 
whereas, Experiments 2-4 are group-based interventions.  Each group is randomly composed of 
5 participants and the group members are fixed without reshuffling through the entire 
experimental session.   
 
Each participant was given 500 endowment tokens (100 tokens = $1.3) to use in this 
study.  If a subject chose “Yes” after any given scenario, they had a chance to gain some self-
benefits from 0 to 30 tokens depending on the severity of the specific scenarios.  Subjects were 
told that the more severe the security breach of the scenario, the more tokens they earned.  
However, the real integer tokens associated with a certain scenario were randomly selected from 
a uniform distribution from 1-9 for minor and 11-30 for major violations.  Hu et al (2015) 
classified each of the 30 scenarios as major or minor.  In addition, we used 10 tokens as either 
reward or punishment. We believe using 10 as the separation point with randomization could 
well capture the fuzzy utilitarian calculations in an employee’s mind when facing security 
temptations.  It is worth noting that the specific tokens associated with a certain scenario is 
unknown to lab participants to avoid their calculating the costs and benefits of a particular 
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decision.  Because we believe this design mimics the real-life situation as a noncompliant 
employee generally would not know the concrete amount of gained benefits before committing 
the violation behavior, but rather would have a rough idea based on violation severity to assess if 
it is worth doing.  The specific order and token worth of each scenario is attached in appendix A.  
The instructions for participations of each group of four experiments are also attached as 
Appendix B.  It is worth noting that we kept the instructions as neutral as possible by referring to 
the punishments and rewards simply as changes to participants’ payoff.   
 
Two main treatments in this experimental study were Reward and Punishment, which 
were reflected by tokens taken from or given to participants.  If they chose “Yes”, they lost 10 
tokens as punishment; however, if they chose “No”, they earned 10 tokens as reward.  
Meanwhile, whenever they chose “Yes” across all four experiments, the aforementioned self-
benefit tokens were always applied to them.  In addition, we conducted all four experiments 
through the oTree environment, an open-source Python and Django based platform for 
laboratory, online and field experiments (Chen et al. 2016).  The following Table 1 is an 
overview of our four experiments with their respective 14 treatment groups (please see Appendix 
C for the specific designs of our four sequential experiments).   
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Table 1 Experimental Design Overview 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
Exp1C: Control  Exp3C: Control with 
20% Inspection 
 
Exp1R: Individual 
Reward 
Exp2R: Collective 
Reward 
Exp3R: Individual 
Reward with 20% 
Inspection  
Exp4R: Collective 
Reward with 20% 
Inspection 
Exp1P: Individual 
Punishment  
Exp2P: Collective 
Punishment  
Exp3P: Individual 
Punishment with 20% 
Inspection 
Exp4P: Collective 
Punishment with 20% 
Inspection 
Exp1RP: 
Individual Reward 
& Punishment  
Exp2RP: 
Collective Reward 
& Punishment  
Exp3RP: Individual 
Reward & Punishment 
with 20% Inspection  
Exp4PR: Collective 
Reward & Punishment 
with 20% Inspection  
 
3.5.  Data Collection and Analysis 
 
3.5.1.  Participants 
Student participant data was collected and used in our study.  We examine participants’ 
behaviors from a very broad sense, meaning we treat employees homogeneously although we do 
control for their risk tendency, impulsivity, age, gender, education, etc.  For those employees 
who have hatred towards to the company, or have psychological problems are not the focus of 
current study.  In other words, our study focuses on how extrinsic motivations will help a 
company to regulate employees’ non-compliant behavior.   
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Although we acknowledge that using student subjects is a convenient sample, Siponen 
and Vance (2010) and Vance and Siponen (2012) have shown that work experience is irrelevant 
to participants’ behavior of complying with information security policies, which is consistent 
with our results that students’ organizational experience is not a significant factor for information 
security policy violation.  In addition, we argue that using student subjects is appropriate for our 
research questions, for the following three reasons.  First, we do not study the intrinsic 
motivation, like commitment to a company.  Instead, we study the fundamental materialism-view 
extrinsic motivation of an employee, which assumes an individual is selfish and incentive driven 
(seeking for benefit and avoiding punishment).  This principle will apply to most populations, 
including student subjects.  Therefore, student subjects could be a good proxy for employees.  
Second, students are the future employees no matter whether they will stay in industry or 
academy.  Security research has a common drawback.  We study those phenomena that have 
occurred rather than develop a mechanism to prevent further incidences.  If the proposed 
incentive structure works for current students, it will have a good chance of working well for 
future employees as well.  Finally, students are similar to those young employees who are 
sometimes unwilling to follow rules due to their energetic minds.  Hence, if we can make 
students comply and build a good culture/mechanism to sustain compliance, we have a good 
chance that the formal and senior employees will comply with the policy as well based on the 
institutional effect. 
 
3.5.2.  Data collection 
Lab experimental data was collected at a large mid-west public university and, to enhance 
the generalizability, from two populations of English speakers within that university.  The first 
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population comes from the business-major students’ subject pool, which has about 900 students.  
This is the same subject pool used by Hu et al. (2015).  The students are completely different, 
which ensures no participants can have seen our research scenarios before.  Students signed up 
for the research study voluntarily.  For those students who showed up in the study location, they 
received course credit and $10 on average to complete the study.  Their final compensation 
depended on their task performance, which is incorporated in experimental treatments and was 
introduced in the aforementioned Experimental Design section.  In total, 285 students 
participated in our experiment.      
 
The second population is general undergraduate students, excluding the previous 
population, which is about 24,000.  The principal investigator sent out invitation emails to the 
general students on campus.  The email list of students was purchased from the university’s 
Office of the Registrar.  About 400 emails per wave with 59 waves of recruiting emails were sent 
out for the study.  The recruitment email included information such as time length of the study, 
study location, compensation and eligibility of the study.  In addition, students were given a 
Doodle Poll link to fill out their email address and choose suitable time slots to participate if they 
were interested in the study.  There were about 600 students who signed up the study and 360 
students who showed up in the study location. Those students who showed up received an extra 
$5 for their participation instead of course credit reward.  All other incentive and experimental 
treatments remained the same as for the first population.  No students from both populations 
were permitted to participate in more than one experimental section.   
 
57 
3.5.3.  Experimental procedure 
The data collection from the first population was conducted from the end of September to 
the mid-October, 2016.  Meanwhile, general students’ data from the second population was 
collected from late October to mid-November.  Each experiment section lasted about 45 minutes.  
The principal investigator kept the time of experiment sections same regardless student 
populations.  Experiments were conducted on every Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday from 
3:00PM to 4:00PM, 4:00PM to 5:00PM, and 5:00PM to 6:00PM.  Experimental procedures for 
the two populations are illustrated in the following. 
 
For business students, they were recruited by the specialized time management online 
platform provided by the subject pool administrator.  Students can log into the web-based 
software by their own credentials to choose available time slots.  Meanwhile, an email reminder 
was sent out each week to remind students to participate in our study.  One day before the 
experiment time slots, the principal investigator sent out another reminder to those signed 
students to confirm the study location, study time and other requirement like bring a pen or 
pencil.   
 
After students arrived at the computer lab, they were greeted and instructed to sit at least 
one empty seat between each other to prevent collusion.  Students were informed that personal 
devices, internet surfing, watching YouTube, etc. were not permitted.  Then, the principal 
investigator used a script to introduce the overview of the experiment to students to enhance their 
comprehension.  After consent forms were distributed, students were given whatever time they 
needed to read it through and sign the form.  Then, they went through the first part of the 
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experiment, which is the 30 scenario-based questionnaires.  To enhance the treatment 
manipulation, the core instruction was repeatedly displayed underneath each scenario when 
participants were making their decisions.  For the specific intervention of each experimental 
groups, please see the Appendix B.  Although a timer was embedded into the online user 
interface for each scenario to enhance the manipulation of treatment and control students’ 
reading speed, those who finished earlier than others were instructed to wait patiently.  After 
students made their decision for each scenario, a current summary of tokens earned was 
displayed.  At the end, after all 30 scenarios finished, students were informed how much cash 
they would receive from the study.  Then, after all students finished the first part of the study, 
they were given the password to access the second part of the study, which is a Qualtrics-
powered online survey to gather their demographic information, risk assessment, risk preference, 
impulsivity assessment, computer skills and so on (see Appendix D for details).   
 
After all students finished their surveys, they were instructed to fill out the necessary 
paperwork in order to get paid.  Then, they were instructed to log off their computers to ensure 
their privacy and to receive their payment (concealed in an individual envelop) from the 
principal investigator.  After students received their payments, the experiment session ended.  
Meanwhile, the principal investigator granted the course credit to students via the 
aforementioned online time management software.     
 
For general students from the campus, they were recruited by email invitations sent 
directly from the principal investigator.  A Doodle poll anonymous link was included for each 
invitation email.  Students who were interested in our study could follow the link to choose their 
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desired time slots.  It is worthy of mention that the Doodle poll is pre-configured to hide 
participations’ emails and names from the public to preserve their privacy.  Only the principal 
investigator and those faculties who have IRB clearance of the project are permitted to see 
participations’ information.  The same as business student population, one day before the 
experiment section, the principal investigator sent out the confirmation/reminder email to 
students to inform them the study location, study time and other requirements, like bringing a 
pen or pencil.  The experimental procedures for general students were the same as the business 
students except for an additional step.  After students finished reading and signed the consent 
forms, they were immediately given a $5 show-up fee to thank them for their participation.  
Meanwhile, they signed a payment receipt form required by the university controllers.  After 
each experimental session finished, no course credit was given to general campus students.    
 
3.5.4.  Data-analysis procedure  
Each scenario question was only given two choices, “Yes” or “No”, for each participant 
to choose on behalf of the hypothetical third-person, “Josh”.  “Yes” means non-compliance, 
whereas “No” means compliance with the information security policy.  The unit of analysis for 
our treatment effect is each treatment group, as our research focuses on how to design an 
incentive structure to intensify employees’ cooperative compliance.  In addition, to further 
control the potential effect caused by the different wording of 30 scenarios, we conducted the 
treatment-effect data analysis in the following procedure.  First, we calculated the scenario-based 
Compliance Ratio for 14 treatment groups.  The Compliance Ratio for each scenario in a certain 
treatment group is the proportion that the number of participants who chosen “No” divided by 
the total number of participants in that treatment group.  For instance, the Compliance Ratio for 
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Scenario 1 in the Control group of Experiment 1 (Exp1C) is 0.714286, since 35 out of 49 
subjects chose “No” in this treatment group.  Second, we calculated the pair-wise Difference of 
Compliance Ratio (DCR) between 14 treatment groups, which yielded to 91 series of numbers of 
30 fractions.  This was done to control the potential effect of 30 different worded scenarios.  For 
example, the Compliance Ratio of Exp1R for Scenario 1 is 0.808511.  Hence, the DCR between 
Exp1R and Exp1C is 0.094225.  This is the individual Reward treatment effect (without the 
confounding caused by scenario wording) compared with the basic control group.  Third, we 
conducted a time series data analysis to test if the 91-respective means of 91 series of DCR 
numbers are not equal to zero.  Particularly, we used an autoregressive model1 with AR=1 
because we suspect that each treatment group’s current decision may be correlated to its previous 
one decision through the 30-repeated observations (i.e., 30 scenario questions), as we showed 
each subject the scenario questions one by one on the screen of the lab computers.  Lastly, we 
obtained the t ratio and p value of the constant term in the time series data analysis to conclude if 
the respective treatment has effect or not.   
 
In addition, we wondered if participants’ demographic and other control variables would 
have impacts on their decision making for choosing “No”.  Hence, we also conducted a Logistic 
Regression with dummy codes for controlling scenario difference, but we had to switch the unit 
of analysis from treatment group level to each participant level in order to test those additional 
variables.   
                                                 
1 ARIMA model with orders of (1,0,0), (1,0,1), (1,0,2), (2,0,1), and (2,0,2) were also tested for 
each 91- series of DCR to obtain the best fitting models by AIC index.  For the sake of model 
concise and parsimonious, we adapted AR=1 autoregressive model to report in this paper, as 
essentially the best fitting models provide the same data-analysis results.  The ARIMA data-
analysis results will be provided upon request.   
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3.6.  Experimental Results and Discussions  
Our overall experimental results can be best summarized in the following Table 2.  It 
shows the coefficient and p-value of the constant term of the autoregressive model for all 91 
DCR combinations.  The shadow areas present those p-values which are less than 0.05.   
 
The complete output of AR=1 model is attached in Appendix E.  In our time series data 
analysis, the constant term represents the expected difference of two means between their 
respective treatment group.  For example, the expected difference between Exp3C and Exp1C is 
-0.038 with a p-value as 0.015, which indicates the low chance of being caught has a significant 
negative impact on information security compliance compared with the most basic control group.   
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Table 2 Experimental Results Overview 
Mean.diff 
&  
p-value 
Exp1
P 
Exp1
R 
Exp1R
P 
Exp2
P 
Exp2
R 
Exp2R
P 
Exp3
C 
Exp3
P 
Exp3
R 
Exp3R
P 
Exp4
P 
Exp4
R 
Exp4R
P 
Exp1C 
0.026 0.101 0.193 -0.091 -0.150 0.016 -0.038 -0.087 0.035 0.022 -0.123 0.063 0.057 
0.210 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.465 0.015 0.003 0.213 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.018 
Exp1P 
  0.074 0.167 -0.118 -0.179 -0.014 -0.063 -0.117 0.005 -0.008 -0.150 0.036 0.028 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.635 0.000 0.000 0.877 0.777 0.000 0.131 0.268 
Exp1R 
    0.093 -0.192 -0.252 -0.087 -0.138 -0.191 -0.069 -0.083 -0.224 -0.039 -0.046 
    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.004 0.000 0.121 0.066 
Exp1RP 
     -0.285 -0.345 -0.180 -0.231 -0.283 -0.162 -0.175 -0.317 -0.131 -0.139 
      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exp2P 
        -0.060 0.106 0.053 0.002 0.124 0.112 -0.032 0.156 0.149 
        0.000 0.000 0.001 0.904 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
Exp2R 
          0.168 0.110 0.064 0.187 0.174 0.028 0.215 0.211 
          0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.000 
Exp2RP 
            -0.054 -0.103 0.020 0.006 -0.139 0.048 0.041 
            0.034 0.000 0.220 0.702 0.000 0.006 0.037 
Exp3C 
              -0.050 0.072 0.059 -0.085 0.101 0.095 
              0.121 0.031 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exp3P 
                0.123 0.110 -0.035 0.151 0.146 
                0.000 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 
Exp3R 
                  -0.013 -0.158 0.029 0.022 
                  0.452 0.000 0.114 0.249 
Exp3RP 
                    -0.146 0.041 0.037 
                    0.000 0.002 0.000 
Exp4P 
                      0.188 0.183 
                      0.000 0.000 
Exp4R 
                        -0.005 
                        0.733 
 
3.6.1.  Experiment 1 and discussions  
Based on the Rational Choice Theory, we designed the Experiment 1 to discuss how 
individual reward and punishment influence employees’ compliance.  The expected difference of 
Exp1P – Exp1C is 0.026 with a p-value as 0.210, which shows that individual punishment has no 
significant impact compared with the control group.  In other words, imposing individual 
punishment to noncompliant behavior does not statistically improve employees’ compliance with 
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information security policy.  Hence, our hypothesis 2 is not supported.  Although it is not 
supported, it may well illustrate why current popular strategy (deterrence only mechanism) 
cannot effectively prevent insider data breaches.   
 
However, the expected difference of Exp1R – Exp1C is 0.101 and extremely significant 
with a p-value less than 0.001.  This indicates that individual reward works very well for 
regulating employees’ noncompliant behavior.  Therefore, hypothesis 1 is supported.  In 
addition, when we compare Exp1RP and Exp1C, a positive difference in means (0.193) and 
extremely small p-value (< 0.001) is found.  Furthermore, the expected difference of Exp1RP – 
Exp1P is 0.167 (p-value < 0.001) and Exp1RP – Exp1R is 0.093 (p-value < 0.001).  This 
illustrates that individual reward and punishment together is significantly better than either 
individual reward or individual punishment.  Thus, our hypothesis 3 is strongly supported.  This 
finding is consistent with Andreoni et al. (2003, p. 901) saying “the absence of a reward is not 
equivalent to a punishment”, as rewards and punishments are complementary to each other.   
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Figure 1 Exp1: Individual Reward and Punishment 
 
The above Figure 1 shows the Difference of Compliance Ratio for all 30 scenarios in 
Experiment 1 when Exp1C is used as the subtracted base.  Figure 1 further evidences that 
individual reward and punishment together has better regulation power over either individual 
reward or individual punishment.  In fact, when reward and punishment is used together, it can 
help to sustain the high compliance rate compared with either individual treatment.  The effect of 
reward and punishment is complementary and enhanced when both methods are presented 
simultaneously because it can constantly deviate employees from their self-interests and 
motivate them to continuously comply with the information security policy.  Additionally, 
Andreoni et al. (2003) pointed out that it may be a mistake when only rewards, omitting an 
option for punishment, is used to design an institution.  Based on our results, we believe 
designing an incentive mechanism around punishment only and omitting reward may also be a 
mistake, although such strategy is commonly used in current practice of protecting information 
security.   
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Furthermore, we also compared reward and punishment in complying with information 
security policy.  We found that the expected difference of Exp1R – Exp1P is positively 
significant with a p-value less than 0.001.  It means reward is more powerful than punishment for 
preventing insider data breaches caused by employees.  This is an interesting result, although the 
extant majority literature found that perceived punishment is more effective than perceived 
reward (Bulgurcu et al. 2009; Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Liang et al. 2013; Pahnila et al. 2007; 
Siponen et al. 2010; Vance et al. 2012).  This literature all used survey as measurement mean, 
which did not allow differentiated incentives to engage survey takers.  Such method suffers from 
self-report bias as survey takers tend to provide socially desirable answer to the questionnaires 
(Krumpal 2013).  In addition, the survey method tends to ask participants about information 
security compliance in a general fashion, which is almost impossible to capture one’s genuine 
thought when facing temptations.  Instead, our behavioral economics approach with hypothetical 
multi-scenario based measurement further revealed the superior regulating power of reward 
compared with punishment in an information security policy compliance setting.   
 
Although violating information security policy is socially undesirable/unethical behavior 
or may even be illegal behavior, a company frequently delegates the compliant responsibility to 
employees’ ethics or moral standards (Herath and Rao 2009a).  Accordingly, deterrence is 
commonly used to enhance such effect when one’s ethical or moral obligation is weak.  
However, employees may not actually perceive the security policy that way, especially when 
facing time pressure or temptations.  Puhakainen and Ahonen (2006) showed that employees 
perceive that the security policy slows down their work with added procedures.  As discussed 
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earlier in the literature review section, providing rewards for employees to put effort into 
complying with the security policy will reconcile their unwillingness for additional time spent in 
security procedure, although such compliant behavior ought to be their obligations.  After all, a 
company paying a little extra reward to prevent huge data breaches is more beneficial and less 
disruptive.   
 
3.6.2.  Experiment 2 and discussions 
Our Experiment 2 was particularly designed for studying how Collective Sanctions 
(Collective Reward and Collective Punishment) influence employees’ compliant behavior.  
Based on Table 2’s statistical results, it seems that in general Collective Sanctions have negative 
impacts on employees’ compliance.  The expected difference of Exp2P – Exp1C is -0.091 with a 
p-value less than 0.001 and the expected difference of Exp2R – Exp1C is -0.150 with a p-value 
less than 0.001.  This result indicates that a company is better off relying on employees’ 
conscience or moral standards rather than using collective reward or collective punishment.  This 
might be the reason why it is very rare to see an American company either reward all their 
employees, when they all cooperatively complying, or punish all including complaint employees, 
when someone is breaking the security policy.   
 
Furthermore, the impact of collective sanctions on employees’ cooperation in security 
compliance can be explored by comparing individual reward with collective reward and 
individual punishment with collective punishment.  Specifically, the expected difference of 
Exp2P – Exp1P is -0.118 with a p-value less than 0.001 and the expected difference of Exp2R – 
Exp1R is -0.252 with a p-value is less than 0.001.  The expected difference of Exp2RP – 
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Exp1RP is -0.180 with a p-value is less than 0.001.  All these results show that collective 
sanctions undermine the individual sanctions (i.e., individual reward or/and individual 
punishment) in our research setting.  Remember, our theoretical augment mentioned that 
collective sanction could promote as well as undermine cooperation in compliance.  The 
following figure will provide more behind-the-scene details. 
 
 
Figure 2 Exp2: Collective Reward and Punishment 
 
Figure 2 presents the Difference of Compliance Ratio for all 30 scenarios in Experiment 
2 when Exp1C is used as the subtracted base to control the scenarios’ difference.  Clearly, it 
shows that collective sanctions have a spiral-downward impact on cooperative compliance with 
information security policy.  This declining trend is consistent with Fehr and Gächter (2000)’s 
stranger-group experiment without punishment option, although there is a distinct difference 
between our work and theirs.  They studied how giving group members the option to punish non-
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cooperative ones to enhance overall contribution in a Public Good game.  Our collective 
punishment, as defined by Heckathorn (1988), is more similar with their no-punishment-option 
group with an external punishing force.  In other words, we study how external punishment will 
impact on group members’ cooperation in compliance.   
 
Initially, collective sanctions seem to have stronger regulating power over individual 
sanctions (compared with Figure 1) in Scenario 1, especially for the collective punishment.  
However, it cannot sustain even though both reward and punishment mechanism is presented 
(illustrated by ∆Exp2RP).  Then, the regulating power starts to weaken and converge to an 
inferior equilibrium when more and more people commit noncompliant behavior.  This could be 
explained by the following.  Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) found that a minority of altruists can 
force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate when cooperators are given the opportunity to 
punish directly to defectors.  Meanwhile, Rand et al. (2009) showed that it is not the punishment 
option but the targeted interaction for sustaining cooperation in contributing the public goods 
game.   Therefore, we argue that when the compliant majority (initially) are not given the option 
to target those minority of noncompliant ones, a few noncompliant behaviors (under the 
environment of collective reward or/and punishment) will stimulate reciprocal selfishness and 
bitterness due to tit for tat among group members to seek their own self-benefit, which will 
gradually collapse the cooperation in security compliance.   
 
Although both collective reward and collective punishment have declining regulating 
power, collective reward tends to diminish more rapidly than collective punishment for security 
compliance.  In fact, the expected difference of Exp2R – Exp2P is -0.060 with a p-value less than 
69 
0.001.  This indicates that collective punishment is more effective than collective reward, 
although our Experiment 1 shows individual reward is more powerful than individual 
punishment.  Remember, the collective reward will be given to all employees when no one is 
breaking the policy.  Instead, the collective punishment will be imposed on all employees as long 
as someone is violating the rules.  Generally, the possibility for all group members to comply is 
much less than for someone in the group to not comply with the security policy.  Therefore, such 
small-chance condition significantly undermines the superior regulating power of collective 
reward compared with collective punishment, which implies that collective reward should not be 
used in a large group-size setting.   
 
Lastly, the expected difference of Exp2RP – Exp2P is 0.106 with a p-value less than 
0.001 and the expected difference of Exp2RP – Exp2R is 0.168 with a p-value less than 0.001.  
This means that collective reward and punishment together outperform either collective reward 
or collective punishment, which is consistent with our result in Experiment 1.  In addition, Figure 
2 also demonstrates the similar patterns as Figure 1 for this finding.  This further demonstrates 
that reward and punishment are complementary to one another no matter whether they are in 
individual forms or collective forms.   
 
3.6.3.  Experiment 3 and discussions 
So far, we have studied how rewards and punishments affect employees’ security 
compliance in a perfect detection environment.  However, as pointed out earlier, such detection 
system cannot be faultless in the real world.  Hence, our Experiment 3 was conducted to 
understand how a low chance of being caught influences employees’ compliance behavior.  The 
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expected difference of Exp3C – Exp1C is -0.038 with a significant p-value of 0.015.  Hence, our 
hypothesis 4 is strongly supported, as a low chance of being caught has a negative impact on 
employees’ behavior of complying with a company’s information security policy.  Furthermore, 
the expected difference of Exp3P – Exp1P is -0.117 with a p-value less than 0.001, the expected 
difference of Exp3R – Exp1R is -0.069 with a p-value of 0.043, and the expected difference of 
Exp3RP – Exp1RP is -0.175 with a p-value less than 0.001.  These results strongly support our 
hypotheses 5 and 6 that the low chance of being caught undermines the regulating power of 
individual reward or/and individual punishment.   
 
 
Figure 3 Exp3-I: Individual Reward and Punishment with Imperfect Detection 
 
To simply control the scenarios’ wording difference, Figure 3 used Exp1C as the 
subtracted base to illustrate the Difference of Compliance Ratio for all 30 scenarios in 
Experiment 3.  Noticeably, a declining trend is presented even when individual reward and 
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punishment together was used.  Comparing the line of Exp3C with the base (Exp1C), inferior 
compliance rates with larger magnitude are frequently displayed.  Furthermore, comparing the 
line of Exp3P, Exp3R, and Exp3RP with Figure 1’s Exp1P, Exp1R, and Exp1RP, respectively, 
the trends of reducing power of regulating noncompliance are also observed for all three pairs.  
This suggests that the effect of individual reward or/and individual punishment is gradually 
diminished under a large uncertain condition (20% inspection rate).  All these findings further 
supported our hypotheses 4, 5, and 6.   
 
 
Figure 4 Exp3-II: Individual Reward and Punishment with Imperfect Detection 
 
In order to further understand how individual reward differs from individual punishment 
under the low chance of being caught condition, Figure 4 shows the Difference of Compliance 
Ratio for all 30 scenarios in Experiment 3 when Exp3C is used as the subtracted base.  Firstly, 
the same declining trend is still presented for individual reward or/and punishment after 
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controlling the detection effect (i.e., using Exp3C to partial out the scenario wording as well as a 
low-chance detection condition).  Secondly, individual reward still outperforms individual 
punishment under the small inspection condition.  This can be further demonstrated by the 
expected difference of Exp3R – Exp3P is 0.123 with a p-value less than 0.001.  Moreover, the 
expected difference of Exp3R – Exp3C is 0.072 with a p-value of 0.031, which means that 
individual reward still has significant regulating power over noncompliance after controlling the 
detection effect.  These two results are consistent with our finding in Experiment 1.  A closer 
comparison between Figure 1 and Figure 4 seems to indicate that the regulating power of 
individual reward or/and individual punishment is shrinking (amplitude-wise) over time after 
controlling for the detection effect.   
 
Interestingly, individual punishment with small inspection is no better than the control 
group with small inspection, as the expected difference of Exp3P – Exp3C is -0.050 with a p-
value of 0.121.  Meanwhile, individual reward and punishment together with small inspection is 
also no better than individual reward only with small inspection because the expected difference 
of Exp3RP – Exp3R is not significant with a p-value of 0.452.  This could be explained by our 
common sense that law must be enforced, otherwise, no one will obey it eventually.  When 
deterrence is uncertain to a large degree, the regulating power of punishment is often ignored 
over time by employees.  This finding suggests a company needs to enhance its deterrence 
certainty in order to prevent insider data breaches if the punishment mechanism is adapted, 
although we found that punishment only is not effective to present noncompliance.  Since 
individual punishment with small inspection is gradually disregarded, the complementary effect 
between reward and punishment is minimized.  Hence, the effect of individual reward and 
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punishment together with small inspection is statistically no difference on average from 
individual reward with small inspection.   
 
3.6.4.  Experiment 4 and discussions 
Our Experiment 4 is the most comprehensive and was designed to study how a low 
chance of being caught interacts with collective sanctions to regulate noncompliant behavior.  
The expected difference of Exp4P – Exp1C is negative (-0.123) with a p-value less than 0.001.  
However, the expected difference of Exp4R – Exp1C is 0.063 with a p-value less than 0.001 and 
expected difference of Exp4RP – Exp1C is 0.057 with a p-value of 0.018.  These suggests that 
collective reward with a small inspection outperforms the most basic control group, which relies 
on employees’ perceived obligation for compliance.  But, collective punishment with a small rate 
of inspection is worse than the basic control group.  The following Figure 5 may reveal the 
reasons and provide more details.     
 
74 
 
Figure 5 Exp4-I: Collective Reward and Punishment with Imperfect Detection 
 
Figure 5 used Exp1C as the subtracted base to demonstrate the Difference of Compliance 
Ratio for all 30 scenarios in Experiment 4 to only control the scenarios’ wording difference.  A 
less rapid declining trend is observed compared with Figure 2.  Such declining trend is inevitable 
because our collective sanction mechanism does not permit group members to target one another.  
However, the low chance of being caught (i.e. large uncertainty) delays the collapse of 
cooperation in information security compliance caused by the collective sanctions.   
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Figure 6 Exp4-II: Collective Reward and Punishment with Imperfect Detection 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the Difference of Compliance Ratio for all 30 scenarios in Experiment 
4 when Exp3C is used as the subtracted base for controlling scenarios’ wording difference as 
well as detection effect.  Although the declining trend is still presented for the collective 
sanctions under the small inspection condition, this non-compliance trend is also moderated and 
slowed down, compared to Figure 2.  After controlling for the detection effect, the expected 
difference of Exp4P – Exp3C is also negative (-0.085) with a p-value less than 0.001, the 
expected difference of Exp4R – Exp3C is 0.101 with a p-value less than 0.001, and the expected 
difference of Exp4RP – Exp3C is 0.095 with a p-value less than 0.001.  This means that 
collective reward only as well as collective reward and punishment together outperform the 
control group under the environment of a large uncertainty.  But, collective punishment is worse 
than the control group when a low chance of being caught is present.   
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Although these are inconsistent with our findings about the general negative effect of 
collective sanctions in Experiment 2, when detection is certain; it is still very interesting to learn 
that collective reward is superior and collective punishment is inferior no matter the low chance 
of being caught is involved in the treatment or controlled in the treatment.  This also 
demonstrates that the interactions between collective sanctions and low chance of being caught 
are not simple liner additive relationship, as both collective reward and collective punishment 
would be worse than the control group after controlling the large uncertainty influence.  Rather, 
the low chance of being caught transforms the collective reward mechanism and differentiates its 
regulating power from the collective punishment.   
 
In addition, after controlling for the detection effect by comparing Experiment 4 with 
Experiment 3, we can learn how the low chance of being caught changes the relationship 
between collective sanctions and individual sanctions.  The expected difference of Exp4P – 
Exp3P is negative (-0.035) with a p-value of 0.012, which suggests that collective punishment is 
worse than individual punishment under the condition of a large uncertainty.  This is consistent 
with a previous finding when the detection system is perfect.  On the contrary, collective reward 
is slightly better than individual reward when a large uncertainty is present.  This can be seen by 
the expected difference of Exp4R – Exp3R is 0.029 with a p-value of 0.114 (one tail is 0.057).  
Furthermore, the expected mean of Exp4RP – Exp3RP is also positive (0.037) with a p-value 
less than 0.001.  This means that the collective reward and punishment together is better than 
individual reward and punishment together when a low chance of being caught is present.   
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In order to understand the fundamental reasons behind the above inconsistent results 
compared when detection is certain, we also compared Experiment 4 with Experiment 2.  The 
only difference between these two experiments is the low chance of being caught.  We found that 
the large uncertainty has a negative impact on collective punishment, but a positive impact on 
collective reward.  These can be shown by the expected difference of Exp4P – Exp2P is negative 
(-0.032) with a p-value of 0.004, but the expected difference of Exp4R – Exp2R is positive 
(0.215) with a p-value less than 0.001.  In addition, the expected difference of Exp4RP – 
Exp2RP is 0.041 with a p-value of 0.037.  This indicates that the large uncertainty also has a 
positive impact on collective reward and punishment together.  These results are consistent with 
the findings when the detection effect is controlled between Experiment 3 and 4.  The following 
is our arguments why a large degree of uncertainty plays different roles between collective 
reward and collective punishment, as well as how it transforms collective reward from inferior to 
superior performance in enhancing compliant behavior.   
 
Due to the low chance of being caught and uncertain punishment, people tend to commit 
more to security violations.  This catalyzes the reciprocal selfishness and cultivates a negative 
atmosphere among group members, and hence facilitates the deterioration of cooperation in 
security compliance.  Therefore, the low chance of being caught has a significant negative 
impact on collective punishment no matter if it is involved in the treatment (i.e., Exp4P vs. 
Exp2P) or controlled in the treatment (i.e., Exp4P vs. Exp3P). 
 
Remember, punishment will be imposed on everyone, including compliant people, as 
long as someone in the inspection list is noncompliant.  Whereas, reward will be given to 
78 
everyone including noncompliant ones, when all people in the inspection list is compliant.  
Therefore, the small inspection list (i.e., low chance of being caught) actually relaxes the very 
restricted small-chance condition (see the Experiment 2 and Discussions) required by our 
collective reward mechanism, although more people get rewarded even if they might be 
noncompliant.  This reduces the tie-for-tat hatred among group members, as the chance of 
reward being incorrectly taken away from compliant ones is greatly reduced.  Accordingly, the 
regulating power of reward is reserved and stands out.  Hence, the low chance of being caught 
has a significant positive impact on collective reward, no matter whether it is involved in the 
treatment (i.e., Exp4R vs. Exp2R) or controlled in the treatment (i.e., Exp4R vs. Exp3R).  
Consequently, the complementary effect between collective reward and collective punishment is 
also reserved and enhanced due to the collective reward’s outstanding, no matter the low chance 
of being caught is involved in the treatment (i.e., Exp4RP vs. Exp2RP) or controlled in the 
treatment (i.e., Exp4RP vs. Exp3RP).   
 
Lastly, within Experiment 4, we also observed a couple of similar patterns as Experiment 
3.  Collective reward with small inspection outperforms collective punishment with small 
inspection.  This can be found by the expected difference of Exp4R – Exp4P is 0.188 with a p-
value less than 0.001.  In addition, the expected difference of Exp4RP – Exp4R is not significant, 
with a p-value of 0.733; therefore, collective reward and punishment together with small 
inspection is no better than collective reward only with small inspection.  This further 
demonstrates that reward is the preferred mechanism to regulate insider data breaches even in a 
collective form under the environment of a low chance of being caught.      
 
79 
 
3.7.  Robustness, Demographic and Personal Characteristic Variables 
We collected the participants’ demographic and personal characteristic variables 
instructed by Hu et al. (2015)’s paper.  In addition, we also employed the Holt and Laury 
(2002)’s risk aversion’s measurement, as suggested by the risk taking and impulsivity survey 
construct adopted from Hu et al. (2015)’s paper.  As aforementioned, in order to understand how 
demographic and personal characteristic variables influence participants’ decisions for 
information security policy violation, we had to change the unit of analysis from treatment group 
level to individual person level.  As each participant makes binary a decision between 
compliance (“No”) and noncompliance (“Yes”), logit regression is used with encoding “No” as 1 
and “Yes” as 0.  In addition, clustered errors around the same participant is adjusted in the 
regression, because we coded dummy variables through 1 to 30 to control the potential effects 
caused by 30 different scenarios’ wording.  The following Table 3 shows the logit regression 
results for participants’ compliance with information security policy.   
 
Table 3 Logit Regression Results for Information Security Policy Compliance  
Dependent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Exp1C 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) 
Exp1P 0.0270 0.0263 0.0407 
 (0.0561) (0.0540) (0.0574) 
Exp1R 0.101+ 0.108* 0.117* 
 (0.0572) (0.0526) (0.0565) 
Exp1RP 0.194*** 0.183*** 0.202*** 
 (0.0536) (0.0510) (0.0542) 
Exp2P -0.0917 -0.0919+ -0.0712 
 (0.0591) (0.0538) (0.0578) 
Exp2R -0.152** -0.137* -0.140* 
 (0.0540) (0.0544) (0.0556) 
Exp2RP 0.0148 0.0133 0.0329 
 (0.0615) (0.0571) (0.0609) 
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Table 3 continued 
Exp3C -0.0377 -0.0380 -0.0222 
 (0.0590) (0.0529) (0.0571) 
Exp3P -0.0881 -0.0968+ -0.0737 
 (0.0553) (0.0526) (0.0575) 
Exp3R 0.0348 0.0367 0.0475 
 (0.0586) (0.0570) (0.0587) 
Exp3RP 0.0215 0.0259 0.0377 
 (0.0596) (0.0557) (0.0606) 
Exp4P -0.124* -0.0941+ -0.100+ 
 (0.0561) (0.0527) (0.0556) 
Exp4R 0.0630 0.0729 0.0878 
 (0.0609) (0.0583) (0.0622) 
Exp4RP 0.0578 0.0493 0.0698 
 (0.0638) (0.0595) (0.0627) 
    
Scenario Difference Controlled Controlled Controlled 
    
Risk Taking  -0.0367***  
  (0.00870)  
Impulsivity  -0.0330***  
  (0.00957)  
HL Risk Aversion  0.00206 0.00837+ 
  (0.00481) (0.00500) 
Age  0.0227* 0.0266** 
  (0.0101) (0.00992) 
Gender: Male  0.0249 0.0833 
  (0.196) (0.185) 
Gender: Female  0.0582 0.127 
  (0.196) (0.185) 
Gender: Other  -0.0370 -0.0670 
  (0.355) (0.320) 
Gender: N.A.  0 0 
  (.) (.) 
Dominant Hand: Right  -0.0502 -0.0919 
  (0.115) (0.124) 
Dominant Hand: Left  -0.0337 -0.0812 
  (0.119) (0.127) 
Dominant Hand: N.A.  0 0 
  (.) (.) 
Non-business Major  0 0 
  (.) (.) 
Business Major  -0.00329 0.00148 
  (0.0215) (0.0221) 
Computer Skills  -0.00958 -0.00791 
  (0.0125) (0.0127) 
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Table 3 continued 
Class: Freshman  -0.0512 -0.0590 
  (0.258) (0.294) 
Class: Sophomore  -0.103 -0.0954 
  (0.257) (0.294) 
Class: Junior  -0.0690 -0.0566 
  (0.256) (0.293) 
Class: Senior  -0.142 -0.125 
  (0.255) (0.292) 
Class: N.A.  0 0 
  (.) (.) 
GPA  -0.00890 0.00547 
  (0.0103) (0.0105) 
Race: White  -0.0663 -0.0326 
  (0.138) (0.142) 
Race: Hispanic/Latino  -0.0782 -0.0377 
  (0.145) (0.149) 
Race: Black/African American  -0.0941 -0.0521 
  (0.143) (0.147) 
Race: Asian/Pacific Islander  -0.0419 -0.0268 
  (0.141) (0.145) 
Race: Other  -0.0579 0.0287 
  (0.154) (0.160) 
Race: N.A.  0 0 
  (.) (.) 
Organizational Experience  0.00998 0.00929 
  (0.0137) (0.0140) 
Computer Hours  0.00898+ 0.00802 
  (0.00531) (0.00550) 
Note: Marginal Effects (dy/dx) with Standard Errors in parentheses; N.A. stands for No Answer 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
The most basic control group (i.e., Exp1C) was used as the base for categorical variable 
in the logit regression to test the treatment effects after controlling the scenario difference in the 
Model 1.  Exp1RP, Exp2R, and Exp4P are significantly different from Exp1C for information 
security compliance.  And Exp1R is weakly significant at 0.1 level for compliance as well.  
These results are consistent with our time series autoregressive model test for DCR.  This is 
reflected by the same direction (i.e., sign) of numbers between the marginal effects of logit 
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regression and the expected difference of DCR (the first row of Table 2) in the time series data 
analysis.  Careful readers may wonder why time series data analysis shows more significant 
value than the logit regression.  This is because the standard errors for treatment effect are more 
precise when the unit of analysis of treatment group is used.  As our research question is about 
the compliance behavior in workplace as group, using individual person as the unit of analysis 
for treatment effect is not appropriate, although it can permit us to study the individual difference 
for compliance.  Furthermore, the standard errors caused by other unobserved variables of 
individual difference shall be averaged out when we use the treatment group as the unit of 
analysis, which shall provide more accurate statistical test results for treatment effect.    
 
The logit regression with demographic and personal traits variables is presented in Model 
2 of Table 3.  Interestingly, the significance level and the sign of marginal effects did not change 
much, except Exp1R is significant from the 0.1 to 0.05 level and Exp3P becomes significant at 
the 0.1 level.  This means that those demographic and personal traits variables should be 
orthogonal to the treatment variables for information security compliance.  This further 
demonstrates our robust results of time series data analysis, as it did not incorporate those 
demographic and personal traits variables for examining the treatment effect.   
 
In addition, risk taking is negatively significant at 0.001 level.  This suggests that risk-
loving employees are more likely to violate information security policy.  Furthermore, 
impulsivity is also negatively significant.  Impulsive people was defined by Hu et al. (2015) as 
the individuals who do not take adequate time to evaluate input before making a decision.  
Hence, it makes sense that impulsive employees tend to violate information security policy more 
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due to the time-saving characteristic.  Moreover, age is another significant factor for security 
compliance.  The positive coefficient of age suggests that the older employees are more likely to 
comply with information security policy compared with younger ones.   
 
However, gender, dominant hand, computer skills, education level and grades, ethnicity, 
as well as organizational experience have no significant impact on information security 
compliance, although the average hours of using computers per day seems to have a weak effect.  
This may very well explain why insider data breaches happened so frequently no matter the 
workplace environment (e.g., companies, governmental sectors, universities, or other nonprofit 
organizations).  It is worthy to note that business major students are no different from non-
business major ones for information security compliance.  This demonstrates that our data 
collection is unbiased for gathering two populations.   
 
Unexpectedly, the Holt and Laury (2002)’s risk aversion’s measurement is not significant 
in Model 2.  We suspected that this may be caused by its multicollinearity with risk taking and 
impulsivity, as risk aversion is a very similar construct with previous two in an opposite way.  
Hence, we omitted both risk taking and impulsivity in Model 3.  Then, risk aversion becomes 
weakly significant with a positive sign of marginal effect.  The positive value matches to our 
intuition as well as risk taking’s result that risk-averse individuals are more likely to comply with 
the information security policy.  In addition, Model 3 represents the almost same regression 
results as Model 2 even without two significant factors.  This further proves that the 
demographic and personal traits variables are independent from the treatment variables for 
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information security compliance.  Therefore, it further demonstrates the robustness of the results 
concluded from our time series data analysis.    
 
3.8.  Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations 
Information security is an undebatable important question for both academic research as 
well as industry practice.  Although so much effort has been put into this topic through various 
means including technological defense as well as regulating policy, data breaches seem to 
become more and more common and hard to prevent.  Much literature has identified that human 
factors, particularly employees’ noncompliance with the information security policy, are the 
fundamental causes for data breaches, as insider employees are the weakest spot for security 
defense.   
 
Our paper aims to design a realistic incentive structure to help a company to better 
protect its information assets.  To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first attempt 
through the lens of behavioral economics to explore how individual sanctions, collective 
sanctions, and detection influence employees’ compliance with a company’s information 
security policy.  The nature and complexity of individual reward, collective reward, individual 
punishment, collective punishment, a large uncertainty, and their interactions were gradually 
unfolded through a series of sequential lab experiments.  Furthermore, we illustrate that a few 
noncompliant behaviors are fatal to the security defense of a company, especially under the 
current Internet era.  Hence, how to regulate such noncompliance and “induce” cooperative 
compliant behavior is even more critical for a company’s long-term benefit.  After the 
thoroughly discussions of our experimental results, we have the following major conclusions.   
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Firstly, individual reward and punishment together with certainty is the best strategy for a 
company to regulate its employees’ noncompliance.  This can be clearly evidenced by the 
dominant superior performance of Exp1RP in Table 2.  In a broader setting beyond the 
information security, temper justice with mercy or carrot and stick has hundreds of years of 
usage history for preventing social undesirable behavior and cultivate the wanted behavior.  The 
complementary effect between reward and punishment is very strong, and thus omitting either 
one could be a considerable managerial mistake.  Therefore, in the long run, a company shall 
always employ both means to achieve better regulating power, although it may cost the company 
some capital for rewarding.    
 
Secondly, individual reward is always better than individual punishment for intensifying 
security compliance.  This suggests a company shall rethink about their managerial policy which 
is deterrence based.  Why do people break rules even though they know it is wrong?  Don’t 
employees understand that it is their obligation to obey the policy?  It seems that employee’s 
perception of security procedure is not in line with the company’s, as the employee wants more 
work done but the company wants more work done securely.  In addition, the modern fast-pace 
life style may make employees pursue more self-interests and short-run benefits.  Hence, giving 
a reward for compliant behavior aligns both parties’ interests.   
 
Thirdly, collective sanctions are a complex incentive mechanism.  A company should use 
it with great caution.  In general, collective sanctions have a spiral-downwards impact on 
cooperative compliance when interactions among employees are not permitted.  For a large size 
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company with loose social ties including blood bonds among employees, it would be very 
dangerous to adopt collective sanctions mechanism to regulate noncompliance.  Punishing all 
due to a few noncompliant ones may cause rebellion and hatred culture in the workplace.  
Meanwhile, rewarding all becomes a small-probability event as the size of group members is 
large.  Thus, employees’ motivation for pursuing the collective reward is dramatically reduced.  
Instead, a company may try the collective reward to those small departments or groups which 
have a strong interactive atmosphere.  Furthermore, different cultures may have different results 
when collective sanctions are used.  It might be reasonable to argue that collective sanctions are 
better supported by collective cultures than individual cultures.  A company with a collective 
culture may be able to better utilize the collective sanctions to achieve its positive potential 
pointed out by Heckathorn (1988). 
 
Fourthly, a large uncertainty or small inspection rate undermines the incentive power of 
individual reward or/and individual punishment.  Hence, a company must improve its detection 
systems in order to take full advantage of individual sanctions.  This requires the joint effort 
between a company’s technical team and managerial leadership.  In addition, uncertainty has a 
stronger negative force to weaken punishment, as the deterrence is not fully enforced.  A 
company is better off to either not use punishment or make it certain; otherwise, punishment with 
uncertainty is even worse than employees’ own moral/ethical obligations.  Therefore, in the real 
workplace with a small inspection or very low detection accuracy, the company should always 
avoid using a punishment only mechanism no matter in individual form or collective form, but 
use it only when rewards are also present. 
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Lastly, examining through our four experiments, we find that the superior complementary 
effect between reward and punishment is always observed no matter in individual form or 
collective form.  In addition, a company is also advised to avoid hiring risk-loving, impulsive, 
and junior people (if possible) for the key information security positions.  Because those 
employees may pose a stronger threat to a company’s security defense and their compliance may 
not be easily improved by rewards or/and punishments no matter in what forms.           
 
 
  
88 
CHAPTER 4.  THE APPLICATION OF BLOCKCHAIN IN ADVANCING 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
 
4.1.  Introduction  
In the era of big data, information assets are one of the most valuable intangible 
productive capital for a company to compete with its rivals, to learn consumers’ shopping habits, 
to guide its development directions, and to standout to retain its profitability.  However, with the 
Internet’s characteristic of pervasiveness, information breaches from both external hacking and 
internal corruption are continuously encroaching a firm’s economic profit.  In 2013, The New 
York Times reported an international cybercriminal group had stolen up to $1 billion from more 
than 100 banking and financial institutions in 30 different countries around the world.  More 
concerning, these cyberattacks continued for two years without detection by banks, regulators, or 
law enforcement (Sanger and Perlroth 2015).  In the same year, Target’s payment network 
system was intruded via its third-party vendor, Fazio Mechanical Services, a provider of 
refrigeration and HVAC systems according to CNN news (Wallace 2014).  More importantly, so 
many corporations or organizations are constantly dealing with data breaches without 
announcing it to the public.  This is mainly due to the firm’s self-protection of its brand 
reputation and fear of letting the public know its failure of protecting its customers’ information.  
Hence, securing information assets has become one of the top concerns of a firm’s future 
developing strategy.  Although information science, computer science, and other related 
disciplines have developed advanced tools to protect information assets, hacking activities grow 
worse by the day.  We cannot help but to ask ourselves: “Why?”  Are there any problems about 
the fundamental design of our current information security models?  In this conceptual article, 
89 
we introduce the breakthrough idea, Blockchain, the first native digital medium for securely 
transferring value over the Internet (Tapscott and Tapscott 2016).  Furthermore, we rely on the 
Theory of Bounded Rationality to discuss how Blockchain technology can undermine the 
motivations of intruders in order to prevent information breaches.   
 
4.2.  The Theory of Bounded Rationality and Information Security Defense 
Rationality is widely used as the core assumption for studying individual behaviors in 
microeconomic models.  It assumes that one shall always behave selfishly.  Rational Choice 
Theory in economics further explains that an individual has preferences among the available 
choice alternatives that allow them to state which option they prefer (Tversky and Kahneman 
1986).  Accordingly, the rational agent is assumed to consider all available information and 
potential costs as well as benefits in determining preferences, and to act consistently in choosing 
the self-determined best choice of action.  Rational choice theory also assumes that an individual 
has a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and is capable of finding the highest 
attainable point on a preference scale among all alternative choices.  Herbert A. Simon (1955) 
instead argues that humans are limited for the tractability of the decision problem, the cognitive 
limitations of his minds, and the time available for him to make the most optimal decision.  
When an individual uses heuristics to make decisions rather than a strict rigid rule of 
optimization due to his inability to process so many complex alternatives, this is so call Bounded 
Rationality.  This Theory of Bounded Rationality has been widely used in economics, political 
science and related disciplines for its practical view of human rational (Gigerenzer and Selten 
2002).  However, for protecting information assets and preventing data breaches from a 
managerial perspective, bounded rationality is underexplored.   
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The classical approach to information security defense is to employ the principles of 
defense in depth and least privilege.  Those principles stand from a technical view of information 
security to block an attack by layers of redundant defense mechanisms, and restricting users’ 
(e.g., employees’) privilege to access protected information so as to prevent breaches.  Even with 
a best-effort application of contemporary technology supporting these two key principles, data 
breaches still happen.  In this paper, we turn our attention to the motivation of the attacker rather 
than focusing on mechanisms to prevent unknown assailants.   
 
As both external hackers and insider employees are human beings with bounded 
rationality, a better defense system could utilize the nature of limited cognitive capacity of 
human beings to undermine intruders’ motivations for data breaches.  In other words, a defense 
system by leveraging human’s bounded rationality to force intruders to compliance with the 
system rather than break into the system would be the ultimate solution for information security.    
 
4.3.  Motivations and Incentives for Data Breaches 
The famous criminal Willie Sutton was once asked why he robbed banks, Sutton replied, 
“because that’s where the money is.”  One may wonder why few persons rob the federal reserve 
banks nowadays.  This is because the robbers’ bounded rationality that they have limited 
resources and capacity to execute their robbing plan.  Data acts like “oil” in the digital economy 
and “fuel” its respective corporation to operate.  Hence, it is extremely critical for a company to 
secure its data from tampering and maintain the access to its data for uninterruptible usage.  On 
the other hand, when valuable things are protected in multiple locations, it is extremely costly for 
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the protectors to operate, at least this is true for physical treasure.  Hence, firms are constantly 
facing data breaches as their data is valuable and centrally protected.   
 
Practically, money has no value if it cannot be traded for other things.  The same is true 
for data as well.  Stolen data are profitable for intruders when they can be exchanged or sold to 
others for monetary gain (e.g., credit card information), when they can be tampered or 
manipulated for malicious purposes (e.g., governmental secrets), and when they can be leveraged 
or utilized for threatening (e.g., private records).  If there is no demand, supply will decrease 
over time.  For example, email accounts used to be very profitable stolen information (e.g., $4 ~ 
$30 per account in 2007) for intruders as one’s email may contain valuable information such as 
disclosing logins to other important online services (Wueest 2015).  By 2015, the price for 1,000 
stole email accounts has dropped to as low as $0.50.  Instead of stealing email accounts, more 
and more identity related data breaches (e.g., medical information) occur in recent years as they 
are more profitable for hackers.  According to McAfee Labs Report (McFarland et al. 2015), the 
sale of a victim’s identity information is the most frightening and profitable among all categories 
in current data breaches.  Credit card with full personal identifiable information including social 
security number, mother’s maiden name, and date of birth is worth of $30 per account in the 
black market.  Even worse, some hackers demanded a ransom of €20,000 for threatening to 
disclose Labio (a French medical-service provider) patients’ diagnostic test results publicly. As 
data breaches keep happening with different forms, we believe the new way of thinking to 
prevent data breaches is to employ an approach which may eventually undermine those 
motivations of intruders for hacking data centers.   
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Accordingly, there are three main categories for intruders’ motivations: monetary gain, 
political purposes, and emotional incentives.  Emotional incentives could include the revenge 
motivation of an disgruntled employee, mischievous motivation because of curiosity, and self-
actualization of a sophisticated hacker.  Political hacking could include a governmental 
sponsored effort.  Monetary gain, especially for online-bank data breaches, is the major 
motivation for data breaches (Peretti 2008).  Monetary-gain data breaches can have multiple 
forms.  Hackers may attack the banking systems directly or steal financial and identity 
information from other industrial sectors (e.g., hospital).  In October 2014, JP Morgan found 
about 76 million households and 7 million businesses were compromised including names, 
addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, and others (Glazer and Yadron 2014).  Additionally, 
in May 2015, Anthem was attacked and about 80 million current and former customers’ 
information was stolen.  That information was sold for profit for fraud, identity theft, and even 
blackmail (Mathews 2015).  In December 2016, Yahoo announced more than one billion user 
accounts had been compromised since 2013, which is one of the largest data breaches until now.  
This attack involved sensitive information including names, telephone numbers, dates of birth, 
encrypted passwords and unencrypted security questions that could be used to reset a password 
(Goel and Perlroth 2016).   
 
In this paper, we focus on those intrusion activities based on monetary gain although the 
other two motivations for intrusions are also important.  We believe cutting off intruders’ avenue 
of cashing out stolen data is the key for future information security strategy.  The following will 
discuss how Blockchain technology with cryptocurrencies will help to protect the financial 
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industry, then we will extend the discussions to other industry that how Blockchain could 
assistant and advance current information defense systems.   
 
4.4.  The Value of Currency and the Value of Digital Assets 
Historically, trade is established because of the needs of exchange, and money exists to 
facilitate such trade between people.  Through the centuries, trade has become incredibly 
complex across regions.  Everyone trades with everyone worldwide.  Instead of the old-fashion 
of carrying gold around, modern local government issues physical money to safeguard the trade 
among unfamiliar parties within its span of control to securely facilitate the trade.  Trade is then 
recorded in bookkeeping, where the information is often isolated and closed to the public.  
Hence, people use third parties and middlemen they trust to facilitate and approve their 
transactions.  Accordingly, the bank system is established to do such tasks.  In ancient times, we 
assigned the privilege only to those people who we can mutually trust to handle our wealth and 
build a solid “wall” as well as use guards to safeguard against thieves.  In the modern time, our 
wealth is abstracted as a number in the bank’s private database which is secured by advanced 
information technologies.  Physical currency is valuable because it allows us to spend to fulfill 
our needs.  It is secured by the local government from counterfeiting and prevented naturally for 
double spending as a physical being.  Complementarily, our current e-bank systems are just the 
digital representation and extensions of the physical bank systems developed historically.  
Accordingly, it still requires the trusted third parties (i.e., banks) to perform trades even for on-
line transactions, audit one’s financial account from fraud, and prevent double spending issues 
through the central clearing house.   
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The value of a paper note is defined by the contemporary market although the number 
printed on it never changes.  The ownership of the paper note is secured when one possesses it.  
Most of the time, the value of physical assets can be quantified and abstracted as an amount of 
local currency.  The same principle is also true for the digital assets.  Its value is assessed by 
current market and secured by its respective ownership via technological protection in the digital 
world.  However, due to the zero cost of duplication of digital assets, the value of the digital 
assets cannot be easily transferred without an appropriate way of transferring ownership.  
Instead, their value may be diminished quickly with the number of replications.  In fact, in some 
cases like trade secrets, its value will be stolen completely when the original information asset is 
leaked out.  Therefore, Bitcoin, a digital cryptocurrency, was developed to secure virtual-
currency transactions over the Internet.  Furthermore, with the Internet’s pervasiveness, 
Blockchain technology, the underneath-supporting infrastructure of Bitcoin, was generalized for 
securely transferring value in the digital world.   
 
4.5.  Blockchain and a New Way to do Bookkeeping 
There is no clear origin of the concept of Blockchain, but its first application, Bitcoin, 
was published in 2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto.  Bitcoin is a purely peer-to-peer version of 
electronic cash, which allows online payments to be sent directly from one party to another 
without going through a financial institution (Nakamoto 2008).   
 
In a regular financial institution, bookkeeping is the foundational stone of its operations 
to record transactions.  Each financial institution (e.g., individual banks) has its own private 
ledger and a proportion of that ledger is made publicly for the central governing institution (e.g., 
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clearing house) to allow communications and broad transactions.  On the other hand, Blockchain 
is the underlying distributed general ledger of Bitcoin for recording that a transaction happened, 
when it happened, and that it happened correctly, without exposing any confidential details about 
the subject or the parties involved (Deloitte 2015).  Specifically, it is a vast globally distributed 
ledger or database running on millions of devices and open to anyone to access and audit who 
are on the Blockchain network.  Entries in the database are configured in “blocks” which are 
then chained together using digital, cryptographic signatures.  In the Blockchain ecosystem, trust 
is established not by powerful intermediaries like banks, governments and technology 
companies, but through mass collaboration and clever code (Tapscott and Tapscott 2016).  This 
is a key property of Blockchain applications. 
 
4.6.  Blockchain and its First Application, Bitcoin 
Bitcoin is different from the paper currency issued by governments to facilitate trade.  
Specifically, Bitcoin, at the basic level, is just a ledger with account numbers and balances with 
its owner’s “private key.”  It may sound like one’s online bank account, but the ledger of Bitcoin 
is owned by everyone in the Bitcoin network, not just one person’s bank systems.  One may feel 
uncomfortable that others may know his account information; however, the design of Blockchain 
cleverly resolves such concerns with a pair of keys that generated by the Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm (Bos et al. 2014).  A digital signature is a kind of one-way cryptographic 
puzzle that only the owner of the Bitcoin can solve because only she/he holds the key that 
generates the digital signature with hashing operation.  This is so-called “private key” which 
should be kept secret by its true owner.  The other half of the digital signature is called “public 
key”, which is calculated from its respective private key and such mathematical operation is not 
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reversible.  It is used by others to check whether the signature is genuine.  The public key can 
either be used raw in a transaction, or converted into a Bitcoin address by means of hashing and 
other operations to preserve anonymity.  The combination of a hacker’s bounded rationality and 
the complexity of the underlying cryptography makes it practically impossible to crack one’s 
private key as long as the private key is randomly chosen.   
 
There are three types of Blockchain infrastructures in current practice: public/open, 
private, and governmental (Mueller-Eberstein 2017).  Private and government controlled 
Blockchain networks are closed to the public and participants must be approved.  Accordingly, 
the speed of processing transaction is faster and typically the identities of involved nodes are 
known to the owners of the Blockchain infrastructures.  For example, Citibank has been 
experimenting its own version of digital currency, CitiCoin, within its own controlled network 
(Popper 2015).  Disney also invents its own Blockchain platform, called Dragonchain 
(McKendrick 2016).  The Dragonchain aims to create cost-efficient business networks where 
virtually anything of value can be tracked and traded.  On the governmental side, Estonia is one 
of the earliest governments adopting Blockchain technology to facilitate citizen interactions with 
the state through the use of electronic solutions (Walport 2016).  e-Estonia the Digital Society 
offers many e-services through its Blockchain network including i-Voting, e-Tax Board, e-
Business, e-Banking, e-Ticket, e-School, and e-Governance Academy (Scott 2014).  Its website 
states, e-Estonia “opens the door to all secure e-services while maintaining the highest level of 
security and trust”(Estonian 2017).  In Asia, the People’s Bank of China also heavily invests in 
Blockchain technology including its own version of digital currency (Popper 2016a).   
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In contrast to closed networks, the public/open Blockchain embraces everyone who wants 
to join in the network through the Internet.  It is permissionless and secured by proof-of-work, 
which is a piece of data that is difficult (costly and time-consuming) to produce but easy for 
others to verify and which satisfies certain requirements.  Because all participants on the network 
need to verify transactions and update local copies of the ledger in a globally consistent way, 
public Blockchain transactions typically takes longer to process.  Bitcoin is not only the first 
application of Blockchain, but also the most successful digital currency utilizing the public 
Blockchain infrastructure (Popper 2017).  Ethereum is another well-known application of public 
Blockchain which focuses on embedding smart contracts into Blockchain system (Popper 
2016b).  In this paper, we focus on the public Blockchain mechanism as other types are just 
derivatives.   
 
To illustrate how a fund transfer works in the Blockchain infrastructure, the transaction 
begins when the originator broadcasts to all network participants that funds are being transferred.  
The message includes the account numbers to be credited and debited, and the amount of the 
transfer.  Then, other computers or nodes in the Bitcoin network apply that transaction to their 
copy of the ledger and pass on the transaction to other nodes that have not yet received the 
message from the originator.  Eventually, everyone on the Bitcoin network will have the same 
copy of entire ledger; hence, it creates a system that lets a group of computers/entities maintain a 
ledger instead of a bank’s private network.  Unlike at a bank where you only know about your 
own transactions, everyone in the Bitcoin network knows about everyone else’s transactions.  In 
order for ensuring that the request of changing the transaction is authentic and only the rightful 
owner has sent the message, unlike a simple static password, a completely different digital 
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signature is required for every transaction (Driscoll 2013).  The Bitcoin owner needs his private 
key to create a transaction signature and others need the public key to check the validity of the 
on-going transaction.  The digital signature is unique among all transactions as it is generated by 
the owner’s private key with hashing the message itself.  Any attempted changes to the original 
transfer message will result in a completely different digital signature and the attack is therefore 
detected.  If the transaction is verified by miners (i.e., participating computers of processing 
Bitcoin transactions), it will add a new digital signature to the Bitcoins, which can be completed 
only by its new owner.  All miners work independently on their own version of the Blockchain to 
make sure the signature is correct and have enough Bitcoin balance to make the transactions (i.e., 
prevent double spending issues in the digital world); then they bundle the new records into a 
block and add it to the end of the Blockchain (Peck 2015).   
 
Hence, the ledger in a Blockchain is essentially a long-string of transaction records, each 
of which refers to an earlier record in the chain.  The arrangement will only converge when the 
miners agree on what the most recent version of the Blockchain should look like (Peck 2015).  
Because the process of adding a new block of transactions to the Blockchain is very difficult and 
it is designed that anyone who participates is required to devote a large amount of computing 
power and electricity towards running the new data through a set of complex math calculations 
(e.g., hash functions).  The complexity of the computations and the many copies of the ledger 
make it very difficult for an attacker to change the distributed Blockchain ledger without nearly 
complete collusion.   
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4.7.  Blockchain and Its Properties 
There are several key properties of the Blockchain ecosystem (Murck 2017) that make it 
interesting to consider in the context of improving information security.  First, distributed nature 
of structure to eliminate trusted third parties.  At the most basic level, Blockchain is very similar 
to the distributed database.  Each database has a full copy of original data, and any changes in 
one database will be synchronized across the others.  Instead of one or a few trusted third parties 
control the distributed database, everyone on the Blockchain has access to the entire database 
and its complete history, although the database is encrypted and accessible by its respective 
software only.  This breakthrough design allows Bitcoin to be used across multiple nations 
without banks and clearing houses.   
 
Second, peer-to-peer transmission without the need of middle parties.  Transactions over 
Blockchain network are peer-to-peer without going through the trusted nodes.  This allows the 
value transfer of digital assets quicker, faster, more efficient, and more secure as the 
vulnerability of middle parties are removed completely from hacking.  Accordingly, the 
likelihood of data breaches is greatly reduced.   
 
Third, transparency with pseudonym preserving information privacy.  Transactions over 
the Blockchain are identified by one’s public key, which is not associated with his identity.  
Furthermore, users on a Blockchain can choose to hash their public key and turn it into a 
blockchain address to further mask their private information, although every transaction and its 
associated value are visible to anyone with access to the system.  The hash function ensures the 
mathematical operation is one-direction conducted and non-invertible.  There is a unique link 
100 
between the hashed content and hash values; hence, user’s transactions are only theoretically 
traceable over blockchain although they may be hashed multiple times.  Accordingly, it might be 
possible for a hacker to identify a target over the Blockchain network, but based on the theory of 
bounded rationality and the enormous searching space behind the traces, hackers are not 
incentivized to do such attacks.   
 
Fourth, immutable from tampering.  This property is the core principle for Blockchain in 
advancing information security.  Once a transaction is agreed by miners, entered in the general 
ledger, and respective accounts are updated, the records cannot be practically altered, because 
they are linked to every previous transaction one by one through the chain.  Various 
computational algorithms and approaches are deployed to ensure that the recording on the 
database is permanent, time stamped, chronologically ordered, and available to all others to 
verify over the Blockchain network.    
 
Lastly, computational logic to enable auto-execution.  Blockchain is a digital ledger and 
thus inherits the program-enable nature of computational algorithms.  In other words, blockchain 
transactions can be tied to computational logic and in essence programmed to execute certain 
codes when the conditions are met.  Accordingly, certain rules and policy can be embedded into 
Blockchain network to ensure the intended tasks will be performed without malicious interfering.  
For example, the name of recipients or specific transaction rules can be easily programmed into 
the Bitcoin (so-called compliancy up front).  The unit of Bitcoin can even be programmed in 
such a way that it will automatically return to the sender if the receiver does not match to the on-
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file records.  Hence, such property can largely reduce the data breaches from both insider and 
outsiders as the compliance is put in place prior.   
 
A common approach to secure digital assets is to build walls to lock people out of the 
network/system and hand out encryption keys only to those people who are permitted to access 
the certain information.  The centralized control of protection of information assets is actually 
equal to the central point of failure of protecting, as the controlling node becomes the common 
target for attackers.  Moreover, such centrally controlled mechanisms cannot ultimately prevent 
sophisticated ones to break in, but instead leave a natural shelter for the hackers to hide 
themselves among public as the public do not hold a copy of the ledger to verify thereby to reject 
tampering.  Therefore, the properties of distributed mechanism and immutability of Blockchain 
can greatly improve current information security defense against external hackers’ attack.  In 
addition, since each unit of the content digitally stored on the Blockchain network can be 
programmed and auto-executed by the smart contract, and such execution is autonomous without 
middle parties, the properties of computational logic and peer-to-peer transmission thus can 
greatly prevent insider data breaches including both unintentional and intentional ones.  The 
following sections further illustrate how those properties of Blockchain can help to assist and 
advance information security defense.   
 
4.8.  Blockchain Helps Prevent External Hackers 
Although firms are increasingly spending more on developing better ways to protect 
information assets, hackers are becoming more sophisticated to break into the firms’ systems 
driven by their motivation of “profit.”  There is no end for such battle between firms and hackers 
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as both parties are constantly improving their skills to either defend or attack.  Hence, in order to 
prevent such data breaches, our economic society needs to reverse hackers’ motivation for 
hacking.  In the old security model, the system tries to lock out all of selfish and dishonest 
people.  On the other hand, Bitcoin in the Blockchain system welcomes everyone to fully act in 
their own self-interest and then the system uses their selfishness to secure the network.  The 
Blockchain, then, becomes more secure as more people participate in the network.  Hence, 
Bitcoin causes an attacker to be better off by playing along than by attacking it due to the 
bounded rationality, since the incentive systems in the Blockchain leads a lot of people to 
contribute resources towards the welfare of the system (Eyal et al. 2016).   
 
If we treat every online in-and-out activity of a firm as a transaction, the only way to 
confirm the absence of a transaction is to be aware of all transactions (Nakamoto 2008).  In other 
words, the new security model cannot rely on any single trusted entity, especially the firm itself, 
to be aware of one’s all transactions.  Instead, all transactions must be publicly announced; 
hence, everyone knows everyone else’s transactions including its capital and material flow.   
 
As monetary gain is the main focus in this paper for hackers’ motivation, thus hacking 
financial industry directly for profit is discussed first.  In a traditional online bank system, 
people’s financial assets (e.g., checking account, credit card, etc.) are protected, essentially 
hidden, by the bank’s information technology.  Online transactions with critical information are 
typically encrypted and securely transmitted over the Internet.  The servers of the bank system 
which stores customers’ financial information are also heavily guarded physically (e.g., security 
personnel and surveillance cameras) as well as virtually (e.g., firewall and intrusion detection 
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systems).  But JP Morgan was still compromised in 2014.  This is because once hackers 
successfully breached the bank systems and gain a control of the system, they could easily move 
funds to their desired destinations such as overseas.  Hence, the rational choice for such 
sophisticated hackers is to keep hacking; once they can see the “gold”, they will be able to move 
it.  If a certain mechanism can bound hackers’ rational choice by infinitely increasing the 
difficulty to move the “gold” even though they “see” it, then the hackers accordingly would have 
no incentive to attack those servers.  Fortunately, Blockchain technology can effectively build 
such “transparent” wall to protect the “gold”.  Hackers can attack the Bitcoin network or a 
certain node on the network; if they are successful, they may be able to see one’s Bitcoin 
account.  However, when they attempt to relocate the victim’s Bitcoins, they have to use the 
victim’s private key to sign the digital signature in order to broadcast the sending-money 
transaction message over the Bitcoin network.  This is different design from the traditional 
online bank, where a password is not required to move fund although it is needed to access one’ 
bank account.   
 
Moreover, most (if not all) digital wallets require two-factor authentication to access 
one’s Bitcoin account.  One’s private key can be stored in the digital wallet protected by a user 
defined password or simply be written on a paper secured by its owner physically.  As long as 
the private key is safely maintained, there is no way for hackers to move one’s Bitcoin even 
though his digital wallet is compromised.  Combined with current cutting-edge information 
security defense systems with Blockchain mechanism, the future financial industry can greatly 
increase the complexity to prevent a hacker’s attack and thereby better protect their customers’ 
financial assets.   
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In addition, in other industries, like music or software, the valuable digital assets stored 
on the Blockchain network can also prevent a hacker’s monetary gain indirectly.  In the 
traditional music industry, audio files (e.g., MP3) are stored in the company’s servers and 
centrally protected.  Hackers will be able to steal its music for profit as long as they successfully 
break into the company’s database.  Afterwards, the hacker will be able to duplicate the music 
and resale it for pirates.  Since the transaction history of stolen music is not complete, the music 
producer company cannot effectively take legal actions to accuse music pirates.  On the other 
hand, if the company stores its music on the Blockchain network, all music transactions will be 
recorded on the general ledger and the ownerships of the music are permanently written into the 
blocks.  Thereby, legal actions can be effectively utilized by the music producer if pirates occur.   
Accordingly, due to the fear of legal penalty, few people demand to pay such stolen 
music, and thus, supply will be reduced naturally.  Eventually, such hacking of information 
assets would be diminished over time.   
 
Furthermore, a hacker may be hired by a third party and thus gain profit by tampering 
with the sensitive data.  However, the distributed nature of Blockchain ensures the data stored on 
it cannot be altered.  Every node on the Blockchain network has a copy of the unpolluted data.  
Any modifications of the original data made by the hacker cannot be realized unless every node 
comes to the consent but nodes are synchronizing in real time.  Theoretically, hackers may be 
able to tamper the data when they can change the existing records of Blockchain on more than 
51% nodes at the same time.  Fortunately, verifying, changing, and modifying the records require 
a large amount of computing power due to the mathematical calculations, which also means the 
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electricity power; hence, it is most unlikely for a hacker to pay such huge effort to manipulate the 
sensitive data.  Accordingly, data integrity is secured through the Blockchain technology.   
 
Data availability is another aspect of information security.  In recent years, a new form of 
cyberattack, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), occurs frequently.  DDoS occurs when 
hackers flood the servers that run a target’s site with internet traffic until it stumbles or collapses 
under the overwhelming load.  On October 21, 2016, millions of internet users across the U.S. 
were not able to reach several major websites including Twitter, Netflix, Spotify, Airbnb, Reddit, 
Etsy, SoundCloud and The New York Times (Perlroth et al. 2016).  The reason was a massive 
DDoS attack that brought down the Domain Name Servers (DNS) of service provider Dyn, 
which supported major internet clients.  Particularly, millions of internet-connected devices (so 
called the Internet of Things), which were infected by malware due to their poor security 
features, were used as launchpads to flood Dyn’s servers.  Such DDoS attacks are profitable for 
hackers who demand ransom from the victims.  Interestingly, the Blockchain mechanism is very 
similar to the DDoS mechanism regarding their distributed nature.  Instead of using Internet of 
Things as attacking launchpads, those devices on the Blockchain may become defense modules.  
If the DDoS targeting servers are also distributed through the Blockchain network, the 
overwhelming traffic caused by the DDoS attack would be divided over the Blockchain network.  
Thus, no single server (i.e. no single point of failure) will be flooded as the traffic has been 
scattered.  Even if hackers are able to manage the DDoS attack for just targeting one or a few 
servers on the Blockchain at one time, the rest of servers, which are synchronizing in real time 
with one another, would be able to take turns to serve the company for its continuous use.      
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Lastly, Blockchain mechanism can also enhance current security countermeasures.  A 
traditional system alarm (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems) may not be sensitive enough to be 
triggered by a sophisticated hacker “quietly” cracking the protection system.  However, if such a 
defending system is employed over the Blockchain network, any bit changes of system 
components will be easily identified through the pre-stored hashing values on the Blockchain 
and thereby raise an alarm for the system administers to take appropriate actions immediately.  In 
addition, if multiple protection systems are used over the Blockchain network, the protection 
mechanism becomes robust and resistant for a hacker’s attack as illustrated in the DDoS attack.  
Therefore, the Blockchain technology does not only prevent an external hacker from cashing out 
the stolen data to undermine his motivation, but also complements current security 
countermeasures to enhance the defense system.  Thus, it greatly increases the complexity and 
difficulty with less incentives for a hacker to attack.  Limited by his bounded rationality, current 
information security models are greatly improved with the application of Blockchain technology.  
 
4.9.  Blockchain Helps Reduce Insider Breach 
Not all information systems are strong enough to prevent insider breach or intrusion if an 
insider betrayer colludes with an outsider intruder.  The ongoing PwC survey in the UK shows 
that 75% of information security breaches in large organizations were caused by human factors 
in 2015 (PwC 2015).  This figure is an increase from 58% compared with one year ago.  In 
addition, the Kroll Global Fraud Report shows that 79% of fraud is perpetrated by insiders (i.e., 
employees) rather than by external hackers (Kroll 2016).  The following discussion will explain 
how Blockchain can reduce insider data breaches due to employees’ ignorance of security 
policies and their malicious actions in the workplace. 
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The major motivation of an employee to not comply with the information security policy 
to protect his company information assets has been identified as time saving (Puhakainen and 
Ahonen 2006).  Employees feel frustrated when added security procedure slow down their work 
performance.  In the financial industry, Blockchain has greatly reduced the inefficiency of 
trading and settlements by eliminating middle parties (Catalini 2017).  In the supply chains 
industry, Blockchain has facilitated fast delivering and more efficient resource use for all partied 
involved in the supply chain systems (Casey and Wong 2017).  The efficiency improved by 
Blockchain technology can relieve employees from time pressure and thereby reduce such 
noncompliance due to time saving.  In addition, the programmable property of Blockchain can 
further prevent employees’ noncompliance as rules and policy can be embedded into the 
Blockchain through the smart contacts and thereby their working tasks cannot be complete 
unless they meet certain security-procedure conditions.   
 
On the other hand, when employees collude with external hackers to compromise the 
company’s digital assets or commit such malicious deeds by themselves for personal monetary 
gains, they essentially act like external hackers with more privilege of accessing the company’s 
digital assets.  Such an insider data breach may be the most difficult one to thwart as this Trojan-
horse employee is covered by his legitimate employee status.  Fortunately, all aforementioned 
benefits of using Blockchain for preventing hacking can still apply to such insider data breaches.  
In addition, smart contracts can program certain employees to perform a given set of tasks, as 
employees’ identity is known to the company and can be written into the smart contracts storing 
on the Blockchain network.  For example, an employee is given the privilege to edit a newly 
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produced music.  Although she/he has the access to copy/edit the music due to task requirement, 
she/he cannot obtain the ownership of this music as long as a smart contract is written to prevent 
such digital value transfer initiation.  Accordingly, such employee cannot cash out the stolen 
music without appropriate ownership although she/he may be able to take advantage of this 
music personally.  Therefore, combining the computational logic property of Blockchain 
technology with the Least Privilege Principle, a company can ensure that an employee is only 
able to perform the given tasks with tamper-resistant and predetermined privilege.  
Consequently, it is better off for an employee to obey the company’s information security policy 
due to his bounded rationality and thereby greatly reduces the insider data breaches.   
 
4.10.  Concerns of Blockchain 
As any other kinds of virtual currency, Bitcoin is challenging the traditional 
governmental control in our economic system.  It reduces the profit of banks and indirectly of 
government if the banks are owned by the government.  It increases the hardness of local 
government to trace its cash or money flows especially for the international transactions because 
all the blocks are encrypted and anonymous in the Blockchain in terms of owners’ identities.  
Hence, it may promote the illegal trades, like drug or human traffic between nations.   
 
In addition, Bitcoin can handle only seven transactions per second under its current 
network bandwidth allowance (BitcoinWiki 2017).  As a comparison, the VISA network can 
process more than 2,000 transactions per second.  The slow transaction speed may become an 
obstacle for Bitcoin being adopted widely.   
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Furthermore, its supporting infrastructure, Blockchain, is not immune to the worldwide 
natural disasters, especially those related to electronic power.  Compared with the traditional 
paper note or gold, Bitcoin is not valuable when there is no power or a power shortage.  
Similarly, Blockchain can be infected by a worldwide computer virus as well.  If some super-
smart hackers could write such worldwide malicious codes and inject it into the Internet, the 
Blockchain will be the best tools for him to spread out virus, especially when the majority of 
computers have been infected.  To illustrate, the another successful public Blockchain 
application, Ethereum, was hacked in 2016 for its DAO project due to a loophole in the 
programming code, although this is not the flaw of Blockchain mechanism (Vigna 2016).  
Hence, one needs to be caution about the risks involved in experimenting with Blockchain as its 
applications may still need some time to improve and perfect (Iansiti and Lakhani 2017).   
 
4.11.  Conclusions 
This conceptual article aims to introduce the Blockchain technology and discuss how 
such profound technology can help to assist and advance information security.  For decades, we 
have studied to build defense systems to prevent external hacking and enhance managerial 
policies to regulate employees’ data breach.  However, information security issues still remain as 
the top concerns in both practice and academy.  The fundamental design of our old security 
models leaves the opportunities and incentives for hackers and insiders to breach the information 
assets of a company.  We made lots of progress to prevent intruders from breaking into the 
systems and accessing valuable information, like “Defense in Depth” and data encryptions, but it 
also leaves a big blank after intruders have successfully hacked into the systems and gained a 
control of it.  The fundamental idea behind it is based on the trusted third party (e.g., 
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government, bank, corporation) to centralize control of our information assets because we 
believe they will have enough means to secure our data.  However, with the advanced 
information technology, a certain intruder or a certain group of intruders sooner or later will 
outperform those trusted third party to seek their own self-interests and harm the rest of the 
public.  The design of Blockchain has recognized the disadvantage of being controlled centrally 
(i.e., central point of failure), and hence, it creates a distributed ledger, which spreads across 
multiple sites, countries or institutions, and is typically public in the sense that anyone can view 
and audit it.  Everything that we own and everything that we do is governed by those big piles of 
records in the Blockchain instead of a central trusted entity.  Such radical design of Blockchain is 
controversial, disruptive, and breakthrough, but it is affecting a number of businesses to rethink 
their business models in the near future markets, especially the financial industry (Gupta and 
Knight 2017).   
 
Furthermore, relying on the theory of bounded rationality, this paper sheds light on how 
the application of Blockchain can complement and improve current information security defense 
models.  The information security research has switched from defending the products of hackers 
(e.g., computer virus) to hackers themselves, as destroy the leader and the gang will collapse.  
Such new focus leads information security companies (e.g., McAfee) to develop new defending 
systems to delay, trace, and identify hackers.  With the help of local law enforcement, 
information security has been greatly improved.  However, with the rapid development of new 
emerging technology (e.g., the Internet of Things), more and more international hackings and 
insider data breaches occur in the recent years.  It seems that the focus on catching intruders is no 
longer the most effective strategy, as they become more difficult to identify and harder to 
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prosecute by law.  Instead, we may need to defeat a hacker’s mind as one’s intention leads to his 
actual behavior according to the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991).  If a certain 
mechanism can effectively undermine hackers’ motivations for attack, hackers would have no 
incentives to commit the malicious deeds any more.  Humans are limited for the cognitive 
capacity of their minds and the time available for them to make the most optimal decision; thus, 
they often make a good enough practical decision under their bounded rational.  Through our 
illustrations in the paper, Blockchain is very suitable to support current information security 
models to dramatically increase the level of complexity of compromising information assets.  
Therefore, due to intruders’ bounded rationality, applications of Blockchain with current 
countermeasures can greatly assist and advance information security.  
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CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The central theme of this dissertation is about information security and compliance.  This 
dissertation consists of three essays where each essay investigates the different aspects of 
information security, and it is aimed to address the growing concern of securing a company’s 
information assets.   
 
The first essay constructed a game theoretical model to study the diversity in a hacker’s 
intrusion behaviors and the firm’s costs to investigate the abnormal activities.  This research 
filled the gap of uniformed hacker’s type in the existing literature and provided insights to 
explain the phenomenon of the increasing number of hackings, especially international 
cyberattacks.  It captured the natural interplay between a firm’s investigations and a hacker’s 
intrusions as a “cat and mouse” game; most importantly, it demonstrated that international 
hacking cannot be fully prevented, no matter what strategy a firm adopts as long as the cost of 
investigating data breaches exists.  This information provides some managerial insights for a 
firm to strategically allocate its resources to prevent inevitable intrusions and could improve the 
firm’s profits by treating security investments like costly insurance.  In addition, this study 
showed that the specific percentage of hackers who can be deterred under a certain level of 
heavy punishment.  In order to increase such a deterred percentage, firms are advised to 
continuously reduce monitoring cost and increase the precision of automated detection to 
minimize manual detection cost.  Lastly, this study can guide a firm to dynamically learn from its 
surrounding cyber-environment to incorporate the external signals (e.g., a newspaper report or 
other media channels) with its own historical data to better defend its information assets.   
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The second essay conducted a series of laboratory experiments to explore the other side 
of information security data breaches caused by insiders’ (e.g., employee) malicious deeds or 
noncompliance with information security policy.  This research aimed to design a realistic 
incentive structure to help a company to better protect its information assets.  It found that 
individual reward and punishment together with certainty is the best strategy for a company to 
regulate its employees’ noncompliance.  This finding suggests that, in the long run, a company 
shall always employ both means to achieve better regulating power, although it may cost the 
company some capital for rewarding.  Additionally, individual reward is always better than 
individual punishment for intensifying information security policy compliance.  It demonstrated 
that employee’s perception of security procedure is not in line with the company’s, as the 
employee wants more work done but the company wants more work done securely.  Modern 
fast-pace life style may make employees pursue more self-interests and short-run benefits.  
Hence, giving a reward for compliant behavior can align both parties’ interests.  Furthermore, the 
superior complementary effect between reward and punishment was always observed no matter 
in individual form or collective form.  Lastly, a company is also advised to avoid hiring risk-
loving, impulsive, and junior people (if possible) for the key positions which hold its critical 
information assets.  This is because those employees may pose a stronger threat to a company’s 
security defense and their compliance may not be easily improved by rewards or/and 
punishments no matter in what forms.   
 
After understanding both sides of information security, external hackers’ hacking 
behaviors as well as internal insiders’ noncompliance, the third essay introduced Blockchain 
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technology and discussed how such profound technology can help to prevent information 
breaches.  Instead of the old security models that store valuable information in the servers of 
trusted third parties, the design of Blockchain has recognized the disadvantage of being 
controlled centrally (i.e., central point of failure), and hence, it creates a distributed ledger, which 
spreads across multiple sites, countries or institutions, and is typically public in the sense that 
anyone can view and audit it.  This article also discussed the new transition that defeating 
intruders’ motivation of hacking can lead to their less malicious deeds.  Moreover, relying on the 
Theory of Bounded Rationality, this study illustrated how Blockchain technology can 
dramatically increase the level of complexity of compromising information assets and 
meanwhile undermine intruders’ motivation of monetary gains.  Accordingly, companies are 
advised to explore such breakthrough technology, Blockchain, with current information security 
countermeasures to better protect their information assets.   
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APPENDIX A.  30 SCENARIOS FOR INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY 
VIOLATIONS 
 
Scenario # 
[unknown 
to 
participants] 
Severity 
(token worth) 
[unknown to 
participants] 
Scenario Content and Decision-making Question 
[known to participant] 
Scenario 1 
Minor 
(1 tokens) 
Josh’s mentor Mary is worried about her job security and 
wanted to know if her position is among those that are being 
considered for elimination. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data?       
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 2 
Minor 
(2 tokens) 
Josh received an e-mail from his college professor who asked 
Josh to talk about the details of IT security management, which 
is considered confidential, in a seminar. 
Should Josh honor his professor’s request? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 3 
Major 
(27 tokens) 
Josh’s boss Christine wanted to know the compensation 
information of the top executives in the company. Josh could 
earn substantial favors from Christine. 
Should Josh access the secure server and get the data for 
Christine?  
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 4 
Major 
(19 tokens) 
Josh’s company is about to release quarterly earnings. If he can 
act early before the information is public, he could make a 
substantial profit on the stock market. 
Should Josh find out the earnings data and act accordingly?       
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 5 
Major 
(26 tokens) 
Jeff is an IT consultant Josh met at a seminar. Jeff wants a copy 
of the detailed computer network map of the company, and 
offers Josh a chance of making a substantial amount of money 
on a consulting project.        
Should Josh provide the map? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 6 
Major 
(22 tokens) 
Josh’s buddy Mike, who works in the sales department, wanted 
to know the prices of competitors for similar products to those 
he is selling, and promised to share commission.   
Should Josh access competitors’ computers and find the data?       
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 7 
Minor 
(1 tokens) 
Josh’s brother-in-law Kevin, who is a salesperson for a local 
firm, wanted to know if a particular type of material is used in 
the new product under development. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data?       
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No?       Yes? 
Scenario 8 
Major 
(21 tokens) 
At a dinner with friends, Josh was introduced to a stranger who 
asked if Josh knows the bidding price of a component from 
suppliers, and promised to share commission. 
Should Josh get the price for this stranger?    
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 9 
Major 
(26 tokens) 
Josh’s girlfriend Jenny, who works for a consulting firm, 
wanted to have some information about suppliers. Jenny could 
earn a substantial amount of commission. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data for 
Jenny? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 10 
Minor 
(4 tokens) 
Josh has invested a significant portion of his money in his 
company stock. The new product under development is going to 
have a significant impact on the stock price. 
Should Josh find internal documents about the new product?      
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 11 
Major 
(30 tokens) 
Josh’s mentor Mary was laid off due to downsizing. Josh is 
very upset about this and considering doing something to take 
revenge. 
Should Josh delete crucial computer files to vent his anger?     
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 12 
Major 
(17 tokens) 
Josh’s friend Mike, who works for an investment firm, wanted 
to know the quarterly earnings data before public release, and 
promised to share any profit from this data. 
Should Josh access the secure server and get the data for Mike? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 13 
Major 
(27 tokens) 
Josh has been upset about not receiving an anticipated salary 
increase in the last annual evaluation. He knows some 
underground websites offering to pay for credit card data. 
Should Josh sell customer credit card information?    
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 14 
Minor 
(8 tokens) 
Josh’s buddy Mike, who works for an investment firm, wanted 
to know how close a new product under development is in 
commercial production. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data?     
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 15 
Minor 
(1 tokens) 
Josh met Frank at an industry conference in Las Vegas. Frank 
asks Josh if he could give him the IP address of a highly 
protected computer server for testing. 
Should Josh find out the IP address for Frank?     
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 16 
Major 
(26 tokens) 
Josh belongs to a citizens’ group that advocates hiring local 
workers. The group wants Josh to provide some confidential 
evidence to support a lawsuit. Josh would share any settlement 
money if the group wins. 
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Should Josh provide the confidential data to the group?    
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 17 
Major 
(23 tokens) 
Josh’s brother-in-law Kevin, who is a salesperson for a local 
firm, wanted to get contract information of suppliers, and 
promised to share a substantial amount of commission.   
Should Josh get the information for Kevin? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 18 
Minor 
(8 tokens) 
Josh’s girlfriend Jenny, who works for a consulting firm, 
wanted to know whether one of her clients is involved in the 
new product development with his firm. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data?     
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 19 
Major 
(15 tokens) 
Josh met Frank at an industry conference in Las Vegas. Frank 
asks Josh if he could give him the IP address of a highly 
protected computer server for testing, and promises to help Josh 
find consulting work. 
Should Josh give Frank the information?      
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 20 
Major 
(20 tokens) 
Josh must complete a project by this Friday and one way to 
speed up the progress is to copy source code from other 
companies that he knows have done similar projects. 
Should Josh hack into a competitor’s computer and copy the 
code? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 21 
Minor 
(5 tokens) 
Josh’s best friend Eric, who works for a competitor, wanted to 
know whether a new product under development has certain 
features. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 22 
Major 
(27 tokens) 
Josh’s friend Julie, who is an HR manager, asks Josh to find the 
payroll information of peer companies for her benchmark study, 
and promises Josh to help in the future. 
Should Josh access the payroll data on peer companies’ 
servers?     
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 23 
Minor 
(2 tokens) 
Josh belongs to a citizens’ group that advocates hiring local 
workers. The group wanted to confirm whether Josh’s company 
is outsourcing jobs to offshore suppliers. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find it out?   
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 24 
Minor 
(8 tokens) 
The only way for Josh to meet the deadline this Friday is to 
bring some files home to work on his computer in the evenings, 
which is explicitly prohibited by the company. 
Should Josh bring the files home and work on his computer? 
No?       Yes? 
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Scenario 25 
Minor 
(5 tokens) 
Josh is not sure how much he should be asking for a salary raise 
or even if he should be asking at all given the financial situation 
of the company. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find more 
information?   
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 26 
Minor 
(4 tokens) 
Josh’s friend, Jane, works in the HR department as a payroll 
specialist. Jane asked Josh to change the payroll data file to 
erase the unpaid vacation hours she had taken. 
Should Josh make the changes on the server for Jane?   
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 27 
Major 
(16 tokens) 
Josh’s buddy Eric, who works for a competitor, wanted to get a 
critical design in the new product under development, and 
promises to pay a substantial amount of money. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data for Eric? 
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 28 
Minor 
(3 tokens) 
Josh’s boss Christine wanted to know about the executive 
compensation information of the company, which is 
confidential. 
Should Josh access the secure server and find the data?       
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 29 
Minor 
(4 tokens) 
At a dinner with friends Josh was introduced to a stranger who 
asked if Josh knows the price of a component for which Josh’s 
company is requesting bids from suppliers. 
Should Josh get the price on a secure server for this stranger?    
No?       Yes? 
Scenario 30 
Minor 
(2 tokens) 
Josh’s buddy Mike, who works in the sales department of the 
same company, wanted to know if another account manager in 
the company is about to close a major deal. 
Should Josh access the secure server and get the information?       
No?       Yes? 
 
*All 30 scenarios were adapted from Hu et al. (2015).   
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APPENDIX B.  EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
 
General Introduction 
Thank you for participating in this study, and please read the following instructions carefully. If 
you have any questions, do not hesitate to ask us. Aside from this, no communication is allowed 
during the experiment. 
 
This study is about information security and decision making. You MUST be least 18 years old 
to participate. This lab session is completely anonymous and will take approximately 45 minutes 
to complete. You will earn $10 on average and your final compensation may vary depending on 
your decisions made on the study tasks. Everything will be paid to you in cash/check 
immediately after the experiment. 
 
Now, you are given 500 endowment tokens to participate in this study and imagine that you are 
an employee, named Josh: [Core Instruction] 
Josh works for the IT department of a large global manufacturing company that 
supplies sophisticated electronic control instruments for civilian and military 
uses. Over the years Josh has developed knowledge and skills that enable him to 
access almost any computer and database in his company with or without 
authorization. 
 
131 
[Exp1C] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized 
access, copy, transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-
confidential data. 
 
Josh has been working on multiple projects recently, some with deadlines in one 
or two weeks. Josh is under tremendous pressure to meet the deadlines of his 
boss. Josh is also financially stressed and he is behind in some payments for his 
bills and credit cards. For each of the given circumstances, Josh will gain some 
benefits from 0 to 30 tokens if he chooses to do things that are favorable to him or 
his friends. The more severe of the scenarios, the more profits Josh would obtain. 
 
For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all 
subsequent screens of this study. 
 
Again, imagine that you are Josh and complete a number of scenario-based tasks on 
behalf of Josh on the following screens. Josh’s final income of tokens from the 
experiment will be converted to dollars and given to you at the end of the study. The 
exchange rate is 100 tokens = $1.3. 
 
Now, please write down the three-digit random number which is given to you in the 
beginning of the study to start the lab: ______________________________ 
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Interventions for Experiment 1-4  
All other is the same as illustrated above except for the paragraph labeled as “[Exp1C]”.  The 
rest treatments of our four experiments are listed as the followings: 
 
[Exp1R] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately established a new policy to give 10 tokens to those employees who are protecting 
the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp1P] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately established a new policy to deduct 10 tokens from those employees who are not 
protecting the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp1RP] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately established a new policy to give 10 tokens to those employees who are protecting 
the company’s information assets, but deduct 10 tokens from those employees who are not 
protecting the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp2R] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
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company lately established a new policy to give 10 tokens to all employees only when all 
employees are protecting the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp2P] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately established a new policy to deduct 10 tokens from all employees as long as 
someone is not protecting the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp2RP] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately established a new policy to give 10 tokens to all employees only when all 
employees are protecting the company’s information assets, but deduct 10 tokens from all 
employees as long as someone is not protecting the company’s information assets for each 
circumstance. 
 
[Exp3C] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. 
 
[Exp3R] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
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they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
to give 10 tokens to those selected employees who are protecting the company’s information 
assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp3P] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
to deduct 10 tokens from those selected employees who are not protecting the company’s 
information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp3RP] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
to give 10 tokens to those selected employees who are protecting the company’s information 
assets, but deduct 10 tokens from those selected employees who are not protecting the company’s 
information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp4R] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
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to give 10 tokens to all employees only when all selected employees are protecting the 
company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp4P] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
to deduct 10 tokens from all employees as long as someone among the selected employees is not 
protecting the company’s information assets for each circumstance. 
 
[Exp4RP] The company has explicit and strict policies against any unauthorized access, copy, 
transfer, or use of its digital assets, including confidential or non-confidential data. The 
company lately installed a detecting system which will inspect 20% of its employees to check if 
they are protecting its information assets. In addition, the company also established a new policy 
to give 10 tokens to all employees only when all selected employees are protecting the 
company’s information assets, but deduct 10 tokens from all employees as long as someone 
among the selected employees is not protecting the company’s information assets for each 
circumstance. 
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APPENDIX C.  DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
Experiment 1    
In this experiment, we simply examine how reward and punishment influence participants’ 
decision making.  A 2 x 2 factorial design is presented here, 
 
Control group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each scenario, oTree records 
their choices.  In addition, participants are informed that they have a chance to earn an additional 
0 to 30 tokens if they choose “Yes”.   
 
Reward only group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each scenario, oTree 
adds 10 tokens if the subject chooses “No”.  No tokens are given to those subjects who choose 
“Yes”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to 
those subjects who choose “Yes”.   
 
Punishment only group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each scenario, oTree 
deducts 10 tokens if the subject chooses “Yes”.  No tokens are given to those subjects who 
choose “No”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still 
applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes”.   
 
Reward & Punishment group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each scenario, 
oTree adds 10 tokens if the subject chooses “No” and deducts 10 tokens if the subject chooses 
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“Yes”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to 
those subjects who choose “Yes”.   
 
Experiment 2 
In this experiment, we introduce the Collective Sanctions (rewarding all or punishing all) to 
compare the results with Experiment 1’s.  Since the Collective Sanctions only exist when main 
treatments (Reward or Punishment) are given, there is no control group in this experiment.   
 
Collective Reward only group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each scenario, 
oTree adds 10 tokens to every subject only when no subjects choose “Yes”.  No tokens are given 
to subjects under any other circumstances.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as 
aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes”.   
 
Collective Punishment only group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each 
scenario, oTree deducts 10 tokens from every subject as long as there are subjects choosing 
“Yes”.  No tokens will be given to subjects under any other circumstances.  Additionally, the 
chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose 
“Yes”.   
 
Collective Reward & Punishment group.  oTree presents subjects with all 30 scenarios.  For each 
scenario, oTree adds 10 tokens to every subject only when no subjects choose “Yes.”  oTree 
deducts 10 tokens from every subject as long as there are subjects choosing “Yes”.  Additionally, 
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the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who 
choose “Yes”.   
 
Experiment 3 
In this experiment, we examine how reward and punishment influence participants’ decision 
making when there is uncertainty that only 20% of them will be inspected.  Another 2 x 2 
factorial design is presented here, 
 
Control with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have made their decisions, 
the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine their choices.  Those 
examined participants are informed that their decisions are captured by the “company”, but no 
tokens are taken from or given to those selected participants.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 
to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” whether 
they are selected or not.   
 
Reward only with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have made their 
decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine their choices.  
oTree adds 10 tokens to the selected ones if they choose “No”.  No tokens are given to those 
selected subjects who choose “Yes”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as 
aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” whether they are selected 
or not.   
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Punishment only with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have made their 
decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine their choices.  
oTree deducts 10 tokens from the selected ones if they choose “Yes”.  No tokens are given to 
those selected subjects who choose “No”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as 
aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” whether they are selected 
or not.   
 
Reward & Punishment with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have made 
their decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine their 
choices.  oTree adds 10 tokens to the selected ones if they choose “No” and deducts 10 tokens 
from the selected ones if they choose “Yes”.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as 
aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” whether they are selected 
or not.   
 
Experiment 4 
In this experiment, we introduce the Collective Sanctions (rewarding all or punishing all) again 
based on Experiment 3.  Since the Collective Sanctions only exist when main treatments 
(Reward or Punishment) are given, there is no control group in this experiment, either. 
 
Collective Reward only with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have made 
their decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine their 
choices.  oTree adds 10 tokens to everyone, including non-selected subjects, if no selected 
subjects choose “Yes”.  No tokens are given to subjects under any other circumstances.  
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Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to those 
subjects who choose “Yes” whether they are selected or not.   
 
Collective Punishment only with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects have 
made their decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to examine 
their choices.  oTree deducts 10 tokens from everyone, including non-selected subjects, if one or 
more selected subjects choose “Yes”.  No tokens are given to subjects under any other 
circumstances.  Additionally, the chance to gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still 
applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” whether they are selected or not.   
 
Collective Reward & Punishment with Inspection group.  For each scenario, after all subjects 
have made their decisions, the oTree software randomly selects 20% of the participants to 
examine their choices.  oTree adds 10 tokens to everyone, including non-selected subjects, if no 
selected subjects choose “Yes” or oTree deducts 10 tokens from everyone, including non-
selected subjects, if one or more selected subjects choose “Yes”.  Additionally, the chance to 
gain 0 to 30 tokens as aforementioned is still applicable to those subjects who choose “Yes” 
whether they are selected or not.   
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APPENDIX D.  BRIEF QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DEMOGRAPHIC AND PERSONAL 
CHARACTERISTIC VARIABLES 
 
Section I: (please check one) 
 
Age 
 
o ______ 
 
o No Answer 
Class 
 
o Freshman 
o Sophomore 
o Junior 
o Senior 
o No Answer 
Gender 
 
o Male 
o Female 
o Other_________ 
o No Answer 
 
GPA 
o 2.0 – 2.5 
o 2.6 – 2.9 
o 3.0 – 3.5 
o 3.6 – 4.0 
o No Answer 
Dominant 
hand 
o Right 
o Left 
o No Answer 
Primary 
ethnicity/race 
o White 
o Hispanic or Latino 
o Black or African 
American 
o Asian/Pacific Islander 
o Other ________ 
o No Answer 
Major 
 
o Accounting 
o Finance 
o Marketing 
o Management 
o MIS 
o SCM 
o Other _________ 
Organizational 
Experience 
o Full-time employee 
o Part-time employee 
o Student Internship 
o Never worked 
 
Computer 
Skills 
o Personal use only 
o Microsoft Office 
skills 
o Programming 
o Hardware and 
software 
o Advanced knowledge 
Average hours 
of using 
computers per 
day 
o < 3 (Specify: ______) 
o 3 
o 4 
o 5 
o > 6 (Specify: ______) 
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Section II*: (please circle the numbers) 
 
1-Strongly Disagree                                    4-Neutral                                                  7-Strongly Agree 
IP1 I often act on the spur of the moment without stopping to 
think. 
1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
IP2 I don’t devote much thought and effort to preparing for 
the future. 
1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
IP3 I often do whatever brings me pleasure here and now, 
even at the cost of some distant goal. 
1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
IP4 I'm more concerned with what happens to me in the short 
run than in the long run. 
1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
RS1 I like to test myself every now and then by doing 
something a little risky. 
1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
RS2 Sometimes I will take a risk just for the fun of it. 1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
RS3 I sometimes find it exciting to do things for which I 
might get in trouble. 
1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
RS4 Excitement and adventure are more important to me than 
security. 
1     2     3     4      5     6     7 
Key: IP—Impulsivity and RS—Risk taking 
(* the order of the questions in this section II was randomly presented to subjects) 
Above survey questions were also adapted from Hu et al. (2015).   
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Section III: (please mark the boxes) 
For each of the ten paired lottery choices in the following table, please check the box next to 
your preferred option, either Option A or Option B.  Imagine throwing a ten-sided die.  Each 
outcome (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) is equally likely.  For instance, if you choose Option A in 
the Row No. 1 shown below, you will have a 1 in 10 chance of earning $2.00 and a 9 in 10 
chance of earning $1.60.  Similarly, Option B of Row No. 1 offers a 1 in 10 chance of earning 
$3.85 and a 9 in 10 chance of earning $0.10.  Please keep in mind that as you move down the 
table, the chances of the higher payoff for each Option A or B increases.   
 
Row 
Number 
Option A Option B 
1 
$2.00 if the die’s number is 1 
$1.60 if the die’s number is 2-10 
☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 2-10 
☐ 
2 
$2.00 if the die’s number is 1-2 
$1.60 if the die’s number is 3-10 
☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-2 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 3-10 
☐ 
3 
$2.00 if the die’s number is 1-3 
$1.60 if the die’s number is 4-10 
☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-3 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 4-10 
☐ 
4 
$2.00 if the die’s number is 1-4 
$1.60 if the die’s number is 5-10 
☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-4 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 5-10 
☐ 
5 
$2.00 if the die’s number is 1-5 
$1.60 if the die’s number is 6-10 
☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-5 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 6-10 
☐ 
6 
$2.00 if the die’s number is 1-6 
$1.60 if the die’s number is 7-10 
☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-6 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 7-10 
☐ 
7 
$2.00 if the die’s number is 1-7 
$1.60 if the die’s number is 8-10 
☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-7 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 8-10 
☐ 
8 
$2.00 if the die’s number is 1-8 
$1.60 if the die’s number is 9-10 
☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-8 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 9-10 
☐ 
9 
$2.00 if the die’s number is 1-9 
$1.60 if the die’s number is 10 
☐ 
$3.85 if the die’s number is 1-9 
$0.10 if the die’s number is 10 
☐ 
10 $2.00 if the die’s number is 1-10 ☐ $3.85 if the die’s number is 1-10 ☐ 
 
Above Risk Aversion measurement was adapted from Holt and Laury (2002).  
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APPENDIX E.  TIME SERIES AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL (AR=1) DATA-ANALYSIS 
RESULT 
 
91-DCR ar1.coef ar1.p-value ar1.se ar1.t-ratio const.coef const.p-value const.se const.t-ratio 
Exp1P-Exp1C -0.0940 0.6461 0.2046 -0.4592 0.0261 0.2097 0.0208 1.2544 
Exp1R-Exp1C 0.0934 0.6238 0.1904 0.4905 0.1014 0.0000 0.0227 4.4614 
Exp1RP-Exp1C -0.0390 0.8389 0.1920 -0.2033 0.1934 0.0000 0.0169 11.4298 
Exp2P-Exp1C 0.0224 0.9063 0.1898 0.1178 -0.0915 0.0000 0.0184 -4.9665 
Exp2R-Exp1C 0.1660 0.3822 0.1899 0.8739 -0.1502 0.0000 0.0258 -5.8109 
Exp2RP-Exp1C 0.2137 0.2468 0.1845 1.1581 0.0158 0.4653 0.0217 0.7301 
Exp3C-Exp1C 0.1019 0.5899 0.1890 0.5390 -0.0376 0.0153 0.0155 -2.4258 
Exp3P-Exp1C 0.2402 0.1802 0.1792 1.3401 -0.0874 0.0028 0.0293 -2.9839 
Exp3R-Exp1C 0.3486 0.0388 0.1687 2.0663 0.0353 0.2129 0.0284 1.2456 
Exp3RP-Exp1C 0.3347 0.0469 0.1685 1.9868 0.0220 0.3688 0.0245 0.8987 
Exp4P-Exp1C 0.0943 0.6117 0.1858 0.5077 -0.1229 0.0000 0.0242 -5.0728 
Exp4R-Exp1C 0.0751 0.6779 0.1808 0.4154 0.0632 0.0003 0.0176 3.5829 
Exp4RP-Exp1C 0.2441 0.1621 0.1746 1.3982 0.0574 0.0184 0.0244 2.3568 
Exp1R-Exp1P -0.3320 0.0606 0.1769 -1.8765 0.0745 0.0000 0.0096 7.7173 
Exp1RP-Exp1P -0.0937 0.6174 0.1876 -0.4995 0.1671 0.0000 0.0146 11.4299 
Exp2P-Exp1P -0.1017 0.6176 0.2037 -0.4993 -0.1185 0.0000 0.0178 -6.6590 
Exp2R-Exp1P 0.0771 0.7134 0.2099 0.3673 -0.1789 0.0000 0.0288 -6.2226 
Exp2RP-Exp1P 0.2153 0.3300 0.2210 0.9741 -0.0137 0.6350 0.0289 -0.4746 
Exp3C-Exp1P -0.2580 0.1763 0.1908 -1.3524 -0.0630 0.0000 0.0137 -4.5965 
Exp3P-Exp1P 0.2448 0.2557 0.2153 1.1366 -0.1174 0.0003 0.0327 -3.5918 
Exp3R-Exp1P 0.2373 0.2366 0.2005 1.1836 0.0052 0.8768 0.0336 0.1550 
Exp3RP-Exp1P 0.1975 0.3432 0.2084 0.9478 -0.0075 0.7766 0.0265 -0.2838 
Exp4P-Exp1P -0.1816 0.3887 0.2107 -0.8619 -0.1503 0.0000 0.0168 -8.9335 
Exp4R-Exp1P 0.0270 0.8945 0.2039 0.1326 0.0358 0.1314 0.0238 1.5085 
Exp4RP-Exp1P 0.1842 0.3630 0.2025 0.9097 0.0284 0.2677 0.0256 1.1083 
Exp1RP-Exp1R -0.0430 0.8115 0.1805 -0.2385 0.0930 0.0000 0.0125 7.4217 
Exp2P-Exp1R 0.1445 0.4410 0.1875 0.7705 -0.1922 0.0000 0.0214 -8.9951 
Exp2R-Exp1R 0.1381 0.4817 0.1962 0.7036 -0.2523 0.0000 0.0284 -8.8950 
Exp2RP-Exp1R 0.3026 0.1197 0.1944 1.5561 -0.0872 0.0031 0.0294 -2.9624 
Exp3C-Exp1R -0.0094 0.9596 0.1859 -0.0506 -0.1384 0.0000 0.0156 -8.8790 
Exp3P-Exp1R 0.2814 0.1552 0.1979 1.4215 -0.1905 0.0000 0.0298 -6.3989 
Exp3R-Exp1R 0.3379 0.0631 0.1818 1.8588 -0.0688 0.0434 0.0341 -2.0194 
Exp3RP-Exp1R 0.4233 0.0175 0.1781 2.3771 -0.0833 0.0043 0.0291 -2.8578 
Exp4P-Exp1R 0.0113 0.9542 0.1969 0.0575 -0.2244 0.0000 0.0181 -12.3837 
Exp4R-Exp1R 0.2469 0.1841 0.1859 1.3284 -0.0391 0.1213 0.0252 -1.5492 
Exp4RP-Exp1R 0.2913 0.1134 0.1840 1.5830 -0.0462 0.0656 0.0251 -1.8408 
Exp2P-Exp1RP 0.1397 0.4605 0.1893 0.7379 -0.2848 0.0000 0.0210 -13.5599 
Exp2R-Exp1RP 0.1305 0.5015 0.1941 0.6722 -0.3450 0.0000 0.0305 -11.3192 
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Exp2RP-Exp1RP 0.5656 0.0012 0.1740 3.2495 -0.1802 0.0000 0.0379 -4.7615 
Exp3C-Exp1RP -0.2805 0.1080 0.1745 -1.6070 -0.2306 0.0000 0.0114 -20.2704 
Exp3P-Exp1RP 0.3527 0.0609 0.1882 1.8740 -0.2831 0.0000 0.0341 -8.3019 
Exp3R-Exp1RP 0.4387 0.0106 0.1717 2.5554 -0.1618 0.0000 0.0378 -4.2748 
Exp3RP-Exp1RP 0.3923 0.0268 0.1771 2.2148 -0.1745 0.0000 0.0283 -6.1705 
Exp4P-Exp1RP 0.1197 0.5327 0.1919 0.6239 -0.3169 0.0000 0.0231 -13.7227 
Exp4R-Exp1RP 0.0405 0.8325 0.1917 0.2115 -0.1307 0.0000 0.0192 -6.8161 
Exp4RP-Exp1RP 0.3648 0.0380 0.1759 2.0744 -0.1393 0.0000 0.0252 -5.5341 
Exp2R-Exp2P 0.0995 0.5945 0.1869 0.5323 -0.0601 0.0004 0.0170 -3.5461 
Exp2RP-Exp2P 0.0219 0.9085 0.1906 0.1150 0.1064 0.0000 0.0155 6.8798 
Exp3C-Exp2P 0.0632 0.7593 0.2064 0.3064 0.0535 0.0005 0.0154 3.4774 
Exp3P-Exp2P 0.1735 0.3598 0.1895 0.9158 0.0024 0.9044 0.0200 0.1202 
Exp3R-Exp2P 0.2483 0.1820 0.1860 1.3347 0.1242 0.0000 0.0197 6.3006 
Exp3RP-Exp2P 0.1086 0.5717 0.1920 0.5655 0.1123 0.0000 0.0152 7.3895 
Exp4P-Exp2P -0.0843 0.6400 0.1803 -0.4677 -0.0320 0.0035 0.0110 -2.9166 
Exp4R-Exp2P -0.3260 0.0625 0.1750 -1.8628 0.1560 0.0000 0.0107 14.5218 
Exp4RP-Exp2P 0.0365 0.8578 0.2035 0.1792 0.1491 0.0000 0.0161 9.2911 
Exp2RP-Exp2R -0.3481 0.0405 0.1699 -2.0490 0.1678 0.0000 0.0130 12.8766 
Exp3C-Exp2R 0.3907 0.0495 0.1989 1.9642 0.1099 0.0003 0.0307 3.5788 
Exp3P-Exp2R -0.0117 0.9500 0.1869 -0.0626 0.0638 0.0000 0.0147 4.3342 
Exp3R-Exp2R -0.0565 0.7657 0.1896 -0.2980 0.1871 0.0000 0.0170 10.9957 
Exp3RP-Exp2R -0.0624 0.7464 0.1928 -0.3234 0.1738 0.0000 0.0168 10.3283 
Exp4P-Exp2R -0.0371 0.8394 0.1832 -0.2026 0.0282 0.0596 0.0150 1.8837 
Exp4R-Exp2R -0.1273 0.4925 0.1855 -0.6864 0.2154 0.0000 0.0179 12.0212 
Exp4RP-Exp2R -0.1114 0.5783 0.2004 -0.5558 0.2106 0.0000 0.0197 10.6663 
Exp3C-Exp2RP 0.2993 0.1337 0.1995 1.4997 -0.0536 0.0343 0.0253 -2.1168 
Exp3P-Exp2RP -0.1820 0.3025 0.1766 -1.0310 -0.1028 0.0000 0.0153 -6.7187 
Exp3R-Exp2RP 0.1248 0.4924 0.1819 0.6864 0.0196 0.2198 0.0160 1.2272 
Exp3RP-Exp2RP 0.0976 0.5989 0.1855 0.5259 0.0064 0.7024 0.0167 0.3821 
Exp4P-Exp2RP -0.1573 0.3871 0.1819 -0.8649 -0.1391 0.0000 0.0148 -9.3904 
Exp4R-Exp2RP 0.1071 0.5594 0.1835 0.5837 0.0480 0.0063 0.0176 2.7311 
Exp4RP-Exp2RP 0.2277 0.2550 0.2000 1.1382 0.0415 0.0372 0.0199 2.0841 
Exp3P-Exp3C 0.3831 0.0408 0.1873 2.0459 -0.0497 0.1206 0.0320 -1.5523 
Exp3R-Exp3C 0.4513 0.0080 0.1702 2.6510 0.0723 0.0307 0.0334 2.1612 
Exp3RP-Exp3C 0.4556 0.0089 0.1742 2.6156 0.0591 0.0107 0.0232 2.5507 
Exp4P-Exp3C 0.1687 0.4068 0.2034 0.8295 -0.0846 0.0000 0.0197 -4.2925 
Exp4R-Exp3C -0.0780 0.6808 0.1896 -0.4114 0.1006 0.0000 0.0162 6.1939 
Exp4RP-Exp3C 0.2060 0.2509 0.1794 1.1482 0.0949 0.0000 0.0187 5.0871 
Exp3R-Exp3P -0.1559 0.3878 0.1805 -0.8636 0.1232 0.0000 0.0127 9.6684 
Exp3RP-Exp3P -0.1538 0.4024 0.1837 -0.8373 0.1098 0.0000 0.0140 7.8167 
Exp4P-Exp3P 0.0416 0.8294 0.1928 0.2155 -0.0353 0.0118 0.0140 -2.5166 
Exp4R-Exp3P -0.1309 0.4727 0.1822 -0.7181 0.1511 0.0000 0.0169 8.9620 
Exp4RP-Exp3P -0.1726 0.3754 0.1947 -0.8865 0.1465 0.0000 0.0157 9.3457 
Exp3RP-Exp3R 0.1468 0.4104 0.1783 0.8233 -0.0133 0.4516 0.0177 -0.7527 
Exp4P-Exp3R 0.0651 0.7287 0.1876 0.3468 -0.1580 0.0000 0.0179 -8.8461 
146 
Exp4R-Exp3R 0.1863 0.2945 0.1777 1.0482 0.0286 0.1144 0.0181 1.5786 
Exp4RP-Exp3R 0.1736 0.3486 0.1852 0.9374 0.0225 0.2492 0.0195 1.1522 
Exp4P-Exp3RP -0.0864 0.6500 0.1904 -0.4537 -0.1457 0.0000 0.0134 -10.9140 
Exp4R-Exp3RP 0.0069 0.9697 0.1804 0.0380 0.0415 0.0017 0.0132 3.1321 
Exp4RP-Exp3RP -0.1822 0.3221 0.1840 -0.9901 0.0367 0.0005 0.0105 3.4925 
Exp4R-Exp4P -0.3100 0.0742 0.1737 -1.7853 0.1879 0.0000 0.0135 13.8946 
Exp4RP-Exp4P -0.1850 0.3541 0.1997 -0.9266 0.1829 0.0000 0.0140 13.0703 
Exp4RP-Exp4R -0.0566 0.7617 0.1866 -0.3033 -0.0050 0.7335 0.0146 -0.3405 
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APPENDIX F.  SUMMARY OF KEY NOTATIONS 
 
Notation Description 
𝜃𝐻 Hacker’s type 
𝑆𝐻 Hacker’s strategy space 
𝑆𝐹 Firm’s strategy space 
𝑠𝐻 Hacker’s strategy action 
𝑠𝐹 Firm’s strategy action 
𝑈𝐻 Hacker’s payoff 
𝑈𝐹 Firm’s payoff 
𝑐 Cost of monitoring intrusion behaviors 
𝑐𝐷 Cost of investigating a domestic hacker including monitor cost 
𝑐𝐼 Cost of investigating an international hacker including 
monitor cost 
𝑑 The damage of firm by an uninvestigated intrusion 
𝜙 Fraction of damage recovered by an investigation process 
𝜇 Benefit of hacker for intrusions 
𝛽𝐷 Expected penalty of a domestic hacker for intrusions 
𝛽𝐼 Expected penalty of an international hacker for intrusions 
𝑞 Prior of firm to believe that hacker is domestic 
𝑤(𝜃𝐻) Cost of investigating hacker 𝜃𝐻 including monitor cost 
𝑔(𝜃𝐻) Expected penalty of hacker 𝜃𝐻 for intrusions 
?̅?𝐻 Marginal hacker who is indifferent between NOT hacking and 
hacking 
𝑓(𝜃𝐻) Probability density function over hacker’s type 𝜃𝐻 
𝜏𝑖 The time point of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ simultaneous game 
𝑞𝑖 Belief of firm that hacker is domestic in the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ game 
𝜀𝑖 External signal, indicating the strength/frequency of domestic 
hacking over all intrusions during time period (𝜏𝑖, 𝜏𝑖+1) 
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APPENDIX G.  IRB APPROVAL LETTERS AND CONSENT FORM 
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